messages from 2019-08-13 07:59:38 to 2019-08-27 19:20:23 UTC [more...]
[PATCH 0/2] keys: ACLs
2019-08-27 19:18 UTC (8+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
` [PATCH keys-next] keys: Fix permissions assigned to anonymous session keyrings
[PATCH] tpm_tis: Fix interrupt probing
2019-08-27 15:19 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH v5 0/4] Create and consolidate trusted keys subsystem
2019-08-27 14:17 UTC (9+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 1/4] tpm: move tpm_buf code to include/linux/
` [PATCH v5 2/4] KEYS: trusted: use common tpm_buf for TPM1.x code
` [PATCH v5 3/4] KEYS: trusted: create trusted keys subsystem
` [PATCH v5 4/4] KEYS: trusted: move tpm2 trusted keys code
[PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
2019-08-27 1:04 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
2019-08-27 0:34 UTC (57+ messages)
` RFC: very rough draft of a bpf permission model
[PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality
2019-08-25 9:51 UTC (39+ messages)
` [PATCH V40 01/29] security: Support early LSMs
` [PATCH V40 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V40 05/29] lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when "
` [PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
` [PATCH V40 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH V40 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH V40 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH V40 17/29] lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when "
` [PATCH V40 18/29] lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH V40 19/29] lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH V40 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH V40 21/29] lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH V40 22/29] lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is "
` [PATCH V40 24/29] lockdown: Lock down perf when "
` [PATCH V40 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
` [PATCH V40 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is "
` [PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs "
` [PATCH V40 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load "
` [PATCH V40 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
[PATCH 1/2] rtnetlink: gate MAC address with an LSM hook
2019-08-23 21:41 UTC (8+ messages)
New skb extension for use by LSMs (skb "security blob")?
2019-08-23 18:56 UTC (17+ messages)
[PATCH 2/2] selinux: use netlink_receive hook
2019-08-23 1:54 UTC (3+ messages)
possible deadlock in ext4_evict_inode
2019-08-22 16:44 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH] smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
KASAN: use-after-free Read in tomoyo_realpath_from_path
2019-08-22 15:47 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets
` [PATCH v2] "
[PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around
2019-08-22 3:51 UTC (11+ messages)
` [RFC][PATCH] fix d_absolute_path() interplay with fsmount()
[GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3
2019-08-21 19:22 UTC (10+ messages)
[RFC/RFT v4 0/5] Add generic trusted keys framework/subsystem
2019-08-21 19:13 UTC (21+ messages)
` [RFC/RFT v4 1/5] tpm: move tpm_buf code to include/linux/
` [RFC/RFT v4 2/5] KEYS: trusted: use common tpm_buf for TPM1.x code
` [RFC/RFT v4 3/5] KEYS: trusted: create trusted keys subsystem
` [RFC/RFT v4 4/5] KEYS: trusted: move tpm2 trusted keys code
[PATCH] keys: Fix description size
2019-08-19 16:44 UTC (2+ messages)
[WIP][RFC][PATCH 0/3] Introduce Infoflow LSM
2019-08-19 14:52 UTC (5+ messages)
` [WIP][RFC][PATCH 1/3] security: introduce call_int_hook_and() macro
` [WIP][RFC][PATCH 2/3] lsm notifier: distinguish between state change and policy change
` [WIP][RFC][PATCH 3/3] security: add infoflow LSM
[RFC PATCH v3] security,capability: pass object information to security_capable
2019-08-16 16:36 UTC (4+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v3] security, capability: "
[RFC PATCH v2] security,capability: pass object information to security_capable
2019-08-16 16:29 UTC (9+ messages)
` [Non-DoD Source] Re: [RFC PATCH v2] security, capability: "
` "
[RFC PATCH] audit, security: allow LSMs to selectively enable audit collection
2019-08-15 17:41 UTC
[PATCH 0/6] lockdown fixups
2019-08-14 18:26 UTC (14+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] tracefs: Fix potential null dereference in default_file_open()
` [PATCH 2/6] early_security_init() needs a stub got !CONFIG_SECURITY
` [PATCH 3/6] Avoid build warning when !CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
` [PATCH 4/6] security: fix ptr_ret.cocci warnings
` [PATCH 5/6] kexec: s/KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG/KEXEC_SIG/ for consistency
` [PATCH 6/6] Document locked_down LSM hook
[PATCH V38 00/29] security: Add support for locking down the kernel
2019-08-14 18:02 UTC (8+ messages)
` [PATCH V38 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
[PATCH V37 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
2019-08-14 6:12 UTC (2+ messages)
` [PATCH] tracefs: Fix NULL pointer dereference when no lockdown is used
[RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation
2019-08-13 18:49 UTC (4+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] "
[PATCH] Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
2019-08-13 14:44 UTC
[RFC/RFT v3 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
2019-08-13 7:59 UTC (6+ messages)
` [RFC/RFT v3 2/3] KEYS: trusted: move tpm2 trusted keys code
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