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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Networking <netdev@vger.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Kernel Team <Kernel-team@fb.com>,
	Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 15:30:51 -0700
Message-ID: <AD211133-EA60-4B91-AB1B-201713F50AB2@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190814220545.co5pucyo5jk3weiv@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com>



> On Aug 14, 2019, at 3:05 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:51:23AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> 
>> If eBPF is genuinely not usable by programs that are not fully trusted
>> by the admin, then no kernel changes at all are needed.  Programs that
>> want to reduce their own privileges can easily fork() a privileged
>> subprocess or run a little helper to which they delegate BPF
>> operations.  This is far more flexible than anything that will ever be
>> in the kernel because it allows the helper to verify that the rest of
>> the program is doing exactly what it's supposed to and restrict eBPF
>> operations to exactly the subset that is needed.  So a container
>> manager or network manager that drops some provilege could have a
>> little bpf-helper that manages its BPF XDP, firewalling, etc
>> configuration.  The two processes would talk over a socketpair.
> 
> there were three projects that tried to delegate bpf operations.
> All of them failed.
> bpf operational workflow is much more complex than you're imagining.
> fork() also doesn't work for all cases.
> I gave this example before: consider multiple systemd-like deamons
> that need to do bpf operations that want to pass this 'bpf capability'
> to other deamons written by other teams. Some of them will start
> non-root, but still need to do bpf. They will be rpm installed
> and live upgraded while running.
> We considered to make systemd such centralized bpf delegation
> authority too. It didn't work. bpf in kernel grows quickly.
> libbpf part grows independently. llvm keeps evolving.
> All of them are being changed while system overall has to stay
> operational. Centralized approach breaks apart.
> 
>> The interesting cases you're talking about really *do* involved
>> unprivileged or less privileged eBPF, though.  Let's see:
>> 
>> systemd --user: systemd --user *is not privileged at all*.  There's no
>> issue of reducing privilege, since systemd --user doesn't have any
>> privilege to begin with.  But systemd supports some eBPF features, and
>> presumably it would like to support them in the systemd --user case.
>> This is unprivileged eBPF.
> 
> Let's disambiguate the terminology.
> This /dev/bpf patch set started as describing the feature as 'unprivileged bpf'.
> I think that was a mistake.
> Let's call systemd-like deamon usage of bpf 'less privileged bpf'.
> This is not unprivileged.
> 'unprivileged bpf' is what sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled controls.
> 
> There is a huge difference between the two.
> I'm against extending 'unprivileged bpf' even a bit more than what it is
> today for many reasons mentioned earlier.
> The /dev/bpf is about 'less privileged'.
> Less privileged than root. We need to split part of full root capability
> into bpf capability. So that most of the root can be dropped.
> This is very similar to what cap_net_admin does.
> cap_net_amdin can bring down eth0 which is just as bad as crashing the box.
> cap_net_admin is very much privileged. Just 'less privileged' than root.
> Same thing for cap_bpf.

The new pseudo-capability in this patch set is absurdly broad. I’ve proposed some finer-grained divisions in this thread. Do you have comments on them?

> 
> May be we should do both cap_bpf and /dev/bpf to make it clear that
> this is the same thing. Two interfaces to achieve the same result.

What for?  If there’s a CAP_BPF, then why do you want /dev/bpf? Especially if you define it to do the same thing.

> 
>> Seccomp.  Seccomp already uses cBPF, which is a form of BPF although
>> it doesn't involve the bpf() syscall.  There are some seccomp
>> proposals in the works that will want some stuff from eBPF.  In
> 
> I'm afraid these proposals won't go anywhere.

Can you explain why?

> 
>> So it's a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation.  There aren't major
>> unprivileged eBPF users because the kernel support isn't there.
> 
> As I said before there are zero known use cases of 'unprivileged bpf'.
> 
> If I understand you correctly you're refusing to accept that
> 'less privileged bpf' is a valid use case while pushing for extending
> scope of 'unprivileged'.

No, I’m not.  I have no objection at all if you try to come up with a clear definition of what the capability checks do and what it means to grant a new permission to a task.  Changing *all* of the capable checks is needlessly broad.

  reply index

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20190627201923.2589391-1-songliubraving@fb.com>
     [not found] ` <20190627201923.2589391-2-songliubraving@fb.com>
     [not found]   ` <21894f45-70d8-dfca-8c02-044f776c5e05@kernel.org>
     [not found]     ` <3C595328-3ABE-4421-9772-8D41094A4F57@fb.com>
     [not found]       ` <CALCETrWBnH4Q43POU8cQ7YMjb9LioK28FDEQf7aHZbdf1eBZWg@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]         ` <0DE7F23E-9CD2-4F03-82B5-835506B59056@fb.com>
     [not found]           ` <CALCETrWBWbNFJvsTCeUchu3BZJ3SH3dvtXLUB2EhnPrzFfsLNA@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]             ` <201907021115.DCD56BBABB@keescook>
     [not found]               ` <CALCETrXTta26CTtEDnzvtd03-WOGdXcnsAogP8JjLkcj4-mHvg@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                 ` <4A7A225A-6C23-4C0F-9A95-7C6C56B281ED@fb.com>
     [not found]                   ` <CALCETrX2bMnwC6_t4b_G-hzJSfMPrkK4YKs5ebcecv2LJ0rt3w@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                     ` <514D5453-0AEE-420F-AEB6-3F4F58C62E7E@fb.com>
     [not found]                       ` <1DE886F3-3982-45DE-B545-67AD6A4871AB@amacapital.net>
     [not found]                         ` <7F51F8B8-CF4C-4D82-AAE1-F0F28951DB7F@fb.com>
     [not found]                           ` <77354A95-4107-41A7-8936-D144F01C3CA4@fb.com>
     [not found]                             ` <369476A8-4CE1-43DA-9239-06437C0384C7@fb.com>
2019-07-30 20:24                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-31  8:10                                 ` Song Liu
2019-07-31 19:09                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-02  7:21                                     ` Song Liu
2019-08-04 22:16                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05  0:08                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05  5:47                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05  7:36                                             ` Song Liu
2019-08-05 17:23                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 19:21                                                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-05 21:25                                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 22:21                                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-06  1:11                                                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-07  5:24                                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-07  9:03                                                         ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-08-07 13:52                                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-13 21:58                                                         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-13 22:26                                                           ` Daniel Colascione
2019-08-13 23:24                                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-13 23:06                                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-14  0:57                                                             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-14 17:51                                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-14 22:05                                                                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-14 22:30                                                                   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-08-14 23:33                                                                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-14 23:59                                                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15  0:36                                                                         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-15 11:24                                                                   ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-15 17:28                                                                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-15 18:36                                                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 23:08                                                                         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16  9:34                                                                           ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-16  9:59                                                                             ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-16 11:33                                                                               ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-16 19:52                                                                                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16 20:28                                                                                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-17 15:02                                                                                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-17 15:44                                                                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-19  9:15                                                                                       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-19 17:27                                                                                         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-19 17:38                                                                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 18:43                                                                       ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-15 19:46                                                           ` Kees Cook
2019-08-15 23:46                                                             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16  0:54                                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-16  5:56                                                                 ` Song Liu
2019-08-16 21:45                                                                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16 22:22                                                                   ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-17 15:08                                                                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-17 15:16                                                                       ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-17 15:36                                                                         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-17 15:42                                                                           ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-22 14:17                                                         ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-08-22 15:16                                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-22 15:17                                                             ` RFC: very rough draft of a bpf permission model Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-22 23:26                                                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-23 23:09                                                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-26 22:36                                                                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-27  0:05                                                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-27  0:34                                                                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-22 22:48                                                           ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf Alexei Starovoitov

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