From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.7 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC353C43387 for ; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 18:36:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B9752070B for ; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 18:36:50 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="YdxvA/HC" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726654AbfAGSgt (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 13:36:49 -0500 Received: from mail-yw1-f66.google.com ([209.85.161.66]:44755 "EHLO mail-yw1-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726758AbfAGSgs (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 13:36:48 -0500 Received: by mail-yw1-f66.google.com with SMTP id b63so522251ywc.11 for ; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 10:36:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=sRMSa7KWUNygxrH9T3/9Y5HGFvY+QklsUvoY0N9jq7M=; b=YdxvA/HC/EFvo9BIXRyilIZ9z0XBdc2tw4gyTGFplBIQugm7C7mmNObU6krRMKlYZ/ Qll09uCnHPoqYrPQep8HydsIT6ch59BJ+MfIa59/W/b03+wkTbaMs1P/JtDTCgmQf7gs JNVGU3LUxmT58obd8/JYhmALLop5XZKn8QpZc= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=sRMSa7KWUNygxrH9T3/9Y5HGFvY+QklsUvoY0N9jq7M=; b=p+BHY12xwpzLaAnM/tvNhbc2PSy0J5lE9tgcT2zSyG0YrhWYwnMu/TES86Yk6+wtia iRnfq75dmrx6ZFOJmfrXIR88aTEx3pE6lY5V4cseODh+a6Io/lp+6+2nFV8rZr19xZyh 9K/Np36XJvm88vEZ3gyUzs5RyAC99hjwjlMuHVuI4Xt36cPJxeCc+RTAuCu3dQfSsa6J Wx94mg4HQbN97+Pva0YS7RcP9MUQP4/WNJ1TPApjvuUYylJC1x/NZAdaRkR6a9dqr4c1 3uYwS0aQGaBQ6yGdhyauhKGwFIPecgIaYGoQZF2UGq1/8D43FT5p6sle8LaZratU9bX6 vOfA== X-Gm-Message-State: AA+aEWY317EfAMeGNOgguEW8L2YQSArm79Vr3F6yO02gZVILpKcqqcbw astFM5F1dWNtMY72bPN8OL2Q878fOz3YLzdnpttpeaQUSEIe4g== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AFSGD/USwmZ+Uof2HM5pXE+IKLOz4H/FY+nZbhNMCX4jxcHlPkYKJMGFuco+At7VpBDm8pPzEZEH8gZp9IqRMqRS2t0= X-Received: by 2002:a81:301:: with SMTP id 1mr62858812ywd.185.1546886206571; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 10:36:46 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <52258331-8aba-c67e-bea0-b5fe0dfcd020@schaufler-ca.com> <20181218223718.96738-1-mortonm@chromium.org> In-Reply-To: From: Micah Morton Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:36:35 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable To: Casey Schaufler Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, Kees Cook , sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: It seems a bit weird to me to keep security_capable_noaudit and not add the analogous "security_capable_insetid" function (or other one-off functions if/when people want to pass new flags to security_capable). Taking away the function doesn't complicate the callers in any way I can see, and somewhat cleans up the logic in at lease one case (ns_capable_common in kernel/capability.c) since callers can just modify the last param in security_capable rather than calling different functions for audit vs. noaudit. I guess my take is why keep "security_capable_noaudit" when it is easy to just call "security_capable" with the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT flag? I have no strong preference here so I'll do whatever seems best. On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 10:16 AM Casey Schaufler wrote: > > On 1/7/2019 9:55 AM, Micah Morton wrote: > > Checking in to see if there are any further comments on this patch now > > that the holidays are passed? It seems like a straightforward change > > to me, but let me know if there is anything I can clarify that isn't > > explained by the commit message. > > > > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 2:37 PM wrote: > >> From: Micah Morton > >> > >> This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the > >> security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is > >> used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for > >> the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag > >> passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether > >> security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by > >> the proposed SafeSetID LSM). > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton > >> --- > >> Changes since the last patch: Changed the code to use a bitmask instead > >> of a struct to represent the options passed to security_capable. > >> > >> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 +++++--- > >> include/linux/security.h | 28 +++++++++++++------------- > >> kernel/capability.c | 22 +++++++++++--------- > >> kernel/seccomp.c | 4 ++-- > >> security/apparmor/capability.c | 14 ++++++------- > >> security/apparmor/include/capability.h | 2 +- > >> security/apparmor/ipc.c | 3 ++- > >> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++-- > >> security/commoncap.c | 17 ++++++++-------- > >> security/security.c | 14 +++++-------- > >> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +++++++-------- > >> security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +- > >> 12 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > >> > >> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > >> index aaeb7fa24dc4..ef955a44a782 100644 > >> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > >> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > >> @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ > >> * @cred contains the credentials to use. > >> * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in > >> * @cap contains the capability . > >> - * @audit contains whether to write an audit message or not > >> + * @opts contains options for the capable check > >> * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. > >> * @syslog: > >> * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing > >> @@ -1446,8 +1446,10 @@ union security_list_options { > >> const kernel_cap_t *effective, > >> const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, > >> const kernel_cap_t *permitted); > >> - int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap, int audit); > >> + int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, > >> + struct user_namespace *ns, > >> + int cap, > >> + unsigned int opts); > >> int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); > >> int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry); > >> int (*syslog)(int type); > >> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > >> index d170a5b031f3..038e6779948c 100644 > >> --- a/include/linux/security.h > >> +++ b/include/linux/security.h > >> @@ -54,9 +54,12 @@ struct xattr; > >> struct xfrm_sec_ctx; > >> struct mm_struct; > >> > >> +/* Default (no) options for the capable function */ > >> +#define SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT 0x0 > >> /* If capable should audit the security request */ > >> -#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0 > >> -#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 > >> +#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0x01 > >> +/* If capable is being called by a setid function */ > >> +#define SECURITY_CAP_INSETID 0x02 > >> > >> /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */ > >> #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1 > >> @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ enum lsm_event { > >> > >> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ > >> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap, int audit); > >> + int cap, unsigned int opts); > >> extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); > >> extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); > >> extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); > >> @@ -233,10 +236,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > >> const kernel_cap_t *effective, > >> const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, > >> const kernel_cap_t *permitted); > >> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap); > >> -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap); > >> +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, > >> + struct user_namespace *ns, > >> + int cap, > >> + unsigned int opts); > >> int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); > >> int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry); > >> int security_syslog(int type); > >> @@ -492,14 +495,11 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, > >> } > >> > >> static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, > >> - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > >> + struct user_namespace *ns, > >> + int cap, > >> + unsigned int opts) > >> { > >> - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > >> -} > >> - > >> -static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, > >> - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { > >> - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > >> + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, opts); > >> } > > Why get rid of security_capable_noaudit()? > > >> > >> static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, > >> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > >> index 1e1c0236f55b..454576743b1b 100644 > >> --- a/kernel/capability.c > >> +++ b/kernel/capability.c > >> @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, > >> int ret; > >> > >> rcu_read_lock(); > >> - ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); > >> + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > >> rcu_read_unlock(); > >> > >> return (ret == 0); > >> @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, > >> int ret; > >> > >> rcu_read_lock(); > >> - ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); > >> + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > >> rcu_read_unlock(); > >> > >> return (ret == 0); > >> @@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) > >> return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); > >> } > >> > >> -static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) > >> +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, > >> + int cap, > >> + unsigned int opts) > >> { > >> int capable; > >> > >> @@ -372,8 +374,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) > >> BUG(); > >> } > >> > >> - capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) : > >> - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap); > >> + capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); > >> if (capable == 0) { > >> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; > >> return true; > >> @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) > >> */ > >> bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > >> { > >> - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true); > >> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > >> } > >> EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); > >> > >> @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); > >> */ > >> bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > >> { > >> - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false); > >> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > >> } > >> EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); > >> > >> @@ -448,10 +449,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); > >> bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> int cap) > >> { > >> + > >> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) > >> return false; > >> > >> - if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) > >> + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0) > >> return true; > >> > >> return false; > >> @@ -500,10 +502,12 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) > >> { > >> int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ > >> const struct cred *cred; > >> + > >> rcu_read_lock(); > >> cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); > >> if (cred) > >> - ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); > >> + ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, > >> + SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > >> rcu_read_unlock(); > >> return (ret == 0); > >> } > >> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c > >> index f2ae2324c232..ddf615eb1bf7 100644 > >> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c > >> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c > >> @@ -383,8 +383,8 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) > >> * behavior of privileged children. > >> */ > >> if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && > >> - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), > >> - CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0) > >> + security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), > >> + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) != 0) > >> return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); > >> > >> /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ > >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c > >> index 253ef6e9d445..0f6dca54b66e 100644 > >> --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c > >> +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c > >> @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, > >> * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap > >> * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) > >> * @cap: capability to test if allowed > >> - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated > >> + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated > >> * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) > >> * > >> * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM > >> */ > >> -static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, > >> - struct common_audit_data *sa) > >> +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, > >> + unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) > >> { > >> int error; > >> > >> @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, > >> else > >> error = -EPERM; > >> > >> - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { > >> + if (opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { > >> if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) > >> return error; > >> /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it > >> @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, > >> * aa_capable - test permission to use capability > >> * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL) > >> * @cap: capability to be tested > >> - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated > >> + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated > >> * > >> * Look up capability in profile capability set. > >> * > >> * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. > >> */ > >> -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) > >> +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) > >> { > >> struct aa_profile *profile; > >> int error = 0; > >> @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) > >> > >> sa.u.cap = cap; > >> error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, > >> - profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa)); > >> + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); > >> > >> return error; > >> } > >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h > >> index e0304e2aeb7f..1b3663b6ab12 100644 > >> --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h > >> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h > >> @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps { > >> > >> extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; > >> > >> -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit); > >> +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); > >> > >> static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps) > >> { > >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c > >> index 527ea1557120..4a1da2313162 100644 > >> --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c > >> +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c > >> @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, > >> aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; > >> aad(sa)->peer = tracee; > >> aad(sa)->request = 0; > >> - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); > >> + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, > >> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > >> > >> return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); > >> } > >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > >> index 42446a216f3b..0bd817084fc1 100644 > >> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > >> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > >> @@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, > >> } > >> > >> static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap, int audit) > >> + int cap, unsigned int opts) > >> { > >> struct aa_label *label; > >> int error = 0; > >> > >> label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); > >> if (!unconfined(label)) > >> - error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit); > >> + error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); > >> aa_put_label(label); > >> > >> return error; > >> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > >> index 232db019f051..3d8609192e17 100644 > >> --- a/security/commoncap.c > >> +++ b/security/commoncap.c > >> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) > >> * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. > >> */ > >> int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > >> - int cap, int audit) > >> + int cap, unsigned int opts) > >> { > >> struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; > >> > >> @@ -222,12 +222,11 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, > >> */ > >> static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) > >> { > >> - > >> /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP > >> * capability > >> */ > >> if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, > >> - CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) > >> + CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0) > >> return 0; > >> return 1; > >> } > >> @@ -1208,8 +1207,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > >> || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ > >> || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ > >> || (cap_capable(current_cred(), > >> - current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, > >> - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ > >> + current_cred()->user_ns, > >> + CAP_SETPCAP, > >> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) != 0) /*[4]*/ > >> /* > >> * [1] no changing of bits that are locked > >> * [2] no unlocking of locks > >> @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) > >> { > >> int cap_sys_admin = 0; > >> > >> - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, > >> - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) > >> + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, > >> + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) > >> cap_sys_admin = 1; > >> + > >> return cap_sys_admin; > >> } > >> > >> @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) > >> > >> if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { > >> ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, > >> - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > >> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > >> /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ > >> if (ret == 0) > >> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; > >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > >> index d670136dda2c..d2334697797a 100644 > >> --- a/security/security.c > >> +++ b/security/security.c > >> @@ -294,16 +294,12 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > >> effective, inheritable, permitted); > >> } > >> > >> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap) > >> +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, > >> + struct user_namespace *ns, > >> + int cap, > >> + unsigned int opts) > >> { > >> - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > >> -} > >> - > >> -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap) > >> -{ > >> - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > >> + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); > >> } > >> > >> int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) > >> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > >> index a67459eb62d5..a4b2e49213de 100644 > >> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > >> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > >> @@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) > >> > >> /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ > >> static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, > >> - int cap, int audit, bool initns) > >> + int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) > >> { > >> struct common_audit_data ad; > >> struct av_decision avd; > >> @@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, > >> > >> rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, > >> sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); > >> - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { > >> + if (!(opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)) { > >> int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, > >> sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); > >> if (rc2) > >> @@ -2316,9 +2316,9 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > >> */ > >> > >> static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > >> - int cap, int audit) > >> + int cap, unsigned int opts) > >> { > >> - return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns); > >> + return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); > >> } > >> > >> static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) > >> @@ -3245,11 +3245,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) > >> static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) > >> { > >> const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > >> - int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; > >> + unsigned int opts = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; > >> > >> - if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit)) > >> + if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) > >> return false; > >> - if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true)) > >> + if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) > >> return false; > >> return true; > >> } > >> @@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > >> case KDSKBENT: > >> case KDSKBSENT: > >> error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, > >> - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true); > >> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT, true); > >> break; > >> > >> /* default case assumes that the command will go > >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c > >> index 9a4c0ad46518..fac2a21aa7d4 100644 > >> --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c > >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c > >> @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred) > >> struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; > >> int rc; > >> > >> - rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > >> + rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > >> if (rc) > >> return false; > >> > >> -- > >> 2.20.0.405.gbc1bbc6f85-goog > >> >