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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: sgrubb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	io-uring@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2021 10:12:08 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRWzizGXuMk3+qK8jcYSDFEqjj+MOtFhHKYH0mpnA52=w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210915122907.GM490529@madcap2.tricolour.ca>

On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 8:29 AM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
> I was in the middle of reviewing the v2 patchset to add my acks when I
> forgot to add the comment that you still haven't convinced me that ses=
> isn't needed or relevant if we are including auid=.

[Side note: v3 was posted on Monday, it would be more helpful to see
the Reviewed-by tags on the v3 patchset.]

Ah, okay, it wasn't clear to me from your earlier comments that this
was your concern.  It sounded as if you were arguing that both session
ID and audit ID needed to be logged for every io_uring op, which
doesn't make sense (as previously discussed).  However, I see your
point, and in fact pulling the audit ID from @current in the
audit_log_uring() function is just plain wrong ... likely a vestige of
the original copy-n-paste or format matching, I'll drop that now.
Thanks.

While a small code change, it is somewhat significant so I'll post an
updated v4 patchset later today once it passes through a round of
testing.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

      parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-15 14:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-11 20:48 [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/9] audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/9] audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/9] audit: dev/test patch to force io_uring auditing Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/9] audit: add filtering for io_uring records Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/9] fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() Paul Moore
2021-08-12  9:32   ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-12 14:32     ` Paul Moore
2021-08-12 15:35       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/9] io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 7/9] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` [RFC PATCH v2 8/9] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` [RFC PATCH v2 9/9] Smack: Brutalist io_uring support with debug Paul Moore
2021-08-31 14:44   ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 15:03     ` Casey Schaufler
2021-08-31 16:43       ` Paul Moore
2021-08-24 20:57 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-24 22:27   ` Paul Moore
2021-08-25  1:36     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26  1:16   ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26  1:34     ` Paul Moore
2021-08-26 16:32       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 19:14         ` Paul Moore
2021-08-27 13:35           ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-27 19:49             ` Paul Moore
2021-08-28 15:03               ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-29 15:18                 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-01 19:21                   ` Paul Moore
2021-09-10  0:58                     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-13 19:23                       ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14  1:50                         ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14  2:49                           ` Paul Moore
2021-09-15 12:29                             ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-15 13:02                               ` Steve Grubb
2021-09-15 14:12                               ` Paul Moore [this message]

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