messages from 2019-08-20 00:19:38 to 2019-08-30 13:58:29 UTC [more...]
[PATCH 00/11] Keyrings, Block and USB notifications [ver #7]
2019-08-30 13:58 UTC (9+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/11] uapi: General notification ring definitions "
` [PATCH 02/11] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch "
` [PATCH 03/11] security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion "
` [PATCH 04/11] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer "
` [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a notification facility "
` [PATCH 06/11] Add a general, global device notification watch list "
` [PATCH 07/11] block: Add block layer notifications "
` [PATCH 08/11] usb: Add USB subsystem "
[RFC PATCH] audit, security: allow LSMs to selectively enable audit collection
2019-08-30 13:44 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around
2019-08-30 10:11 UTC (12+ messages)
` [RFC][PATCH] fix d_absolute_path() interplay with fsmount()
[RFC/RFT v4 0/5] Add generic trusted keys framework/subsystem
2019-08-30 9:19 UTC (17+ messages)
` [RFC/RFT v4 1/5] tpm: move tpm_buf code to include/linux/
` [RFC/RFT v4 3/5] KEYS: trusted: create trusted keys subsystem
` [RFC/RFT v4 4/5] KEYS: trusted: move tpm2 trusted keys code
` [RFC/RFT v4 5/5] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
[PATCH] tpm_tis: Fix interrupt probing
2019-08-30 0:11 UTC (8+ messages)
[PATCH] tpm_tis_core: Set TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ before probing for interrupts
2019-08-30 0:09 UTC
[PATCH v8 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-08-29 23:29 UTC (29+ messages)
` [PATCH v8 01/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
` [PATCH v8 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
` [PATCH v8 03/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
` [PATCH v8 04/28] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure
` [PATCH v8 05/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
` [PATCH v8 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
` [PATCH v8 07/28] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
` [PATCH v8 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
` [PATCH v8 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
` [PATCH v8 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
` [PATCH v8 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
` [PATCH v8 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
` [PATCH v8 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
` [PATCH v8 14/28] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
` [PATCH v8 15/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
` [PATCH v8 16/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
` [PATCH v8 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
` [PATCH v8 18/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
` [PATCH v8 19/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
` [PATCH v8 20/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
` [PATCH v8 21/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
` [PATCH v8 22/28] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
` [PATCH v8 23/28] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
` [PATCH v8 24/28] Audit: Include object data for all security modules
` [PATCH v8 25/28] LSM: Provide an user space interface for the default display
` [PATCH v8 26/28] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs
` [PATCH v8 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
` [PATCH v8 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
[PATCH 00/11] Keyrings, Block and USB notifications [ver #6]
2019-08-29 19:11 UTC (14+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/11] uapi: General notification ring definitions "
` [PATCH 02/11] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch "
` [PATCH 03/11] security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion "
` [PATCH 04/11] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer "
` [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a notification facility "
` [PATCH 06/11] Add a general, global device notification watch list "
` [PATCH 07/11] block: Add block layer notifications "
` [PATCH 08/11] usb: Add USB subsystem "
` [PATCH 09/11] Add sample notification program "
` [PATCH 10/11] selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook "
` [PATCH 11/11] smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks [untested] "
[PATCH] overlayfs: filter of trusted xattr results in audit
2019-08-29 18:30 UTC
[PATCH] ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
2019-08-29 17:29 UTC
[PATCH bpf-next] bpf, capabilities: introduce CAP_BPF
2019-08-29 17:49 UTC (31+ messages)
[PATCH] ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
2019-08-29 17:16 UTC (6+ messages)
[PATCH v5 0/4] Create and consolidate trusted keys subsystem
2019-08-29 14:53 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 1/4] tpm: move tpm_buf code to include/linux/
` [PATCH v5 2/4] KEYS: trusted: use common tpm_buf for TPM1.x code
` [PATCH v5 3/4] KEYS: trusted: create trusted keys subsystem
` [PATCH v5 4/4] KEYS: trusted: move tpm2 trusted keys code
[WIP][RFC][PATCH 0/3] Introduce Infoflow LSM
2019-08-29 14:29 UTC (4+ messages)
` [WIP][RFC][PATCH 1/3] security: introduce call_int_hook_and() macro
[PATCH 1/2] rtnetlink: gate MAC address with an LSM hook
2019-08-29 7:45 UTC (10+ messages)
[PATCH][next] ima: ima_modsig: Fix use-after-free bug in ima_read_modsig
2019-08-28 18:55 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
2019-08-28 13:43 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH 1/2] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
2019-08-27 19:18 UTC (2+ messages)
` [PATCH keys-next] keys: Fix permissions assigned to anonymous session keyrings
[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
2019-08-27 0:34 UTC (21+ messages)
` RFC: very rough draft of a bpf permission model
[PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality
2019-08-25 9:51 UTC (30+ messages)
` [PATCH V40 01/29] security: Support early LSMs
` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime "
` [PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH V40 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH V40 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH V40 17/29] lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when "
` [PATCH V40 18/29] lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH V40 19/29] lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH V40 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH V40 22/29] lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
` [PATCH V40 24/29] lockdown: Lock down perf "
` [PATCH V40 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs "
New skb extension for use by LSMs (skb "security blob")?
2019-08-23 18:56 UTC (17+ messages)
[PATCH 2/2] selinux: use netlink_receive hook
2019-08-23 1:54 UTC (3+ messages)
possible deadlock in ext4_evict_inode
2019-08-22 16:44 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH] smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
KASAN: use-after-free Read in tomoyo_realpath_from_path
2019-08-22 15:47 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets
` [PATCH v2] "
[GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3
2019-08-21 19:22 UTC (10+ messages)
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