messages from 2019-04-23 19:17:48 to 2019-05-02 14:11:08 UTC [more...]
[PATCH 1/2] apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches
2019-05-02 14:10 UTC (8+ messages)
[RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation
2019-05-02 11:35 UTC (39+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: add X86_FEATURE_SCI
` [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation
` [RFC PATCH 3/7] x86/entry/64: add infrastructure for switching to isolated syscall context
` [RFC PATCH 4/7] x86/sci: hook up isolated system call entry and exit
` [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification
` [RFC PATCH 6/7] security: enable system call isolation in kernel config
` [RFC PATCH 7/7] sci: add example system calls to exercse SCI
[PATCH 1/2 v2] efi: add a function to convert the status value to string
2019-05-02 9:04 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 2/2 v3] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems
2019-05-02 8:32 UTC (8+ messages)
` [PATCH V5 2/4] tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table
[PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
2019-05-02 8:27 UTC (3+ messages)
[GIT PULL] keys: Namespacing
2019-05-01 17:18 UTC (3+ messages)
[RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
2019-05-01 15:18 UTC (4+ messages)
[PULL] Smack: Repair for 5.2 build issue
2019-04-30 21:29 UTC
[PATCH V32 0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2
2019-04-30 19:19 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH V32 22/27] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
[GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.1 (#3)
2019-04-30 18:25 UTC (2+ messages)
[PULL] Smack: one more change for 5.2
2019-04-30 16:08 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH 00/11] keys: Namespacing [ver #2]
2019-04-30 15:08 UTC (12+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/11] keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys "
` [PATCH 02/11] keys: Kill off request_key_async{, _with_auxdata} "
` [PATCH 03/11] keys: Simplify key description management "
` [PATCH 04/11] keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation "
` [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches "
` [PATCH 06/11] keys: Namespace keyring names "
` [PATCH 07/11] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace "
` [PATCH 08/11] keys: Include target namespace in match criteria "
` [PATCH 09/11] keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed "
` [PATCH 10/11] keys: Network namespace domain tag "
` [PATCH 11/11] keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism "
[PATCH 1/3] selinux: Check address length before reading address family
2019-04-29 20:21 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH 2/3] smack: "
` [PATCH 3/3] tomoyo: "
[PATCH] tomoyo: Change pathname calculation for read-only filesystems
2019-04-29 20:07 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH (resend)] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing
2019-04-29 20:07 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials
2019-04-29 13:57 UTC (4+ messages)
Zdravstvuyte! Vas interesuyut kliyentskiye bazy dannykh?
2019-04-27 15:00 UTC
[PATCH v6 00/24] x86: text_poke() fixes and executable lockdowns
2019-04-27 10:32 UTC (27+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 01/24] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()"
` [PATCH v6 02/24] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init
` [PATCH v6 03/24] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs
` [PATCH v6 04/24] x86/mm: Save debug registers when loading a temporary mm
` [PATCH v6 05/24] uprobes: Initialize uprobes earlier
` [PATCH v6 06/24] fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm
` [PATCH v6 07/24] x86/alternative: Initialize temporary mm for patching
` [PATCH v6 08/24] x86/alternative: Use temporary mm for text poking
` [PATCH v6 09/24] x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code
` [PATCH v6 10/24] x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable
` [PATCH v6 11/24] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page "
` [PATCH v6 12/24] x86/module: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules
` [PATCH v6 13/24] x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom poker
` [PATCH v6 14/24] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()
` [PATCH v6 15/24] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_ functions
` [PATCH v6 16/24] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages
` [PATCH v6 17/24] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions
` [PATCH v6 18/24] modules: Use vmalloc special flag
` [PATCH v6 19/24] bpf: "
` [PATCH v6 20/24] x86/ftrace: "
` [PATCH v6 21/24] x86/kprobes: "
` [PATCH v6 22/24] x86/alternative: Comment about module removal races
` [PATCH v6 23/24] mm/tlb: Provide default nmi_uaccess_okay()
` [PATCH v6 24/24] bpf: Fail bpf_probe_write_user() while mm is switched
[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 52/79] KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warning
2019-04-27 1:38 UTC
[PATCH v5 00/23] x86: text_poke() fixes and executable lockdowns
2019-04-26 16:43 UTC (27+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 01/23] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()"
` [PATCH v5 02/23] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init
` [PATCH v5 03/23] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs
` [PATCH v5 04/23] x86/mm: Save debug registers when loading a temporary mm
` [PATCH v5 05/23] fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm
` [PATCH v5 06/23] x86/alternative: Initialize temporary mm for patching
` [PATCH v5 07/23] x86/alternative: Use temporary mm for text poking
` [PATCH v5 08/23] x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code
` [PATCH v5 09/23] x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable
` [PATCH v5 10/23] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page "
` [PATCH v5 11/23] x86/module: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules
` [PATCH v5 12/23] x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom poker
` [PATCH v5 13/23] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()
` [PATCH v5 14/23] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_ functions
` [PATCH v5 15/23] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages
` [PATCH v5 16/23] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions
` [PATCH v5 17/23] modules: Use vmalloc special flag
` [PATCH v5 18/23] bpf: "
` [PATCH v5 19/23] x86/ftrace: "
` [PATCH v5 20/23] x86/kprobes: "
` [PATCH v5 21/23] x86/alternative: Comment about module removal races
` [PATCH v5 22/23] mm/tlb: Provide default nmi_uaccess_okay()
` [PATCH v5 23/23] bpf: Fail bpf_probe_write_user() while mm is switched
[PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option
2019-04-26 15:48 UTC (16+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the "
` [PATCH 2/3] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NOINIT
` [PATCH 3/3] RFC: net: apply __GFP_NOINIT to AF_UNIX sk_buff allocations
[PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2
2019-04-25 21:44 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
[PATCH v4 00/23] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns
2019-04-25 21:22 UTC (16+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 03/23] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs
` [PATCH v4 04/23] x86/mm: Save DRs when loading a temporary mm
` [PATCH v4 16/23] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions
` [PATCH v4 19/23] x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag
smack ( on host ) + apparmor ( on docker ) - possible ?
2019-04-25 19:22 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 00/11] keys: Namespacing
2019-04-25 11:38 UTC (18+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/11] keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys
` [PATCH 02/11] keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}
` [PATCH 03/11] keys: Simplify key description management
` [PATCH 04/11] keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation
` [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
` [PATCH 06/11] keys: Namespace keyring names
` [PATCH 07/11] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
` [PATCH 08/11] keys: Include target namespace in match criteria
` [PATCH 09/11] keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed
` [PATCH 10/11] keys: Network namespace domain tag
` [PATCH 11/11] keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism
[PATCH v3 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening
2019-04-24 21:02 UTC (8+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area
` [PATCH v3 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening
` [PATCH v3 3/3] security: Implement Clang's stack initialization
[PATCH v2 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening
2019-04-24 4:05 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area
kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!
2019-04-23 20:18 UTC (20+ messages)
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