messages from 2019-02-28 22:44:31 to 2019-03-12 21:24:06 UTC [more...]
[PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing
2019-03-12 21:24 UTC (12+ messages)
[GIT PULL] apparmor updates for v5.1
2019-03-12 12:23 UTC
[PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2
2019-03-12 1:52 UTC (40+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when "
` [PATCH 05/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
` [PATCH 08/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH 10/27] uswsusp: "
` [PATCH 11/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH 12/27] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH 13/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection "
` [PATCH 18/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when "
` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH 20/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH 21/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH 23/27] Lock down kprobes
` [PATCH 24/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down perf
` [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 27/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
[PATCH 1/1] smack: removal of global rule list
2019-03-11 21:05 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 0/3] selftest/ima: fail kexec_load syscall
2019-03-11 19:20 UTC (12+ messages)
` [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
[PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions
2019-03-11 18:38 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 2/2] "
[GIT PULL] security: tpm subsystem updates for v5.1
2019-03-11 15:55 UTC (2+ messages)
kernel panic: MAC Initialization failed. (3)
2019-03-11 13:45 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH] secuirty: integrity: ima: pedantic formatting
2019-03-11 13:44 UTC
Inquiry March-2019
2019-03-09 9:50 UTC
[GIT PULL] security: integrity subsystem updates for v5.1
2019-03-08 22:44 UTC
[PATCH 0/3] selftest/ima: add kexec_file_load test
2019-03-08 13:45 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH 2/3] scripts/ima: define a set of common functions
[PATCH 0/1] RFC: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY
2019-03-08 13:29 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/1] RFC: initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK
[PATCH v2 0/2] RFC: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY
2019-03-08 13:27 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK
` [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP
[PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
2019-03-07 22:45 UTC (6+ messages)
[GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.1
2019-03-07 20:55 UTC (2+ messages)
[GIT PULL] security subsystem changes for v5.1
2019-03-07 20:55 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH v2 00/20] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns
2019-03-07 20:25 UTC (18+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading
` [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()
[RFC PATCH 0/2] Create CAAM HW key in linux keyring and use in dmcrypt
2019-03-07 13:17 UTC (7+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 1/2] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
` [RFC PATCH 2/2] dm-crypt: Use any key type which is registered
[PATCH 1/1] Smack :- In this patch, global rule list has been removed. Now all smack rules will be read using "smack_known_list". This list contains all the smack labels and internally each smack label structure maintains the list of smack rules corresponding to that smack label. So there is no need to maintain extra list
2019-03-07 9:23 UTC
[PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent
2019-03-07 9:01 UTC (6+ messages)
[PATCH] security: keys: Kconfig: pedantic cleanup
2019-03-06 18:57 UTC
[PATCH] vfs: Move kernel_read_file() to fs/read_write.c
2019-03-05 23:18 UTC
[PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions
2019-03-05 15:46 UTC (8+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 2/2] "
` [PATCH v4 1/2] "
` [PATCH v5 "
[PATCH] keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
2019-03-05 7:41 UTC (4+ messages)
[PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches
2019-03-04 22:10 UTC (44+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when "
` [PATCH 05/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
` [PATCH 08/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH 10/27] uswsusp: "
` [PATCH 11/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH 12/27] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH 13/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection "
` [PATCH 18/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when "
` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH 20/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH 21/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH 23/27] Lock down kprobes
` [PATCH 24/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down perf
` [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 27/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
overlayfs access checks on underlying layers
2019-03-04 19:21 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH] vfs: Move kernel_read_file() to fs/read_write.c
2019-03-04 16:49 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH 00/43] VFS: Introduce filesystem context
2019-03-03 2:53 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH 15/43] vfs: Add configuration parser helpers
[PATCH] LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
2019-03-01 17:54 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking
2019-03-01 17:06 UTC (12+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
` [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure
` [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
[PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking
2019-02-28 22:43 UTC (12+ messages)
` [PATCH 84/97] Netlabel: Add a secattr comparison API function
` [PATCH 85/97] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on the ambient domain
` [PATCH 89/97] Netlabel: Return the labeling type on socket
` [PATCH 90/97] "
` [PATCH 91/97] "
` [PATCH 92/97] LSM: Remember the NLTYPE of netlabel sockets
` [PATCH 93/97] Smack: Use the NLTYPE on output
` [PATCH 94/97] LSM: Hook for netlabel reconciliation
` [PATCH 95/97] LSM: Avoid network conflicts in SELinux and Smack
` [PATCH 96/97] LSM: Apply Netlabel consitancy checks on send and connect
` [PATCH 97/97] Smack: Remove the exclusive bit
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