From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Problem with 9ba09998baa9 ("selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook") in linux-next
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 17:09:45 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSUApfdxpFHbZLGqM1g=5XSZBYzxCCTDhhss_FidahbWw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQnORRaRapbb1wrUsxweJCRJ+X+RdvKw8_U0pT0fuxZ6A@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 3:20 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 8:29 AM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> >
> > > ... in particular it is the fifth argument to avc_has_perm(),
> > > "KEY_NEED_VIEW" which is a problem. KEY_NEED_VIEW is not a SELinux
> > > permission and would likely result in odd behavior when passed to
> > > avc_has_perm().
> >
> > I think it works because KEY_NEED_VIEW happens to coincide with KEY__VIEW. It
> > should just use KEY__VIEW instead.
>
> Yes, it looks like it. To be clear, it is dangerous to rely on
> permission values from outside SELinux aligning with SELinux
> permissions; changing the outside permission values w/o adjusting the
> SELinux hook code to do the necessary translation will result in some
> scary behavior (wrong permission checks).
>
> > > it probably makes the most sense to pull the permission mapping in
> > > selinux_key_permission() out into a separate function, e.g.
> > > key_perm_to_av(...)
> >
> > Agreed. How about the attached patch? I wonder if I should do bit-by-bit
> > translation rather than using a switch? But then it's difficult to decide
> > what it means if someone passes in two KEY_NEED_* flags OR'd together - is it
> > either or both?
>
> Comments inline.
>
> > > and then use this newly created mapping function in [...]
> > > selinux_watch_key()
> >
> > No, I think I should just hard-code KEY__VIEW there.
>
> FWIW, my comment was based on a version of linux-next where you were
> making policycap based permission adjustments to KEY_VIEW and I
> thought you would want the same adjustments to be applied to both
> access control points. That code appears to now be gone in
> linux-next.
>
> > ---
> > commit 70d1d82aa014ae4511976b4d80c17138006dddec
> > Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Date: Tue Apr 21 13:15:16 2020 +0100
> >
> > selinux: Fix use of KEY_NEED_* instead of KEY__* perms
> >
> > selinux_key_getsecurity() is passing the KEY_NEED_* permissions to
> > security_sid_to_context() instead of the KEY__* values. It happens to work
> > because the values are all coincident.
> >
> > Fixes: d720024e94de ("[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem")
> > Reported-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index 0b4e32161b77..32f7fa538c5f 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -6539,12 +6539,27 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
> > kfree(ksec);
> > }
> >
> > +static unsigned int selinux_keyperm_to_av(unsigned int need_perm)
> > +{
> > + switch (need_perm) {
> > + case KEY_NEED_VIEW: return KEY__VIEW;
> > + case KEY_NEED_READ: return KEY__READ;
> > + case KEY_NEED_WRITE: return KEY__WRITE;
> > + case KEY_NEED_SEARCH: return KEY__SEARCH;
> > + case KEY_NEED_LINK: return KEY__LINK;
> > + case KEY_NEED_SETATTR: return KEY__SETATTR;
> > + default:
> > + return 0;
> > + }
>
> Regarding your question of permission translation via switch-statement
> as opposed to bit-by-bit comparison, I think it depends on if multiple
> permissions are going to be required in a single call to the hook.
> The failure mode for the code above if multiple permissions are
> requested is not very good, it defaults to *no* permission which means
> that if someone requested KEY_NEED_SEARCH|KEY_NEED_VIEW (or some other
> combination) then the SELinux check would not check any permissions
> ... that seems wrong to me.
>
> If we want to stick with a switch statement I think we should have it
> return -EPERM for the default case to protect against this. We don't
> need the full 32-bits afforded us by the unsigned int.
>
> > +}
> > +
> > static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> > const struct cred *cred,
> > - unsigned perm)
> > + unsigned need_perm)
> > {
> > struct key *key;
> > struct key_security_struct *ksec;
> > + unsigned int perm;
> > u32 sid;
> >
> > /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
> > @@ -6553,6 +6568,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> > if (perm == 0)
> > return 0;
> >
> > + perm = selinux_keyperm_to_av(need_perm);
>
> ... and add a check for (perm < 0) as discussed above if we stick with
> the switch statement.
... and we should probably emit some sort of message to indicate that
an invalid permission set was used.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-22 21:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-17 15:48 Problem with 9ba09998baa9 ("selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook") in linux-next Paul Moore
2020-04-17 16:32 ` Richard Haines
2020-04-17 16:59 ` Paul Moore
2020-04-21 12:29 ` David Howells
2020-04-22 19:20 ` Paul Moore
2020-04-22 21:09 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2020-04-24 23:43 ` David Howells
2020-04-26 20:53 ` Paul Moore
2020-04-27 14:12 ` [PATCH] selinux: Fix use of KEY_NEED_* instead of KEY__* perms David Howells
2020-04-27 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 15:24 ` Paul Moore
2020-04-27 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 22:17 ` Paul Moore
2020-04-28 12:54 ` [PATCH] selinux: Fix use of KEY_NEED_* instead of KEY__* perms [v2] David Howells
2020-04-28 14:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-28 15:57 ` David Howells
2020-04-28 16:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-01 16:37 ` Paul Moore
2020-05-12 22:33 ` [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask David Howells
2020-05-13 1:04 ` Paul Moore
2020-05-13 12:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-13 15:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-13 23:13 ` David Howells
2020-05-14 12:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-14 14:45 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-13 23:16 ` David Howells
2020-05-13 23:25 ` David Howells
2020-05-14 11:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-14 16:58 ` [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code David Howells
2020-05-14 17:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-15 15:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-15 16:45 ` David Howells
2020-05-15 18:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-15 19:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-15 22:27 ` David Howells
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