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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Dominik Brodowski" <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Kentaro Takeda" <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
	"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 06:33:02 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YGQXnqNsG0iUljvk@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202103302249.6FE62C03@keescook>

On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 11:03:10PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

> Regardless, I still endorse this change because it doesn't make things
> _worse_, since without this, a compromised process wouldn't need ANY
> tricks to escape a chroot because it wouldn't be in one. :) It'd be nice
> if there were some way to make future openat() calls be unable to
> resolve outside the chroot, but I view that as an enhancement.
> 
> But, as it stands, I think this makes sense and I stand by my
> Reviewed-by tag. If Al is too busy to take it, and James would rather
> not take VFS, perhaps akpm would carry it? That's where other similar
> VFS security work has landed.

Frankly, I'm less than fond of that thing, but right now I'm buried
under all kinds of crap (->d_revalidate() joy, mostly).  I'll post
a review, but for now it's very definitely does *not* get an implicit
ACK from me.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-31  6:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-16 20:36 [PATCH v5 0/1] Unprivileged chroot Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:36 ` [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-30 17:01   ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-30 17:19     ` Casey Schaufler
2021-03-30 18:11       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-30 18:22         ` Casey Schaufler
2021-03-30 18:40         ` Casey Schaufler
2021-03-30 19:28           ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-30 22:53             ` Casey Schaufler
2021-03-31  6:03               ` Kees Cook
2021-03-31  6:33                 ` Al Viro [this message]
2021-03-26 23:12 Askar Safin
2021-03-27 18:56 ` Mickaël Salaün

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