From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
selinux@vger.kernel.org,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2021 23:44:55 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQEoZVMP9kc224PMsGjkEt0OfYtyr_7D8AArM2xX4U8VA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a3ec6fb4-d0ef-e0ae-d91b-8b92c4d81fbc@schaufler-ca.com>
On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 4:57 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 3/18/2021 1:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
> > hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
> > credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
> > callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
> > a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
> > credentials.
> >
> > This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
> > the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
> > for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
> >
> > void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
> > u32 *secid);
> > void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
> > u32 *secid);
> >
> > While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
> > variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
> > ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
> > both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
> > the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
> > LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
> > implementations and return the correct credentials.
> >
> > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
> > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Thanks Casey.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-19 3:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-18 20:42 [PATCH v2 0/3] Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants Paul Moore
2021-03-18 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants Paul Moore
2021-03-18 20:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-03-19 3:44 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2021-03-19 13:35 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-03-18 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials Paul Moore
2021-03-19 13:36 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-03-18 20:42 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials Paul Moore
2021-03-22 19:29 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants Paul Moore
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