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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: jeffxu@chromium.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org,
	Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@google.com>,
	Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Add CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_PERMISSIVE_DONTAUDIT
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 15:11:15 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhS-jv5cpSdq7dxFGYH=z=5grQceNMyjroeL2KHdrVUV6g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220921185426.1663357-2-jeffxu@chromium.org>

On Wed, Sep 21, 2022 at 2:54 PM <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
>
> When SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP=y and the system is running in permissive
> mode, it is useful to disable logging from permissive domain, so audit
> log does not get spamed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@google.com>
> Tested-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
> Tested-by: Jeff Xu<jeffxu@chromium.org>
> ---
>  security/selinux/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
>  security/selinux/avc.c   |  9 +++++++++
>  2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)

I'm sorry, but I can't accept this into the upstream kernel.
Permissive mode, both per-domain and system-wide, is not intended to
be a long term solution.  Permissive mode should really only be used
as a development tool or emergency "hotfix" with the proper solution
being either an adjustment of the existing policy (SELinux policy
booleans, labeling changes, etc.) or the development of a new policy
module which better fits your use case.

-- 
paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2022-09-21 19:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-21 18:54 [PATCH 0/1] Add CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_PERMISSIVE_DONTAUDIT jeffxu
2022-09-21 18:54 ` [PATCH 1/1] " jeffxu
2022-09-21 19:11   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2022-09-23 17:43     ` Jeff Xu
2022-09-23 18:04       ` Paul Moore
2022-09-23 18:45         ` Dominick Grift
2022-09-26 18:03           ` Jeff Xu
2022-09-26 21:40             ` Paul Moore
2022-09-28 16:49               ` Jeff Xu
2023-02-13  5:44           ` Jeff Xu
2023-02-13  7:39             ` Dominick Grift
2023-02-17 15:22             ` Stephen Smalley
2023-02-17 15:25               ` Stephen Smalley
2023-03-10  0:32                 ` Jeff Xu
2022-09-21 19:10 ` [PATCH 0/1] " Casey Schaufler

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