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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: "Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David Gstir" <david@sigma-star.at>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"kernel@pengutronix.de" <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Aymen Sghaier" <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Udit Agarwal" <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>,
	"Jan Luebbe" <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
	"Franck Lenormand" <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 23:03:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YGViOc3DG+Pjuur6@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YGVfDUHunGC44iuH@kernel.org>

On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 08:50:05AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 12:11:32PM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 31, 2021 at 04:34:29PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 02:31:46AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > It's a bummer but uapi is the god in the end. Since TPM does not do it
> > > > today, that behaviour must be supported forever. That's why a boot option
> > > > AND a warning would be the best compromise.
> > > 
> > > It's not UAPI if there is no way for userspace to tell if it changed.
> > 
> > Exactly.  UAPI is only an issue if something *breaks*.
> 
> If there's even one user that comes shouting that he has a user space
> configuration, where e.g. rng entropy is consumed constantly and the
> code assumes that trusted keys does not add to that, then something
> would break.
> 
> It would be a crap user space yes, but I don't want to go on reverting
> because of that. I think there is small but still existing chance that
> something could break.

random.c no longer provides any interfaces that subtract entropy credits, as
that was never something that made sense.  So "consuming" all the entropy from
random.c isn't a thing anymore.

> 
> Why not just add a boot parameter instead of making brutal enforcing
> changes, indirectly visible to the user space?

Why not just fix this bug instead of providing an option to fix it that everyone
will need to remember to provide?

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-01  6:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-16 17:01 [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-21 20:46   ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:41     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] KEYS: trusted: implement fallback to kernel RNG Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 19:22   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-17 13:58     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 23:14   ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17  7:39     ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-17  8:07       ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 14:02     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:28       ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-21 20:48   ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:35     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-23 18:07       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-24  9:26         ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-24 10:47           ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-24 14:07             ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-25  5:26               ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-27 12:41                 ` David Gstir
2021-03-28 20:37                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-29 10:11                     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-31 23:29                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-30  7:26                     ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-31 23:30                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-04-01  7:41                         ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:47                     ` Eric Biggers
2021-03-31 23:31                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-31 23:34                         ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-01  1:11                           ` Herbert Xu
2021-04-01  5:50                             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-04-01  6:03                               ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2021-04-01  5:46                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-24 16:14         ` James Bottomley
2021-03-24 20:49           ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-24 21:58             ` James Bottomley
2021-04-02  1:49           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-03-31 18:35   ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:15     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:23       ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-16 23:10 ` [PATCH v1 0/3] " Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 14:08   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:50     ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:04       ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:20         ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:28           ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:53             ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:57               ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 11:05                 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 11:13                   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 11:16                     ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-30 22:04     ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-30 22:16       ` James Bottomley
2021-03-31 18:36         ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-31 18:49           ` James Bottomley
2021-03-31 19:36             ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:06               ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 13:20                 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 18:26                   ` James Bottomley
2021-04-01 12:55       ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 13:17         ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 13:30           ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 13:52             ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 13:59               ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 14:12                 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 11:11     ` David Howells
2021-03-21 20:01 ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:34   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-24  6:23     ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-23 16:37   ` Ahmad Fatoum

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