From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V31 22/25] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 12:21:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUtYir8bCCMMH2kEAEmWBB_h4tL_9fq0zgNwRNXmZfG6A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190326182742.16950-23-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 11:28 AM Matthew Garrett
<matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:
>
> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>
> There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
> bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk. These allow
> private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
> be read by an eBPF program and kernel memory to be altered without
> restriction. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in
> confidentiality mode.
>
:)
This is yet another reason to get the new improved bpf_probe_user_read
stuff landed!
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-26 19:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-26 18:27 [PATCH V31 00/25] Add support for kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 01/25] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 02/25] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 03/25] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 04/25] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 05/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 6:34 ` Dave Young
2019-06-21 20:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 20:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 6:43 ` Dave Young
2019-06-21 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 1:52 ` Dave Young
2019-06-24 21:06 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 21:27 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-25 0:02 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-25 1:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-25 2:51 ` Dave Young
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 08/25] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 09/25] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 10/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-26 21:19 ` Alex Williamson
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 11/25] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 20:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 12/25] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 13/25] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 14/25] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 15/25] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 16/25] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 17/25] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 18/25] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 19/25] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-03-27 15:57 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-03-27 16:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 20/25] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 21/25] Lock down kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 22/25] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 19:21 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 23/25] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 24/25] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 19:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-26 19:21 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-27 0:30 ` Greg KH
2019-03-27 4:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-27 5:06 ` Greg KH
2019-03-27 5:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-27 5:33 ` Greg KH
2019-03-27 16:53 ` James Morris
2019-03-27 17:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-27 17:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-27 18:29 ` Greg KH
2019-03-27 18:31 ` Greg KH
2019-03-27 0:31 ` Greg KH
2019-03-27 2:06 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-27 2:35 ` Greg KH
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