From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8008C43460 for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 17:45:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F79C61284 for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 17:45:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234236AbhDARmO (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Apr 2021 13:42:14 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57172 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234869AbhDARk6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Apr 2021 13:40:58 -0400 Received: from mail-lj1-x231.google.com (mail-lj1-x231.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::231]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0AA56C05BD19 for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 05:55:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x231.google.com with SMTP id y1so2112517ljm.10 for ; Thu, 01 Apr 2021 05:55:16 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=VIk1VyBFqF5fVZFBu0yexXHYaS9Jn30Rld7o2bVbBwk=; b=Apd+UzHEAEi98S6OdfucHkNROZU7jCgX5/KNygYU3cVOLmi2PHXIN8LRL/INjJMZT2 +T7sbpkA1dHoI5hc7fww5ba5aE2TjM8dwGwwufSllGQiwylrGI0cS488JL/xNibDw5Cu 2+eknYxHVIfteXbHDfVGnwtETKC61+6Ys9Q59Y5+NreZIXf3O8ek1f6nwiPeAZ31FLYx JP07cdx8Lht2U45g70INCV2MprWQgxaOUq4Y3uGF3LwH7J/nRfQOjuLD03XeTBhbnZ3w 3kGM/AEkbnuu9X/oEc2B9w4enaBqVfgrhZYb3ySlCRAGSvA6qD8rW+w9ga1FZsJLnIXC z8Dg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=VIk1VyBFqF5fVZFBu0yexXHYaS9Jn30Rld7o2bVbBwk=; b=t5mueok87JciROdLVCKgjtQG0jMe4RXQPoik4MU6S8NtqfNfaGME7uxXPybxxH4Or/ iqqreMiqdEx1CBz1NwZo3PimS6tlOeyJpUtneq79Qwl5IP9HejMwXt1xpYsi0jMICF/d s6K9TcQsOd0o0drp7BCQnkKPK9xpcQCT2qxc4irmse5fNpzwcLpMr0GHxucTTipoZAFN pmJqeRfSeogpcFlzW+1kn7GXEFyCDZZHGPwlyuJ3wt0rpavAXHEEaFCDf6SWTXBg8Dhv sn6A5gHDdlnB5QeuR/9sjcu40FH+KvbViMRbVzuc0WeIgGIioMJnLtk8lUCvufR/5i23 JZqw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530jDntrmQNlM+/fQO706CiIzHPthwkneYxKXzuksqCufC/r2byd Z1CARAls01FgYKMNIh6Jv9go7aC14AohcC4zK1yVZw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzxwz2LDe0yIeonE1iDSI5e5lDG4mIYMjWxL+WfT+GgrPcNFOKL6OGonaimUeBpqxqGZ9SE9Ng/p3VJVcrOnEs= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:8e33:: with SMTP id r19mr5136316ljk.40.1617281715310; Thu, 01 Apr 2021 05:55:15 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Sumit Garg Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 18:25:03 +0530 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys To: Richard Weinberger Cc: Ahmad Fatoum , Jarkko Sakkinen , =?UTF-8?Q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Mimi Zohar , Aymen Sghaier , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , James Bottomley , kernel@pengutronix.de, David Howells , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Steffen Trumtrar , Udit Agarwal , Jan Luebbe , David Gstir , Franck LENORMAND , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" , Linux Crypto Mailing List , LKML , LSM Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: Hi Richard, On Wed, 31 Mar 2021 at 03:34, Richard Weinberger wrote: > > Ahmad, > > On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 3:08 PM Ahmad Fatoum wrote: > > keyctl add trusted $KEYNAME "load $(cat ~/kmk.blob)" @s > > Is there a reason why we can't pass the desired backend name in the > trusted key parameters? > e.g. > keyctl add trusted $KEYNAME "backendtype caam load $(cat ~/kmk.blob)" @s > IIUC, this would require support for multiple trusted keys backends at runtime but currently the trusted keys subsystem only supports a single backend which is selected via kernel module parameter during boot. So the trusted keys framework needs to evolve to support multiple trust sources at runtime but I would like to understand the use-cases first. IMO, selecting the best trust source available on a platform for trusted keys should be a one time operation, so why do we need to have other backends available at runtime as well? -Sumit > -- > Thanks, > //richard