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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 11:07:55 +0300
Message-ID: <a143e9e8-d800-1dc9-ee7b-7125596a1e7e@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com>

Hi,

Is there anything else that could be done from my side to move this forward?

Thanks,
Alexey

On 30.04.2020 10:06, Alexey Budankov wrote:
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - mention "CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN" instead of sole CAP_PERFMON or 
>   CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the docs and messages to support use case
>   of newer Perf tool on kernel w/o CAP_PERFMON
> - reverted double new line in "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n"
> - updated security.txt content with new messages wording
> 
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/66f2975b-4a69-b428-7dc5-d9aa40b3c673@linux.intel.com/
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - implemented minor doc and code changes to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>   with CAP_PERFMON capability;
> - introduced Perf doc file with instructions on how to enable and use
>   perf_event LSM hooks for mandatory access control to perf_event_open()
>   syscall;
> 
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b8a0669e-36e4-a0e8-fd35-3dbd890d2170@linux.intel.com/
> 
> repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux.git perf/core
> sha1: ee097e8ee56f8867cbbf45fe2a06f6b9e660c39c
> 
> 
> Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify 
> in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced 
> SELinux policy settings. See new added security.txt file for exact steps
> how the changes look like and how to test the patch set.
> 
> ---
> Alexey Budankov (3):
>   perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed
>   perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
>   perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues
> 
>  tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt |   2 +-
>  tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt      | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  tools/perf/util/cloexec.c                  |   4 +-
>  tools/perf/util/evsel.c                    |  39 ++--
>  4 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
> 

  parent reply index

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-30  7:06 Alexey Budankov
2020-04-30  7:15 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed Alexey Budankov
2020-04-30  7:15 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov
2020-05-18 15:58   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-05-18 16:43     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-05-19  7:34       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-05-19 18:10         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-30  7:16 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues Alexey Budankov
2020-05-18 15:59   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-05-18 16:50     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-05-18 17:06       ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-05-18  8:07 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-04-24  6:45 [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov

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