From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 06:55:27 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1909060644570.1710@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b5705661-089a-cb9c-53b5-21b855937638@tycho.nsa.gov>
On Thu, 5 Sep 2019, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> For the next and any future rounds of stacking support, I'm hoping we can be a
> bit more rigorous in our code review and testing requirements.
After the 5th iteration of the patchset and with everything having at
least one trusted reviewer, I did ask the list if there were any
objections and stated I would otherwise merge to v4.21:
http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2018-December/010209.html
Regardless, from now I'll also require signoffs from all of the major LSMs
on these kinds of changes.
I'd have to say I also have concerns about the direction of LSM stacking
and what its final goal is. It seems to makes sense to be able to stack
Apparmor inside SELinux or Smack, so that folk can use AA system
containers on an SELinux or Smack host.
We've not seen other proposed use-cases for full stacking materialize in a
sustained and viable manner.
Are there really any beyond AA inside a labeling LSM? Because if not I
think this is a reasonable goal state for LSM stacking until we concretely
know otherwise.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-05 20:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-04 14:32 [PATCH] selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob Stephen Smalley
2019-09-04 15:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-09-04 15:31 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-09-04 16:46 ` John Johansen
2019-09-04 19:35 ` James Morris
2019-09-04 22:50 ` Paul Moore
2019-09-05 20:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-09-05 20:55 ` James Morris [this message]
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