From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB042C433E6 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 16:59:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A664423358 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 16:59:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2391752AbhATQ7f (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Jan 2021 11:59:35 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56954 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2391721AbhATQ6l (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Jan 2021 11:58:41 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-x331.google.com (mail-wm1-x331.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::331]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 53FB6C0613CF for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 08:58:01 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wm1-x331.google.com with SMTP id 190so3461269wmz.0 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 08:58:01 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=rpcAZMiidkdn8kgbweSucunSZNfQr7y4sBDVK9pNMyU=; b=aSKdOyEfUZ7+nbgQG4Oz34S0QFBBEpe0NkmOUgkIRQmr7puRYU8XMppmMlQK5DGLFM 0GuKLRPRBMQvkzaw9QCBPnYJ8+Doyqjuf4weUAIPh7K2nTvy5Y9ipXkegUZc0/jbwYMN Z/+ys6EhiyqdFl1caKGMEH7NMXeQT4GVAjgw0ggJJUigQcSJWPWhBUTwagRzTm3SFNUF Vh7dMIiU/ZWLwWHovBCP7+kQOgS1da5mvzAOu1AlNAUshTtLvBSqJVGxkhVPe4yo++Nw +gq/kzv307e98VThRr81N9MAIin6nMYoBnx1wOuKtT9u50vzlv3s0hf29boUw909vpQv 283Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=rpcAZMiidkdn8kgbweSucunSZNfQr7y4sBDVK9pNMyU=; b=E3nnIdrgZnueJglOj+S/rvbYqwxpXGQ39bbMzisP0fhmkBxNe9D6rIo8KyTDk/jDti RaotYt6XKECavfqdHcIte6T2zCuLrXFsZxs1njtOMs+SxKm+nnmwhduA9gWxkei4Vene BKKN4i2USNeGxxhweZ2rcT7N/MtsTJ0hrx9sQkFhZocX/EQLrzJSU5gOso7qqTubqS41 /+/RGuoQVojFgiu4tO+zVCooJV0wn8P4EeGAS2rlGTr9C8dz8flIQaJM2Oo6Ehih0Hq4 31xKGMPXH3Ko1jKbG82o41Up+Yl7t6Mno7bCELNIuu+KPdZQtAdClE+Xm8X/8VYGbXwg wBsg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533qgSksV2dyP0KdXzBTXLiI7nhBpliMzgxfeN+CiWEPQRPNaMER ooBbBOXL/opaY7nPWdJi6MD6/GuY/NslpE0pM0hMtQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzk/tqIUvkT/+lRnqF2/87jws3xp9TGgijlSnku7fw8B2GOkgwDvPruEYich6TykilQINnAL5XxzzoViuhPoV4= X-Received: by 2002:a1c:98c6:: with SMTP id a189mr5184234wme.88.1611161879809; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 08:57:59 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20210111170622.2613577-1-surenb@google.com> <20210112074629.GG22493@dhcp22.suse.cz> <20210112174507.GA23780@redhat.com> <20210113142202.GC22493@dhcp22.suse.cz> In-Reply-To: From: Suren Baghdasaryan Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 08:57:48 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise To: Jann Horn Cc: Michal Hocko , Oleg Nesterov , Andrew Morton , Kees Cook , Jeffrey Vander Stoep , Minchan Kim , Shakeel Butt , David Rientjes , =?UTF-8?Q?Edgar_Arriaga_Garc=C3=ADa?= , Tim Murray , linux-mm , SElinux list , Linux API , LKML , kernel-team , linux-security-module Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 5:18 AM Jann Horn wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 3:22 PM Michal Hocko wrote: > > On Tue 12-01-21 09:51:24, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote: > > > On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 9:45 AM Oleg Nesterov wrote: > > > > > > > > On 01/12, Michal Hocko wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Mon 11-01-21 09:06:22, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > What we want is the ability for one process to influence another process > > > > > > in order to optimize performance across the entire system while leaving > > > > > > the security boundary intact. > > > > > > Replace PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH with a combination of PTRACE_MODE_READ > > > > > > and CAP_SYS_NICE. PTRACE_MODE_READ to prevent leaking ASLR metadata > > > > > > and CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance. > > > > > > > > > > I have to say that ptrace modes are rather obscure to me. So I cannot > > > > > really judge whether MODE_READ is sufficient. My understanding has > > > > > always been that this is requred to RO access to the address space. But > > > > > this operation clearly has a visible side effect. Do we have any actual > > > > > documentation for the existing modes? > > > > > > > > > > I would be really curious to hear from Jann and Oleg (now Cced). > > > > > > > > Can't comment, sorry. I never understood these security checks and never tried. > > > > IIUC only selinux/etc can treat ATTACH/READ differently and I have no idea what > > > > is the difference. > > Yama in particular only does its checks on ATTACH and ignores READ, > that's the difference you're probably most likely to encounter on a > normal desktop system, since some distros turn Yama on by default. > Basically the idea there is that running "gdb -p $pid" or "strace -p > $pid" as a normal user will usually fail, but reading /proc/$pid/maps > still works; so you can see things like detailed memory usage > information and such, but you're not supposed to be able to directly > peek into a running SSH client and inject data into the existing SSH > connection, or steal the cryptographic keys for the current > connection, or something like that. > > > > I haven't seen a written explanation on ptrace modes but when I > > > consulted Jann his explanation was: > > > > > > PTRACE_MODE_READ means you can inspect metadata about processes with > > > the specified domain, across UID boundaries. > > > PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH means you can fully impersonate processes with the > > > specified domain, across UID boundaries. > > > > Maybe this would be a good start to document expectations. Some more > > practical examples where the difference is visible would be great as > > well. > > Before documenting the behavior, it would be a good idea to figure out > what to do with perf_event_open(). That one's weird in that it only > requires PTRACE_MODE_READ, but actually allows you to sample stuff > like userspace stack and register contents (if perf_event_paranoid is > 1 or 2). Maybe for SELinux things (and maybe also for Yama), there > should be a level in between that allows fully inspecting the process > (for purposes like profiling) but without the ability to corrupt its > memory or registers or things like that. Or maybe perf_event_open() > should just use the ATTACH mode. Thanks for additional clarifications, Jann! Just to clarify, the documentation I'm preparing is a man page for process_madvise(2) which will list the required capabilities but won't dive into all the security details. I believe the above suggestions are for documenting different PTRACE modes and will not be included in that man page. Maybe a separate document could do that but I'm definitely not qualified to write it.