From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96CEBC2BA83 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 19:12:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5721224670 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 19:12:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="A01RKV0y" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388832AbgBNTMg (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 14:12:36 -0500 Received: from mail-ot1-f68.google.com ([209.85.210.68]:33948 "EHLO mail-ot1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388761AbgBNTMF (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 14:12:05 -0500 Received: by mail-ot1-f68.google.com with SMTP id j16so10193911otl.1 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 11:12:04 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=6uqzI/vJCb+lytMRQLBtmGBNvQ3CBGyQ4CHe99juhWw=; b=A01RKV0yUncA2zmUFntZswW/86rIj8tLC2M+AhXaShqxWykJDCkRYD43cXW50sXU39 MAa7XyeI7GLjetxuKiKl6Z+csq3oWb/Ynl+99TLWkIoJSkpYl2aCL7j/cGo8BHzrvsd2 8aySaepz0fQ2TgDbNN875+eReDdnjC93cTHaog9V5AwTUQwx8yb1iHjXkm3WNamm65pV hGFAn/wkc14F1h7uUo5Lzol4RTLd0WtY2Xogo92Ly7NncWyYlAwKRiui1jUZR5WcYhIt FXIzTf3dg9PluaRNFM74ih0l8HABOHZ+yTWC3VapgIcDQ1btBJ0IDtlJKNucSnOnbLig c0/g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=6uqzI/vJCb+lytMRQLBtmGBNvQ3CBGyQ4CHe99juhWw=; b=bFWR51namPFpNgj73hyjBZMFs4a3IEj1FST4pdl19aNydXJiwZguQG0EljWpLFv6Qs 6n8VDyHJPk5a1rbzxwf75SwHz/OYWTRKm7sjWWK4aSoAiwESLT9GLFI1W3Cmz9Dbnk41 52mKxWFRX50wq/aVLc+863SbtHnbsYZzGUkEe0Wyym+C1Db/yuXRAz9AI3AiF1XjIO+K zcg8QDbzidrsFqImiRqEpaEbUCvqapmRnzudnOgAqbH+guvZa46YujL+lX1FxdBbFNTu gIBVYNzDxUH+ZEenYxZJ+pGQ3VzQxekWPzo3naov+2w7gUwlslQALT4jpI357fJUnrhp ZSWQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAV524Bab/CQU3cGYFENOJ3G4xfIU9HpDpIIOG24Nw7CZCNDCdyk bgqTgEII39vaAfWLnV52YWXRbX0ercKCUBePdjj9Ow== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw9Sh4U5QH4PzNP9ZbTWhW45tXHy/W8ePIQAS0ykZLvuNQTIJlI1t1RupZqm8jvXOKMHeZWx2pyg/XWkHVOixM= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6830:1d6e:: with SMTP id l14mr3411629oti.32.1581707524096; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 11:12:04 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200214183554.1133805-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> <20200214183554.1133805-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> In-Reply-To: <20200214183554.1133805-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> From: Jann Horn Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 20:11:36 +0100 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/28] fsuidgid: add fsid mapping helpers To: Christian Brauner Cc: =?UTF-8?Q?St=C3=A9phane_Graber?= , "Eric W. Biederman" , Aleksa Sarai , Stephen Barber , Seth Forshee , Alexander Viro , Alexey Dobriyan , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Phil Estes , kernel list , linux-fsdevel , Linux Containers , linux-security-module , Linux API Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:37 PM Christian Brauner wrote: > This adds a set of helpers to translate between kfsuid/kfsgid and their > userspace fsuid/fsgid counter parts relative to a given user namespace. > > - kuid_t make_kfsuid(struct user_namespace *from, uid_t fsuid) > Maps a user-namespace fsuid pair into a kfsuid. > If no fsuid mappings have been written it behaves identical to calling > make_kuid(). This ensures backwards compatibility for workloads unaware > or not in need of fsid mappings. [...] > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_FSID > +/** > + * make_kfsuid - Map a user-namespace fsuid pair into a kuid. > + * @ns: User namespace that the fsuid is in > + * @fsuid: User identifier > + * > + * Maps a user-namespace fsuid pair into a kernel internal kfsuid, > + * and returns that kfsuid. > + * > + * When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace kfsuid > + * pair INVALID_UID is returned. Callers are expected to test > + * for and handle INVALID_UID being returned. INVALID_UID > + * may be tested for using uid_valid(). > + */ > +kuid_t make_kfsuid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t fsuid) > +{ > + unsigned extents = ns->fsuid_map.nr_extents; > + smp_rmb(); > + > + /* Map the fsuid to a global kernel fsuid */ > + if (extents == 0) > + return KUIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->uid_map, fsuid)); > + > + return KUIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->fsuid_map, fsuid)); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kfsuid); What effect is this fallback going to have for nested namespaces? Let's say we have an outer namespace N1 with this uid_map: 0 100000 65535 and with this fsuid_map: 0 300000 65535 Now from in there, a process that is not aware of the existence of fsuid mappings creates a new user namespace N2 with the following uid_map: 0 1000 1 At this point, if a process in N2 does chown("foo", 0, 0), is that going to make "foo" owned by kuid 101000, which isn't even mapped in N1? > @@ -1215,11 +1376,13 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, > uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) { > u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; > if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { > - kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id); > + kuid_t uid = map_fsid ? make_kfsuid(ns->parent, id) : > + make_kuid(ns->parent, id); > if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid)) > return true; Let's say we have an outer user namespace N1 with this uid_map: 0 1000 3000 and this fsuid_map: 0 2000 3000 and in that namespace, a process is running as UID 1000 (which means kernel-euid=2000, kernel-fsuid=3000). Now this process unshares its user namespace and from this nested user namespace N2, tries to write the following fsuid_map: 0 1000 1 This should work, since the only ID it maps is the one the process had in N1; but the code is AFAICS going to run as follows: if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) { // branch taken u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { // branch taken // uid = make_kfsuid(ns->parent, 1000) = 3000 kuid_t uid = map_fsid ? make_kfsuid(ns->parent, id) : make_kuid(ns->parent, id); // uid_eq(3000, 2000) if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid)) // not taken return true; } else [...] } Instead, I think what would succeed is this, which shouldn't be allowed: 0 0 1 which AFAICS will evaluate as follows: if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) { // branch taken u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { // branch taken // uid = make_kfsuid(ns->parent, 0) = 2000 kuid_t uid = map_fsid ? make_kfsuid(ns->parent, id) : make_kuid(ns->parent, id); // uid_eq(2000, 2000) if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid)) // taken return true; } else [...] } > } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) { > - kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id); > + kgid_t gid = map_fsid ? make_kfsgid(ns->parent, id) : > + make_kgid(ns->parent, id); > if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) && > gid_eq(gid, cred->egid)) > return true; > -- > 2.25.0 >