From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 13:28:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJuvW47m3JvEcuEX1bsr+L2Ht9LDn_iCuPbHLOoaohOFW4Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
Hi James,
David is low on cycles at the moment, so I'm taking over for this time
round. This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When
enabled and active (by enabling the config option and passing the
"lockdown" option on the kernel command line), various pieces of
kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on
low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as
a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate
evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
unified upstream implementation to reduce the delta. This PR probably
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
This PR is mostly the same as the previous attempt, but with the
following changes:
1) The integration between EFI secure boot and the lockdown state has
been removed
2) A new CONFIG_KERNEL_LOCK_DOWN_FORCE kconfig option has been added,
which will always enable lockdown regardless of the kernel command
line
3) The integration with IMA has been dropped for now. Requiring the
use of the IMA secure boot policy when lockdown is enabled isn't
practical for most distributions at the moment, as there's still not a
great deal of infrastructure for shipping packages with appropriate
IMA signatures, and it makes it complicated for end users to manage
custom IMA policies.
The following changes since commit a3b22b9f11d9fbc48b0291ea92259a5a810e9438:
Linux 5.0-rc7 (2019-02-17 18:46:40 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://github.com/mjg59/linux lock_down
for you to fetch changes up to 43e004ecae91bf9159b8e91cd1d613e58b8f63f8:
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages (2019-02-28
11:19:23 -0800)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dave Young (1):
Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
David Howells (12):
Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
Lock down /proc/kcore
Lock down kprobes
bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
Lock down perf
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
Jiri Bohac (2):
kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
Josh Boyer (2):
hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
Kyle McMartin (1):
Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
Linn Crosetto (2):
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Matthew Garrett (7):
Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down
kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 10 +++++++++
arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c | 3 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 +++-
drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/tables.c | 5 +++++
drivers/char/mem.c | 2 ++
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 +
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 ++++++++
drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 +++++++-
drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++-
drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 3 +++
drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 +++++++++++------
fs/debugfs/file.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/debugfs/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
fs/proc/kcore.c | 2 ++
include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++
include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/kernel.h | 17 +++++++++++++++
include/linux/kexec.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++-
include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 ++++++-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 +++
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +-
kernel/events/core.c | 5 +++++
kernel/kexec.c | 7 ++++++
kernel/kexec_file.c | 56
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
kernel/kprobes.c | 3 +++
kernel/module.c | 56
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
kernel/params.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
security/Kconfig | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++
security/Makefile | 3 +++
security/lock_down.c | 106
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
41 files changed, 466 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
next reply other threads:[~2019-02-28 21:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-28 21:28 Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-02-28 22:20 ` [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches Mimi Zohar
2019-02-28 23:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-01 1:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01 1:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-01 3:33 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01 4:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-28 22:44 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 22:44 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:10 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:10 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 08/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01 2:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-19 22:15 ` Pavel Machek
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 10/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 11/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 13/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 18/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 20/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 21/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 23/27] Lock down kprobes Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12 ` [PATCH 24/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12 ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down perf Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12 ` [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12 ` [PATCH 27/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:24 ` [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches Randy Dunlap
2019-03-04 22:10 ` Matthew Garrett
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