From: peter.moody@gmail.com (Peter Moody)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: out of tree lsm's
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 09:06:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CADc-OzFAiq4ccLgTYtx+jvkGxduoOC3J+C90UTQWDOB6+EoFfQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <04d6fd0a-bb59-b3c0-258c-b5826e7277a0@schaufler-ca.com>
On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 8:36 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 3/21/2017 3:41 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>> Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>> Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> right. sorry for the imprecise language; by site-specific I meant a "small" lsm.
>>>>>
>>>>> I would love to have the ability write a small lsm that I can build as
>>>>> a module and load at boot eg. via initrd.
>>>>>
>>>>> AIUI, adding even a new "small" lsm requires kconfig patches, building
>>>>> a new kernel, etc. I know there are objections to dynamically loadable
>>>>> lsms and I was trying to find a compromise that made them easier to
>>>>> work with.
>>>> The stacking design criteria I'm working with
>>>> include not doing anything that would prevent
>>>> dynamic module loading. I do not plan to implement
>>>> dynamic loading. Tetsuo has been a strong
>>>> advocate of loadable modules. I would expect to
>>>> see a proposal from him shortly after the
>>>> general stacking lands, assuming it does.
>>> But currently __lsm_ro_after_init which is planned to go to 4.12 is preventing
>>> dynamic modules from loading. We need a legitimate interface for loadable modules like
>>> http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201702152342.GBH04183.FOFJFHQOLMOtVS at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp .
>>> Requiring rodata=0 kernel command line option to allow dynamic modules is silly.
>>>
>> I think we need something like below change when allowing loadable modules.
>
> I believe that a simpler approach would be to
> add a separate list of dynamic hooks to supliment
> the list of static hooks. If SELinux unloading is
> desired the SELinux hooks would be put on the
> dynamic list which would not be "hardened" with
> _ro_after_init, where the rest of the static modules
> would be.
FWIW, I don't know if that would solve the case I was initially asking
about since the out-of-tree lsm I was hoping to be able to access all
of the standard security hooks with an out-of-tree module.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-21 16:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-20 18:54 out of tree lsm's Peter Moody
2017-03-20 19:30 ` Paul Moore
2017-03-20 19:45 ` Peter Moody
2017-03-20 20:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-20 22:18 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-21 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-21 15:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-21 16:06 ` Peter Moody [this message]
2017-03-21 16:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-21 21:53 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-21 22:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-22 12:13 ` Tetsuo Handa
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