From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:00:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu_0bSCdeUGQo=nnKU=mfHXu+-U+qXWqJpJGUd6dVZF61Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190622000358.19895-29-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Sat, 22 Jun 2019 at 02:05, Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:
>
> efivar_ssdt_load allows the kernel to import arbitrary ACPI code from an
> EFI variable, which gives arbitrary code execution in ring 0. Prevent
> that when the kernel is locked down.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> index 55b77c576c42..9f92a013ab27 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
> #include <linux/acpi.h>
> #include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
> #include <linux/memblock.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>
> #include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
>
> @@ -242,6 +243,11 @@ static void generic_ops_unregister(void)
> static char efivar_ssdt[EFIVAR_SSDT_NAME_MAX] __initdata;
> static int __init efivar_ssdt_setup(char *str)
> {
> + int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES);
> +
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> if (strlen(str) < sizeof(efivar_ssdt))
> memcpy(efivar_ssdt, str, strlen(str));
> else
> --
> 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-25 15:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-22 0:03 [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 2:01 ` Dave Young
2019-06-25 2:35 ` Dave Young
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 4:59 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 15:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 18:14 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 17:52 ` Pavel Machek
2019-06-24 13:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-07-10 15:26 ` Joey Lee
2019-07-11 4:11 ` joeyli
2019-06-22 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:01 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 1:49 ` Daniel Axtens
2019-06-27 15:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23 11:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23 1:57 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 15:15 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 19:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-24 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:59 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-25 15:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:25 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 23:01 ` [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM James Morris
2019-06-24 23:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 23:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-25 6:04 ` James Morris
2019-06-25 8:16 ` John Johansen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to='CAKv+Gu_0bSCdeUGQo=nnKU=mfHXu+-U+qXWqJpJGUd6dVZF61Q@mail.gmail.com' \
--to=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=matthewgarrett@google.com \
--cc=mjg59@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).