From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 07:51:57 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJ-EccPTayPqZ9_sM+nB2SnGDcrJ2fLwVV7bbLFs9=AvrAAhmQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190122224209.222480-1-mortonm@chromium.org>
Patch set 1 of 2 was "Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>"
as well -- forgot to add that in the commit message above.
On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 2:42 PM <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
>
> This change ensures that the set*uid family of syscalls in kernel/sys.c
> (setreuid, setuid, setresuid, setfsuid) all call ns_capable_common with
> the CAP_OPT_INSETID flag, so capability checks in the security_capable
> hook can know whether they are being called from within a set*uid
> syscall. This change is a no-op by itself, but is needed for the
> proposed SafeSetID LSM.
>
> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
> ---
> These changes used to be part of the main SafeSetID LSM patch set.
>
> include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++
> kernel/capability.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/sys.c | 10 +++++-----
> 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index f640dcbc880c..c3f9a4d558a0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
> extern bool capable(int cap);
> extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> +extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> #else
> static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
> {
> @@ -240,6 +241,10 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> {
> return true;
> }
> +static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
> extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode);
> extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 7718d7dcadc7..e0734ace5bc2 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -417,6 +417,25 @@ bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
>
> +/**
> + * ns_capable_setid - Determine if the current task has a superior capability
> + * in effect, while signalling that this check is being done from within a
> + * setid syscall.
> + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
> + * @cap: The capability to be tested for
> + *
> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
> + * available for use, false if not.
> + *
> + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> + * assumption that it's about to be used.
> + */
> +bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> +{
> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_INSETID);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_setid);
> +
> /**
> * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
> * @cap: The capability to be tested for
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index a48cbf1414b8..a98061c1a124 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
> new->uid = kruid;
> if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
> !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
> - !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
> + !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
> goto error;
> }
>
> @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
> if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
> !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
> !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
> - !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
> + !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
> goto error;
> }
>
> @@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> - if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
> + if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
> new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
> if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
> retval = set_user(new);
> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> - if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
> + if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
> if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
> !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
> goto error;
> @@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
>
> if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
> uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
> - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
> + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
> if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
> new->fsuid = kuid;
> if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
> --
> 2.20.1.97.g81188d93c3-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-25 15:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-31 15:28 [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-10-31 21:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31 21:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-31 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 1:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 15:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 15:56 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:18 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:11 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:22 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:41 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 17:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 19:52 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 16:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 17:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 18:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 18:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-02 19:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 19:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-08 20:53 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-08 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-09 0:30 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-09 23:21 ` [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-11-21 16:54 ` [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-12-06 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2018-12-06 17:51 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-11 17:13 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-15 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: mark all set*uid call sites in kernel/sys.c mortonm
2019-01-15 19:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2019-01-15 19:44 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 21:50 ` [PATCH v4 " mortonm
2019-01-15 22:32 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-16 15:46 ` [PATCH v5 " mortonm
2019-01-16 16:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-22 20:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:28 ` James Morris
2019-01-22 22:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:42 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] " mortonm
2019-01-25 15:51 ` Micah Morton [this message]
2019-01-25 20:15 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] " James Morris
2019-01-25 21:06 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:47 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-28 20:09 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 20:19 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 20:30 ` [PATCH] LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM mortonm
2019-01-28 22:12 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 22:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-29 17:25 ` James Morris
2019-01-29 21:14 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-30 7:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-06 19:03 ` [PATCH] LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest mortonm
2019-02-06 19:26 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-07 21:54 ` Micah Morton
2019-02-12 19:01 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 21:58 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:49 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 4:07 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 19:42 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 19:28 ` [PATCH] " Micah Morton
2018-11-06 19:09 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2018-11-06 20:59 ` [PATCH] " James Morris
2018-11-06 21:21 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2018-11-02 18:07 ` [PATCH] " Stephen Smalley
2018-11-02 19:13 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-19 18:54 ` [PATCH] [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-12-13 22:29 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-13 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-12-14 0:05 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-18 22:37 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-07 17:55 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 18:36 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 19:02 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 22:57 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2019-01-07 23:13 ` [PATCH v2] " Kees Cook
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v4] " mortonm
2019-01-08 0:20 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-09 18:39 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-10 22:31 ` James Morris
2019-01-10 23:03 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
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