From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>,
kpsingh@kernel.org, revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org,
ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
kafai@fb.com, songliubraving@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
john.fastabend@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
shuah@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, cgzones@googlemail.com,
karl@bigbadwolfsecurity.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2022 15:49:48 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSKmqn5wxF3BZ67Z+-CV7sZzdnO+JODq48rZJ4WAe8ULA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <877d3ia65v.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>
On Mon, Aug 8, 2022 at 3:26 PM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> writes:
> >> I did provide constructive feedback. My feedback to his problem
> >> was to address the real problem of bugs in the kernel.
> >
> > We've heard from several people who have use cases which require
> > adding LSM-level access controls and observability to user namespace
> > creation. This is the problem we are trying to solve here; if you do
> > not like the approach proposed in this patchset please suggest another
> > implementation that allows LSMs visibility into user namespace
> > creation.
>
> Please stop, ignoring my feedback, not detailing what problem or
> problems you are actually trying to be solved, and threatening to merge
> code into files that I maintain that has the express purpose of breaking
> my users.
I've heard you talk about bugs being the only reason why people would
want to ever block user namespaces, but I think we've all seen use
cases now where it goes beyond that. However, even if it didn't, the
need to build high confidence/assurance systems where big chunks of
functionality can be disabled based on a security policy is a very
real use case, and this patchset would help enable that. I've noticed
you like to talk about these hooks being a source of "regressions",
but access controls are not regressions Eric, they are tools that
system builders, administrators, and users use to secure their
systems.
From my perspective, I believe that addresses your feedback around
"fix the bugs" and "this is a regression", which is the only thing
I've noted from your responses in this thread and others, but if I'm
missing something more technical please let me/us know.
> You just artificially constrained the problems, so that no other
> solution is acceptable.
There is a real need to be able to gain both additional visibility and
access control over user namespace creation, please suggest the
approach(es) you would find acceptable.
> On that basis alone I am object to this whole
> approach to steam roll over me and my code.
I saw that choice of wording in your last email and thought it a bit
curious, so I did a quick git log dump on kernel/user_namespace.c and
I see approximately 31 contributors to that one file. I've always
thought of the open source maintainer role as more of a "steward" and
less of an "owner", but that's just my opinion.
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-08 19:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-01 18:01 [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Frederick Lawler
2022-08-01 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] security, lsm: " Frederick Lawler
2022-08-02 21:47 ` KP Singh
2022-08-03 13:13 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-08-01 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable Frederick Lawler
2022-08-01 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-08-01 23:06 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-02 21:29 ` KP Singh
2022-08-01 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook Frederick Lawler
2022-08-02 22:08 ` KP Singh
2022-08-01 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] selinux: Implement " Frederick Lawler
2022-08-02 2:56 ` [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-03 2:10 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-08 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-08 19:16 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-08 19:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-08 19:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-08 22:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-09 16:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-09 16:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-09 21:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-09 22:40 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-10 0:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-08-09 17:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-08-09 21:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-08 19:49 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2022-08-09 16:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-14 15:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-15 2:32 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-15 15:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-15 16:24 ` Paul Moore
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