linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror

 messages from 2020-05-14 00:28:35 to 2020-05-20 15:15:57 UTC [more...]

[PATCH bpf] security: Fix hook iteration for secid_to_secctx
 2020-05-20 15:15 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH 0/5] exec: Control flow simplifications
 2020-05-20 13:02 UTC  (55+ messages)
    ` [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
    ` [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications
      ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
      ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
      ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
      ` [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally
      ` [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
      ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
      ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support
      ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler

[PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks
 2020-05-19 22:58 UTC  (26+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES
` [PATCH 2/4] exec: Relocate S_ISREG() check
` [PATCH 3/4] exec: Relocate path_noexec() check
` [PATCH 4/4] fs: Include FMODE_EXEC when converting flags to f_mode

[PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
 2020-05-19 18:10 UTC  (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: "
` [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues

[PATCH v17 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
 2020-05-19 15:48 UTC  (31+ messages)
  ` [PATCH v17 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
  ` [PATCH v17 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure
  ` [PATCH v17 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  ` [PATCH v17 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  ` [PATCH v17 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
  ` [PATCH v17 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  ` [PATCH v17 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  ` [PATCH v17 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  ` [PATCH v17 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  ` [PATCH v17 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  ` [PATCH v17 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  ` [PATCH v17 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  ` [PATCH v17 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  ` [PATCH v17 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  ` [PATCH v17 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  ` [PATCH v17 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  ` [PATCH v17 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  ` [PATCH v17 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  ` [PATCH v17 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
  ` [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes
  ` [PATCH v17 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object "
  ` [PATCH v17 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
  ` [PATCH v17 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag

[PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC
 2020-05-19 10:13 UTC  (30+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property
` [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC
                ` How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)

[PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
 2020-05-18 22:02 UTC  (3+ messages)

[RFC][PATCH 0/2] Add support for using reserved memory for ima buffer pass
 2020-05-18 20:34 UTC  (8+ messages)
` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] Add a layer of abstraction to use the memory reserved by device tree "

linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path
 2020-05-18 18:07 UTC  (16+ messages)
    ` [PATCH] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument
    ` [PATCH v2] "
    ` [PATCH v3] "
    ` [PATCH v4] "

[PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls
 2020-05-18 15:21 UTC  (6+ messages)

WARNING: suspicious RCU usage with PROVE_RCU_LIST=y
 2020-05-18  9:39 UTC  (4+ messages)

[PATCH 01/14] cachefiles: switch to kernel_write
 2020-05-18  6:42 UTC  (6+ messages)
` clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2
  ` [PATCH 02/14] autofs: switch to kernel_write
    ` [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write

[RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)
 2020-05-16 22:14 UTC  (6+ messages)

[PATCH] selinux: Fix use of KEY_NEED_* instead of KEY__* perms [v2]
 2020-05-15 22:27 UTC  (14+ messages)
` [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  ` [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code

[PATCH -next] apparmor: Use true and false for bool variable
 2020-05-15 21:28 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v7 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF
 2020-05-15 15:55 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v30 10/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
 2020-05-15  0:44 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [PATCH v30 11/20] x86/sgx: Add provisioning

[PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
 2020-05-15  0:00 UTC  (13+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
` [PATCH v4 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
` [PATCH v4 3/4] doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source
` [PATCH v4 4/4] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys

[PATCH v17 00/10] Landlock LSM
 2020-05-14 19:37 UTC  (12+ messages)
` [PATCH v17 02/10] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
` [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control

[PATCH] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
 2020-05-14 18:21 UTC  (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v2] "

[PATCH] lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status
 2020-05-14 17:28 UTC  (6+ messages)
` [PATCH RESEND] "