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From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: syzbot <syzbot+f07cc9be8d1d226947ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: andriin@fb.com, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	john.fastabend@gmail.com, kafai@fb.com,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Security Module list 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	network dev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	songliubraving@fb.com, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
	yhs@fb.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: general protection fault in security_inode_getattr
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 23:00:00 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFqZXNvQcjp201ahjLBhYJJCuYqZrYLGDA-wE3hXiJpRNgbTKg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <000000000000a726a405ada4b6cf@google.com>

On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 9:37 PM syzbot
<syzbot+f07cc9be8d1d226947ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
> syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:

Looping in fsdevel and OverlayFS maintainers, as this seems to be
FS/OverlayFS related...

See also original report against 5.8-rc7:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/0000000000008caae305ab9a5318@google.com/T/

>
> HEAD commit:    d012a719 Linux 5.9-rc2
> git tree:       upstream
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14aa130e900000
> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=891ca5711a9f1650
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f07cc9be8d1d226947ed
> compiler:       clang version 10.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/ c2443155a0fb245c8f17f2c1c72b6ea391e86e81)
> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=104a650e900000
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+f07cc9be8d1d226947ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
> general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
> CPU: 1 PID: 32288 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> RIP: 0010:d_backing_inode include/linux/dcache.h:549 [inline]
> RIP: 0010:security_inode_getattr+0x42/0x140 security/security.c:1276
> Code: 1b fe 49 8d 5e 08 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 38 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 bc b4 5b fe 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 68 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 38 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 9f b4 5b fe 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 0c
> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a017750 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: 000000000000000d RBX: 0000000000000068 RCX: ffff888093ec6180
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000a017860 RDI: ffffc9000a017850
> RBP: ffffc9000a017850 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: ffffc9000a017850
> R10: fffff52001402f0c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc9000a017860
> R13: 0000000000008401 R14: ffffc9000a017850 R15: dffffc0000000000
> FS:  00007f292d4ef700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000001b30920074 CR3: 00000000937fd000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
>  vfs_getattr+0x21/0x60 fs/stat.c:121
>  ovl_copy_up_one fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:850 [inline]
>  ovl_copy_up_flags+0x2ef/0x2a00 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:931
>  ovl_maybe_copy_up+0x154/0x180 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:963
>  ovl_open+0xa2/0x200 fs/overlayfs/file.c:147
>  do_dentry_open+0x7c8/0x1010 fs/open.c:817
>  do_open fs/namei.c:3251 [inline]
>  path_openat+0x2794/0x3840 fs/namei.c:3368
>  do_filp_open+0x191/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:3395
>  file_open_name+0x321/0x430 fs/open.c:1113
>  acct_on kernel/acct.c:207 [inline]
>  __do_sys_acct kernel/acct.c:286 [inline]
>  __se_sys_acct+0x122/0x6f0 kernel/acct.c:273
>  do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> RIP: 0033:0x45d579
> Code: 5d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> RSP: 002b:00007f292d4eec78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a3
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000700 RCX: 000000000045d579
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000040
> RBP: 000000000118cf70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cf4c
> R13: 00007ffc8e04bc4f R14: 00007f292d4ef9c0 R15: 000000000118cf4c
> Modules linked in:
> ---[ end trace 7e4f1041b188e411 ]---
> RIP: 0010:d_backing_inode include/linux/dcache.h:549 [inline]
> RIP: 0010:security_inode_getattr+0x42/0x140 security/security.c:1276
> Code: 1b fe 49 8d 5e 08 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 38 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 bc b4 5b fe 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 68 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 38 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 9f b4 5b fe 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 0c
> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a017750 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: 000000000000000d RBX: 0000000000000068 RCX: ffff888093ec6180
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000a017860 RDI: ffffc9000a017850
> RBP: ffffc9000a017850 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: ffffc9000a017850
> R10: fffff52001402f0c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc9000a017860
> R13: 0000000000008401 R14: ffffc9000a017850 R15: dffffc0000000000
> FS:  00007f292d4ef700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00007fef820e7000 CR3: 00000000937fd000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>

-- 
Ondrej Mosnacek
Software Engineer, Platform Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.


  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-24 21:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-29 20:23 general protection fault in security_inode_getattr syzbot
2020-08-24 19:37 ` syzbot
2020-08-24 21:00   ` Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2020-10-30 13:02     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-10-30 18:42       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 19:21         ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-10-30 19:56           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-08-25  0:32 ` syzbot
2020-08-25  0:48   ` Yonghong Song
2022-10-15 17:24 ` [syzbot] " syzbot
2022-10-16 14:52   ` Paul Moore
2022-10-17 14:29     ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-10-17  5:38   ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-01 17:36 ` Andrey Kalachev
2024-04-02 16:01   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-04-19 20:01     ` Andrey Kalachev

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