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From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
	penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 6/8] LSM: lsm_self_attr syscall for LSM self attributes
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 08:03:29 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y1jNsT0F7NKBi17h@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221025184519.13231-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 11:45:17AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a system call lsm_self_attr() to provide the security
> module maintained attributes of the current process. Historically
> these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in
> procfs under /proc/self/attr.
> 
> Attributes are provided as a collection of lsm_ctx structures
> which are placed into a user supplied buffer. Each structure
> identifys the security module providing the attribute, which
> of the possible attributes is provided, the size of the
> attribute, and finally the attribute value. The format of the
> attribute value is defined by the security module, but will
> always be \0 terminated. The ctx_len value will be larger than
> strlen(ctx).
> 
>         ------------------------------
>         | unsigned int id            |
>         ------------------------------
>         | unsigned int flags         |
>         ------------------------------
>         | __kernel_size_t ctx_len    |
>         ------------------------------
>         | unsigned char ctx[ctx_len] |
>         ------------------------------
>         | unsigned int id            |
>         ------------------------------
>         | unsigned int flags         |
>         ------------------------------
>         | __kernel_size_t ctx_len    |
>         ------------------------------
>         | unsigned char ctx[ctx_len] |
>         ------------------------------
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/syscalls.h |   2 +
>  include/uapi/linux/lsm.h |  21 ++++++
>  kernel/sys_ni.c          |   3 +
>  security/Makefile        |   1 +
>  security/lsm_syscalls.c  | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 183 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 security/lsm_syscalls.c
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> index a34b0f9a9972..2d9033e9e5a0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct clone_args;
>  struct open_how;
>  struct mount_attr;
>  struct landlock_ruleset_attr;
> +struct lsm_cxt;
>  enum landlock_rule_type;
>  
>  #include <linux/types.h>
> @@ -1056,6 +1057,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int flags);
>  asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy_home_node(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
>  					    unsigned long home_node,
>  					    unsigned long flags);
> +asmlinkage long sys_lsm_self_attr(struct lsm_ctx *ctx, size_t *size, int flags);
>  
>  /*
>   * Architecture-specific system calls
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> index 61e13b1b9ece..1d27fb5b7746 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> @@ -9,6 +9,27 @@
>  #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LSM_H
>  #define _UAPI_LINUX_LSM_H
>  
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/unistd.h>
> +
> +/**
> + * struct lsm_ctx - LSM context
> + * @id: the LSM id number, see LSM_ID_XXX
> + * @flags: context specifier and LSM specific flags
> + * @ctx_len: the size of @ctx
> + * @ctx: the LSM context, a nul terminated string
> + *
> + * @ctx in a nul terminated string.
> + *	(strlen(@ctx) < @ctx_len) is always true.
> + *	(strlen(@ctx) == @ctx_len + 1) is not guaranteed.
> + */
> +struct lsm_ctx {
> +	unsigned int		id;
> +	unsigned int		flags;
> +	__kernel_size_t		ctx_len;
> +	unsigned char		ctx[];

Please use data types that are allowed to cross the user/kernel boundry
in a safe way.  That would mean this would use __u64 instead of unsigned
int, and __u8 instead of unsigned char.

thanks,

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-26  6:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20221025184519.13231-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-10-25 18:45 ` [PATCH v1 0/8] LSM: Two basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 1/8] LSM: Identify modules by more than name Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26  5:56     ` Greg KH
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 2/8] LSM: Add an LSM identifier for external use Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26  5:58     ` Greg KH
2022-10-26 19:36       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-27  0:11         ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-10-27  6:31         ` Greg KH
2022-10-28 16:54           ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-09 23:33             ` Paul Moore
2022-11-10  0:57               ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-10  2:37                 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-09 23:33     ` Paul Moore
2022-11-10  0:46       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 3/8] LSM: Identify the process attributes for each module Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26  5:59     ` Greg KH
2022-11-09 23:34     ` Paul Moore
2022-11-10  1:03       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-10  2:39         ` Paul Moore
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 4/8] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26  6:00     ` Greg KH
2022-10-27  0:38       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-27  6:29         ` Greg KH
2022-10-27 17:08           ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-27 17:13             ` Greg KH
2022-11-09 23:34               ` Paul Moore
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 5/8] proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Casey Schaufler
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 6/8] LSM: lsm_self_attr syscall for LSM self attributes Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26  6:03     ` Greg KH [this message]
2022-10-26  7:01     ` kernel test robot
2022-10-26  8:14     ` kernel test robot
2022-10-26  9:33     ` kernel test robot
2022-11-09 23:34     ` Paul Moore
2022-11-10  1:32       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-10  3:02         ` Paul Moore
2022-11-10 23:36       ` Paul Moore
2022-11-11  0:36         ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-11  3:16           ` Paul Moore
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 7/8] LSM: Create lsm_module_list system call Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26  6:02     ` Greg KH
2022-10-26 12:07     ` kernel test robot
2022-11-09 23:35     ` Paul Moore
2022-11-10  1:37       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-10  3:17         ` Paul Moore
2022-10-25 18:45   ` [PATCH v1 8/8] lsm: wireup syscalls lsm_self_attr and lsm_module_list Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26  8:07     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-11-23 19:57 [PATCH v1 0/8] LSM: Two basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2022-11-23 19:57 ` [PATCH v1 6/8] LSM: lsm_self_attr syscall for LSM self attributes Casey Schaufler

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