From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EC41C433E2 for ; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 09:44:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BF7C208DB for ; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 09:44:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725964AbgHaJo0 convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Mon, 31 Aug 2020 05:44:26 -0400 Received: from lhrrgout.huawei.com ([185.176.76.210]:2712 "EHLO huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725915AbgHaJoZ (ORCPT ); Mon, 31 Aug 2020 05:44:25 -0400 Received: from lhreml727-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.7.108]) by Forcepoint Email with ESMTP id 6D646A6DED6AE900DFEB; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 10:44:21 +0100 (IST) Received: from fraeml701-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.50) by lhreml727-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.78) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.1913.5; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 10:44:21 +0100 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) by fraeml701-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.50) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256) id 15.1.1913.5; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 11:44:20 +0200 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com ([10.206.15.33]) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com ([10.206.15.33]) with mapi id 15.01.1913.007; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 11:44:20 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: Mimi Zohar , "mjg59@google.com" CC: "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Silviu Vlasceanu Subject: RE: [PATCH 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Thread-Topic: [PATCH 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Thread-Index: AQHWRYodp/NjA9peNES6j1M1Cdu/PKlDKc4AgA9AvsA= Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 09:44:20 +0000 Message-ID: References: <20200618160133.937-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> <20200618160133.937-2-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> <8a1773d7707639d275fff138736d57472e26ade5.camel@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <8a1773d7707639d275fff138736d57472e26ade5.camel@linux.ibm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [10.48.205.186] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: > From: Mimi Zohar [mailto:zohar@linux.ibm.com] > Sent: Friday, August 21, 2020 8:45 PM > On Thu, 2020-06-18 at 18:01 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > Public keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the restriction on the > > IMA/EVM keyrings ensures that a key is loaded only if it is signed with a > > key in the primary or secondary keyring. > > > > However, when evm_load_x509() is loaded, appraisal is already enabled > and > > a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification. > > > > Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM keyrings, it is safe > > to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch calls > > evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is > defined. > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu > > --- > > security/integrity/iint.c | 2 ++ > > security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++++ > > 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c > > index e12c4900510f..4765a266ba96 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c > > @@ -212,7 +212,9 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t > offset, > > void __init integrity_load_keys(void) > > { > > ima_load_x509(); > > +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 > > evm_load_x509(); > > +#endif > > } > > > > static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > > index 4902fe7bd570..9d29a1680da8 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > > @@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) > > > > ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; > > integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, > CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH); > > + > > + /* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */ > > + evm_load_x509(); > > + > > ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; > > } > > #endif > > As much as possible IMA and EVM should remain independent of each > other. Modifying integrity_load_x509() doesn't help. This looks like > a good reason for calling another EVM function from within IMA. Can I add your Reviewed-by? Thanks Roberto HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063 Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli