* [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
@ 2020-03-13 17:27 Alexey Budankov
2020-03-19 6:23 ` Alexey Budankov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Alexey Budankov @ 2020-03-13 17:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Cc: Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim, Alexander Shishkin, Peter Zijlstra,
Ingo Molnar, Andi Kleen, linux-kernel, selinux,
linux-security-module
Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify
in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced
SELinux policy settings.
Testing and evaluation (Fedora 31 x86_64 with enforced Targeted policy extended
by perf_event class (see refpolicy [1] master branch)):
[root@host ~]# ps -Z
LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 3960 pts/1 00:00:00 bash
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4167 pts/1 00:00:00 ps
[root@host ~]# ls -alhZ /usr/local/bin/
total 56M
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.0K Mar 4 12:27 .
drwxr-xr-x. 12 root root system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0 4.0K Jul 25 2019 ..
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash.before_shellshock_patch
...
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 372 May 14 2019 flask
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:15 perf <== unprivileged users (perf_event_paranoid)
-rwxr-x---. 1 root perf_users unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:19 perf.cap <== perf_users (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 44K Dec 8 2016 spiff
...
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4 Aug 21 2018 zstdmt -> zstd
[root@host ~]# getenforce
Enforcing
=== Access by unprivileged user ===
[user@host ~]$ ps -Z
LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps
[user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls
Error:
Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.
SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance
monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records
for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open
access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1:
-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
>= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
>= 1: Disallow CPU event access
>= 2: Disallow kernel profiling
To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it
in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)
[root@host ~]# journalctl --follow
... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0
... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0
... setroubleshoot[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d
... python3[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t.
***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests **************************
If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default.
Then you should report this as a bug.
You can generate a local policy module to allow this access.
Do
allow this access for now by executing:
# ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf
# semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp
=== Access by perf privileged user ===
[user@host ~]$ ps -Z
LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps
[user@host ~]$ libcap/progs/getcap /usr/local/bin/perf.cap
/usr/local/bin/perf.cap = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_sys_admin+ep
[user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -- ls
Error:
Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.
SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance
monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records
for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open
access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1:
-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
>= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
>= 1: Disallow CPU event access
>= 2: Disallow kernel profiling
To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it
in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)
[root@host ~]# journalctl --follow
... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0
... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0
... setroubleshoot[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d
... python3[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t.
***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests **************************
If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default.
Then you should report this as a bug.
You can generate a local policy module to allow this access.
Do
allow this access for now by executing:
# ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf
# semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp
=== Open access to performance monitoring and observability operations in unconfined_t domain ===
[root@host ~]# ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te
module my-perf 1.0;
require {
type unconfined_t;
class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write };
}
#============= unconfined_t ==============
allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write };
[root@host ~]# semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp
[user@host ~]$ ps -Z
LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps
[user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls
Desktop Documents Downloads intel Music perf.data perf.data.old Pictures Public Templates Videos
Performance counter stats for 'ls':
0.72 msec task-clock:u # 0.655 CPUs utilized
0 context-switches:u # 0.000 K/sec
0 cpu-migrations:u # 0.000 K/sec
98 page-faults:u # 0.137 M/sec
908,356 cycles:u # 1.266 GHz
729,984 instructions:u # 0.80 insn per cycle
142,774 branches:u # 198.968 M/sec
8,238 branch-misses:u # 5.77% of all branches
0.001095239 seconds time elapsed
0.001147000 seconds user
0.000000000 seconds sys
[user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -a
Error:
Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.
SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance
monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records
for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open
access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1:
-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
>= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
>= 1: Disallow CPU event access
>= 2: Disallow kernel profiling
To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it
in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)
[user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -a
^C
Performance counter stats for 'system wide':
13,427.05 msec cpu-clock # 7.997 CPUs utilized
783 context-switches # 0.058 K/sec
29 cpu-migrations # 0.002 K/sec
6 page-faults # 0.000 K/sec
161,084,874 cycles # 0.012 GHz
146,823,131 instructions # 0.91 insn per cycle
12,164,802 branches # 0.906 M/sec
380,350 branch-misses # 3.13% of all branches
1.678938906 seconds time elapsed
[1] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 ++--
tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
index a12872f2856a..9c8ec816261b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void)
return 1;
}
- WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY,
+ WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
"perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n",
err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)));
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void)
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
- if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY,
+ if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
"perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n",
err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))))
return -1;
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index 816d930d774e..f03ce1d362d3 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2493,32 +2493,40 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
int err, char *msg, size_t size)
{
char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE];
- int printed = 0;
+ int printed = 0, enforced = 0;
switch (err) {
case EPERM:
case EACCES:
+ printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
+ "Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n");
+
+ if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) {
+ if (enforced) {
+ printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
+ "SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance\n"
+ "monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records\n"
+ "for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n");
+ }
+ }
+
if (err == EPERM)
- printed = scnprintf(msg, size,
- "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n",
+ printed += scnprintf(msg, size,
+ "No permission to enable %s event.\n",
perf_evsel__name(evsel));
return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
- "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
- "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
- "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
- "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
- "The current value is %d:\n\n"
+ "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n"
+ "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n"
+ "without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n"
" -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
" Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
- ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
- " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
- ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
- ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
- "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
- " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
- target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
- perf_event_paranoid());
+ ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n"
+ ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n"
+ ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n"
+ "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n"
+ "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)",
+ perf_event_paranoid());
case ENOENT:
return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.",
perf_evsel__name(evsel));
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control 2020-03-13 17:27 [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov @ 2020-03-19 6:23 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-03-19 19:01 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Alexey Budankov @ 2020-03-19 6:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim, Alexander Shishkin, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andi Kleen, linux-kernel, selinux, linux-security-module Hi, Is there any thougts, comments or questions so far? Please share you mind. Thanks, Alexey On 13.03.2020 20:27, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify > in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced > SELinux policy settings. > > Testing and evaluation (Fedora 31 x86_64 with enforced Targeted policy extended > by perf_event class (see refpolicy [1] master branch)): > > [root@host ~]# ps -Z > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 3960 pts/1 00:00:00 bash > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4167 pts/1 00:00:00 ps > > [root@host ~]# ls -alhZ /usr/local/bin/ > total 56M > drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.0K Mar 4 12:27 . > drwxr-xr-x. 12 root root system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0 4.0K Jul 25 2019 .. > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash.before_shellshock_patch > ... > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 372 May 14 2019 flask > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:15 perf <== unprivileged users (perf_event_paranoid) > -rwxr-x---. 1 root perf_users unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:19 perf.cap <== perf_users (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 44K Dec 8 2016 spiff > ... > lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4 Aug 21 2018 zstdmt -> zstd > > [root@host ~]# getenforce > Enforcing > > === Access by unprivileged user === > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls > Error: > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > [root@host ~]# journalctl --follow > ... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > ... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > ... setroubleshoot[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d > ... python3[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. > > ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests ************************** > > If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. > Then you should report this as a bug. > You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. > Do > allow this access for now by executing: > # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf > # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > === Access by perf privileged user === > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > [user@host ~]$ libcap/progs/getcap /usr/local/bin/perf.cap > /usr/local/bin/perf.cap = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_sys_admin+ep > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -- ls > Error: > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > [root@host ~]# journalctl --follow > > ... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > ... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > ... setroubleshoot[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d > ... python3[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. > > ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests ************************** > > If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. > Then you should report this as a bug. > You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. > Do > allow this access for now by executing: > # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf > # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > === Open access to performance monitoring and observability operations in unconfined_t domain === > > [root@host ~]# ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te > > module my-perf 1.0; > > require { > type unconfined_t; > class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; > } > > #============= unconfined_t ============== > allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; > > [root@host ~]# semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls > Desktop Documents Downloads intel Music perf.data perf.data.old Pictures Public Templates Videos > > Performance counter stats for 'ls': > > 0.72 msec task-clock:u # 0.655 CPUs utilized > 0 context-switches:u # 0.000 K/sec > 0 cpu-migrations:u # 0.000 K/sec > 98 page-faults:u # 0.137 M/sec > 908,356 cycles:u # 1.266 GHz > 729,984 instructions:u # 0.80 insn per cycle > 142,774 branches:u # 198.968 M/sec > 8,238 branch-misses:u # 5.77% of all branches > > 0.001095239 seconds time elapsed > > 0.001147000 seconds user > 0.000000000 seconds sys > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -a > Error: > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -a > ^C > Performance counter stats for 'system wide': > > 13,427.05 msec cpu-clock # 7.997 CPUs utilized > 783 context-switches # 0.058 K/sec > 29 cpu-migrations # 0.002 K/sec > 6 page-faults # 0.000 K/sec > 161,084,874 cycles # 0.012 GHz > 146,823,131 instructions # 0.91 insn per cycle > 12,164,802 branches # 0.906 M/sec > 380,350 branch-misses # 3.13% of all branches > > 1.678938906 seconds time elapsed > > [1] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> > --- > tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 ++-- > tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- > 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > index a12872f2856a..9c8ec816261b 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > +++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) > return 1; > } > > - WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY, > + WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, > "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n", > err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))); > > @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) > if (fd >= 0) > close(fd); > > - if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY, > + if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, > "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n", > err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)))) > return -1; > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > index 816d930d774e..f03ce1d362d3 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > @@ -2493,32 +2493,40 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, > int err, char *msg, size_t size) > { > char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; > - int printed = 0; > + int printed = 0, enforced = 0; > > switch (err) { > case EPERM: > case EACCES: > + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > + "Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n"); > + > + if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) { > + if (enforced) { > + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > + "SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance\n" > + "monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records\n" > + "for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n"); > + } > + } > + > if (err == EPERM) > - printed = scnprintf(msg, size, > - "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n", > + printed += scnprintf(msg, size, > + "No permission to enable %s event.\n", > perf_evsel__name(evsel)); > > return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > - "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" > - "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" > - "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" > - "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" > - "The current value is %d:\n\n" > + "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n" > + "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n" > + "without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n" > " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" > " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" > - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" > - "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" > - " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , > - target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", > - perf_event_paranoid()); > + ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n" > + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n" > + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n" > + "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n" > + "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)", > + perf_event_paranoid()); > case ENOENT: > return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.", > perf_evsel__name(evsel)); > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control 2020-03-19 6:23 ` Alexey Budankov @ 2020-03-19 19:01 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-03-19 19:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2020-03-19 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Alexey Budankov Cc: Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim, Alexander Shishkin, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andi Kleen, linux-kernel, selinux, linux-security-module Em Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 09:23:30AM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu: > Hi, > > Is there any thougts, comments or questions so far? > Please share you mind. From a quick look, seems ok, I'll do some testing now, - Arnaldo > Thanks, > Alexey > > On 13.03.2020 20:27, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > > > Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify > > in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced > > SELinux policy settings. > > > > Testing and evaluation (Fedora 31 x86_64 with enforced Targeted policy extended > > by perf_event class (see refpolicy [1] master branch)): > > > > [root@host ~]# ps -Z > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 3960 pts/1 00:00:00 bash > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4167 pts/1 00:00:00 ps > > > > [root@host ~]# ls -alhZ /usr/local/bin/ > > total 56M > > drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.0K Mar 4 12:27 . > > drwxr-xr-x. 12 root root system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0 4.0K Jul 25 2019 .. > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash.before_shellshock_patch > > ... > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 372 May 14 2019 flask > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:15 perf <== unprivileged users (perf_event_paranoid) > > -rwxr-x---. 1 root perf_users unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:19 perf.cap <== perf_users (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 44K Dec 8 2016 spiff > > ... > > lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4 Aug 21 2018 zstdmt -> zstd > > > > [root@host ~]# getenforce > > Enforcing > > > > === Access by unprivileged user === > > > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls > > Error: > > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK > >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access > >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access > >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > > > [root@host ~]# journalctl --follow > > ... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > ... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > ... setroubleshoot[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d > > ... python3[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. > > > > ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests ************************** > > > > If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. > > Then you should report this as a bug. > > You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. > > Do > > allow this access for now by executing: > > # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf > > # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > > > === Access by perf privileged user === > > > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > > > [user@host ~]$ libcap/progs/getcap /usr/local/bin/perf.cap > > /usr/local/bin/perf.cap = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_sys_admin+ep > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -- ls > > Error: > > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK > >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access > >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access > >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > > > [root@host ~]# journalctl --follow > > > > ... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > ... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > > > ... setroubleshoot[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d > > ... python3[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. > > > > ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests ************************** > > > > If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. > > Then you should report this as a bug. > > You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. > > Do > > allow this access for now by executing: > > # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf > > # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > > > === Open access to performance monitoring and observability operations in unconfined_t domain === > > > > [root@host ~]# ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te > > > > module my-perf 1.0; > > > > require { > > type unconfined_t; > > class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; > > } > > > > #============= unconfined_t ============== > > allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; > > > > [root@host ~]# semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls > > Desktop Documents Downloads intel Music perf.data perf.data.old Pictures Public Templates Videos > > > > Performance counter stats for 'ls': > > > > 0.72 msec task-clock:u # 0.655 CPUs utilized > > 0 context-switches:u # 0.000 K/sec > > 0 cpu-migrations:u # 0.000 K/sec > > 98 page-faults:u # 0.137 M/sec > > 908,356 cycles:u # 1.266 GHz > > 729,984 instructions:u # 0.80 insn per cycle > > 142,774 branches:u # 198.968 M/sec > > 8,238 branch-misses:u # 5.77% of all branches > > > > 0.001095239 seconds time elapsed > > > > 0.001147000 seconds user > > 0.000000000 seconds sys > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -a > > Error: > > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK > >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access > >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access > >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -a > > ^C > > Performance counter stats for 'system wide': > > > > 13,427.05 msec cpu-clock # 7.997 CPUs utilized > > 783 context-switches # 0.058 K/sec > > 29 cpu-migrations # 0.002 K/sec > > 6 page-faults # 0.000 K/sec > > 161,084,874 cycles # 0.012 GHz > > 146,823,131 instructions # 0.91 insn per cycle > > 12,164,802 branches # 0.906 M/sec > > 380,350 branch-misses # 3.13% of all branches > > > > 1.678938906 seconds time elapsed > > > > [1] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy > > > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> > > --- > > tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 ++-- > > tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- > > 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > > index a12872f2856a..9c8ec816261b 100644 > > --- a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > > +++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > > @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) > > return 1; > > } > > > > - WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY, > > + WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, > > "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n", > > err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))); > > > > @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) > > if (fd >= 0) > > close(fd); > > > > - if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY, > > + if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, > > "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n", > > err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)))) > > return -1; > > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > > index 816d930d774e..f03ce1d362d3 100644 > > --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > > +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > > @@ -2493,32 +2493,40 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, > > int err, char *msg, size_t size) > > { > > char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; > > - int printed = 0; > > + int printed = 0, enforced = 0; > > > > switch (err) { > > case EPERM: > > case EACCES: > > + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > > + "Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n"); > > + > > + if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) { > > + if (enforced) { > > + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > > + "SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance\n" > > + "monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records\n" > > + "for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n"); > > + } > > + } > > + > > if (err == EPERM) > > - printed = scnprintf(msg, size, > > - "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n", > > + printed += scnprintf(msg, size, > > + "No permission to enable %s event.\n", > > perf_evsel__name(evsel)); > > > > return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > > - "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" > > - "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" > > - "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" > > - "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" > > - "The current value is %d:\n\n" > > + "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n" > > + "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n" > > + "without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n" > > " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" > > " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" > > - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > > - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > > - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > > - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" > > - "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" > > - " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , > > - target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", > > - perf_event_paranoid()); > > + ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n" > > + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n" > > + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n" > > + "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n" > > + "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)", > > + perf_event_paranoid()); > > case ENOENT: > > return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.", > > perf_evsel__name(evsel)); > > -- - Arnaldo ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control 2020-03-19 19:01 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2020-03-19 19:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-03-20 12:24 ` Alexey Budankov 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2020-03-19 19:05 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Alexey Budankov Cc: Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim, Alexander Shishkin, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andi Kleen, linux-kernel, selinux, linux-security-module Em Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 04:01:26PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu: > Em Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 09:23:30AM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu: > > Is there any thougts, comments or questions so far? > > Please share you mind. > From a quick look, seems ok, I'll do some testing now, > > On 13.03.2020 20:27, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > > Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify > > > in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced > > > SELinux policy settings. > > > > > > Testing and evaluation (Fedora 31 x86_64 with enforced Targeted policy extended > > > by perf_event class (see refpolicy [1] master branch)): So I'll try the steps below with/without your patch, and then... what are the steps that a tester needs to go thru to have that refpolicy in? Install some new SELinux package or library, spelling out in detail the steps one needs to go thru helps reviewing/testing, - Arnaldo > > > [root@host ~]# ps -Z > > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 3960 pts/1 00:00:00 bash > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4167 pts/1 00:00:00 ps > > > > > > [root@host ~]# ls -alhZ /usr/local/bin/ > > > total 56M > > > drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.0K Mar 4 12:27 . > > > drwxr-xr-x. 12 root root system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0 4.0K Jul 25 2019 .. > > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash > > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4.1M Jan 23 2017 bash.before_shellshock_patch > > > ... > > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 372 May 14 2019 flask > > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:15 perf <== unprivileged users (perf_event_paranoid) > > > -rwxr-x---. 1 root perf_users unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 24M Mar 4 12:19 perf.cap <== perf_users (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > > > -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 44K Dec 8 2016 spiff > > > ... > > > lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 4 Aug 21 2018 zstdmt -> zstd > > > > > > [root@host ~]# getenforce > > > Enforcing > > > > > > === Access by unprivileged user === > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls > > > Error: > > > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > > > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > > > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > > > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > > > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > > > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > > > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > > > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > > > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK > > >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access > > >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access > > >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > > > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > > > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > > > > > [root@host ~]# journalctl --follow > > > ... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > > ... audit[4186]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=4186 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > > ... setroubleshoot[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d > > > ... python3[4194]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. > > > > > > ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests ************************** > > > > > > If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. > > > Then you should report this as a bug. > > > You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. > > > Do > > > allow this access for now by executing: > > > # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf > > > # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > > > > > === Access by perf privileged user === > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ libcap/progs/getcap /usr/local/bin/perf.cap > > > /usr/local/bin/perf.cap = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_sys_admin+ep > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -- ls > > > Error: > > > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > > > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > > > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > > > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > > > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > > > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > > > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > > > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > > > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK > > >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access > > >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access > > >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > > > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > > > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > > > > > [root@host ~]# journalctl --follow > > > > > > ... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > > ... audit[3926]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=3926 comm="perf.cap" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 > > > > > > ... setroubleshoot[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 9a6f3db2-3d8f-461e-afad-0b5c3a9c3b9d > > > ... python3[3934]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. > > > > > > ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests ************************** > > > > > > If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. > > > Then you should report this as a bug. > > > You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. > > > Do > > > allow this access for now by executing: > > > # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf > > > # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > > > > > === Open access to performance monitoring and observability operations in unconfined_t domain === > > > > > > [root@host ~]# ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te > > > > > > module my-perf 1.0; > > > > > > require { > > > type unconfined_t; > > > class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; > > > } > > > > > > #============= unconfined_t ============== > > > allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; > > > > > > [root@host ~]# semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ ps -Z > > > LABEL PID TTY TIME CMD > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4043 pts/2 00:00:00 bash > > > unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 4168 pts/2 00:00:00 ps > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -- ls > > > Desktop Documents Downloads intel Music perf.data perf.data.old Pictures Public Templates Videos > > > > > > Performance counter stats for 'ls': > > > > > > 0.72 msec task-clock:u # 0.655 CPUs utilized > > > 0 context-switches:u # 0.000 K/sec > > > 0 cpu-migrations:u # 0.000 K/sec > > > 98 page-faults:u # 0.137 M/sec > > > 908,356 cycles:u # 1.266 GHz > > > 729,984 instructions:u # 0.80 insn per cycle > > > 142,774 branches:u # 198.968 M/sec > > > 8,238 branch-misses:u # 5.77% of all branches > > > > > > 0.001095239 seconds time elapsed > > > > > > 0.001147000 seconds user > > > 0.000000000 seconds sys > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf stat -a > > > Error: > > > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > > > SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance > > > monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records > > > for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. > > > Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open > > > access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users > > > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: > > > -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users > > > Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK > > >> = 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access > > >> = 1: Disallow CPU event access > > >> = 2: Disallow kernel profiling > > > To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it > > > in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) > > > > > > [user@host ~]$ /usr/local/bin/perf.cap stat -a > > > ^C > > > Performance counter stats for 'system wide': > > > > > > 13,427.05 msec cpu-clock # 7.997 CPUs utilized > > > 783 context-switches # 0.058 K/sec > > > 29 cpu-migrations # 0.002 K/sec > > > 6 page-faults # 0.000 K/sec > > > 161,084,874 cycles # 0.012 GHz > > > 146,823,131 instructions # 0.91 insn per cycle > > > 12,164,802 branches # 0.906 M/sec > > > 380,350 branch-misses # 3.13% of all branches > > > > > > 1.678938906 seconds time elapsed > > > > > > [1] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> > > > --- > > > tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 ++-- > > > tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- > > > 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > > > index a12872f2856a..9c8ec816261b 100644 > > > --- a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > > > +++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c > > > @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) > > > return 1; > > > } > > > > > > - WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY, > > > + WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, > > > "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n", > > > err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))); > > > > > > @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) > > > if (fd >= 0) > > > close(fd); > > > > > > - if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY, > > > + if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, > > > "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n", > > > err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)))) > > > return -1; > > > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > > > index 816d930d774e..f03ce1d362d3 100644 > > > --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > > > +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > > > @@ -2493,32 +2493,40 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, > > > int err, char *msg, size_t size) > > > { > > > char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; > > > - int printed = 0; > > > + int printed = 0, enforced = 0; > > > > > > switch (err) { > > > case EPERM: > > > case EACCES: > > > + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > > > + "Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n"); > > > + > > > + if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) { > > > + if (enforced) { > > > + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > > > + "SELinux Enforcing mode is enabled and can limit access to performance\n" > > > + "monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records\n" > > > + "for more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n"); > > > + } > > > + } > > > + > > > if (err == EPERM) > > > - printed = scnprintf(msg, size, > > > - "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n", > > > + printed += scnprintf(msg, size, > > > + "No permission to enable %s event.\n", > > > perf_evsel__name(evsel)); > > > > > > return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, > > > - "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" > > > - "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" > > > - "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" > > > - "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" > > > - "The current value is %d:\n\n" > > > + "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n" > > > + "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n" > > > + "without CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n" > > > " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" > > > " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" > > > - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > > > - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > > > - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > > > - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" > > > - "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" > > > - " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , > > > - target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", > > > - perf_event_paranoid()); > > > + ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n" > > > + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n" > > > + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n" > > > + "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n" > > > + "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)", > > > + perf_event_paranoid()); > > > case ENOENT: > > > return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.", > > > perf_evsel__name(evsel)); > > > > > -- > > - Arnaldo -- - Arnaldo ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control 2020-03-19 19:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2020-03-20 12:24 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-03-20 13:48 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Alexey Budankov @ 2020-03-20 12:24 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim, Alexander Shishkin, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andi Kleen, linux-kernel, selinux, linux-security-module On 19.03.2020 22:05, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > Em Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 04:01:26PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu: <SNIP> > > So I'll try the steps below with/without your patch, and then... what > are the steps that a tester needs to go thru to have that refpolicy in? > Install some new SELinux package or library, spelling out in detail the > steps one needs to go thru helps reviewing/testing, Yes, sure. Steps to extend FC31 Targeted policy for testing perf_events access control: * download selinux-policy srpm [1]: selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm on my FC31 * install srpm - it creates rpmbuild dir: [root@host ~]# rpm -Uhv selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm * get into rpmbuild/SPECS dir and unpack sources: [root@host ~]# rpmbuild -bp selinux-policy.spec * Place patch below at rpmbuild/BUILD/selinux-policy-b86eaaf4dbcf2d51dd4432df7185c0eaf3cbcc02 dir and apply it: [root@host ~]# patch -p1 < selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch patching file policy/flask/access_vectors patching file policy/flask/security_classes [root@host ~]# cat selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch diff -Nura a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors --- a/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 +++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-28 23:37:25.000000000 +0300 @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ wake_alarm block_suspend audit_read + perfmon } # @@ -1099,3 +1100,15 @@ class xdp_socket inherits socket + +class perf_event +{ + open + cpu + kernel + tracepoint + read + write +} + + diff -Nura a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes --- a/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 +++ b/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-28 21:35:17.000000000 +0300 @@ -200,4 +200,6 @@ class xdp_socket +class perf_event + # FLASK [root@host ~]# * get into rpmbuild/SPECS dir and build policy packages from patched sources: [root@host ~]# rpmbuild --noclean --noprep -ba selinux-policy.spec so you have this: [root@host ~]# ls -alh rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/ total 33M drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 . drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 .. -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 112K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1.2M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-devel-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 2.3M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-doc-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 12M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-minimum-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4.5M Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-mls-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 111K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-sandbox-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 14M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-targeted-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm * install SELinux packages from FC repo [2], if not already done so, and update with the patched rpms above: [root@host ~]# rpm -Uhv rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/selinux-policy-* * there are also packages providing GUI interface and visualizing SELinux management [root@host ~]# dnf install policycoreutils-gui * enable SELinux Permissive mode for Targeted policy, if not already done so: [root@host ~]# cat /etc/selinux/config # This file controls the state of SELinux on the system. # SELINUX= can take one of these three values: # enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced. # permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing. # disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded. SELINUX=permissive # SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these three values: # targeted - Targeted processes are protected, # minimum - Modification of targeted policy. Only selected processes are protected. # mls - Multi Level Security protection. SELINUXTYPE=targeted * enable filesystem SELinux labeling at the next reboot [root@host ~]# touch /.autorelabel * reboot machine and it will label filesystems and load Targeted policy into the kernel * login and check that dmesg output doesn't mention that perf_event class is unknown to SELinux subsystem * check that SELinux is enabled and in Permissive mode [root@host ~]# getenforce Permissive * turn SELinux into Enforcing mode: [root@host ~]# setenforce 1 [root@host ~]# getenforce Enforcing * Now the machine is enabled to test the patch --- If something went wrong --- * To turn SELinux into Permissive mode: setenforce 0 * To fully disable SELinux during kernel boot [3] set kernel command line parameter: selinux=0 * To remove SELinux labeling from local filesystems: find / -mount -print0 | xargs -0 setfattr -h -x security.selinux * To fully turn SELinux off a machine set SELINUX=disabled at /etc/selinux/config file and reboot ~Alexey [1] https://download-ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/updates/31/Everything/SRPMS/Packages/s/selinux-policy-3.14.4-49.fc31.src.rpm [2] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/11/html/Security-Enhanced_Linux/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Enabling_and_Disabling_SELinux.html [3] https://danwalsh.livejournal.com/10972.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control 2020-03-20 12:24 ` Alexey Budankov @ 2020-03-20 13:48 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2020-03-20 13:48 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Alexey Budankov Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim, Alexander Shishkin, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andi Kleen, linux-kernel, selinux, linux-security-module Em Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 03:24:47PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu: > > On 19.03.2020 22:05, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > > Em Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 04:01:26PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu: > <SNIP> > > > > So I'll try the steps below with/without your patch, and then... what > > are the steps that a tester needs to go thru to have that refpolicy in? > > Install some new SELinux package or library, spelling out in detail the > > steps one needs to go thru helps reviewing/testing, > > Yes, sure. Steps to extend FC31 Targeted policy for testing perf_events access control: Thanks a lot! This is the level of detail I was talking about, good job! - Arnaldo > * download selinux-policy srpm [1]: selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm on my FC31 > > * install srpm - it creates rpmbuild dir: > [root@host ~]# rpm -Uhv selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm > > * get into rpmbuild/SPECS dir and unpack sources: > [root@host ~]# rpmbuild -bp selinux-policy.spec > > * Place patch below at rpmbuild/BUILD/selinux-policy-b86eaaf4dbcf2d51dd4432df7185c0eaf3cbcc02 > dir and apply it: > [root@host ~]# patch -p1 < selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch > patching file policy/flask/access_vectors > patching file policy/flask/security_classes > [root@host ~]# cat selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch > diff -Nura a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors > --- a/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 > +++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-28 23:37:25.000000000 +0300 > @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ > wake_alarm > block_suspend > audit_read > + perfmon > } > > # > @@ -1099,3 +1100,15 @@ > > class xdp_socket > inherits socket > + > +class perf_event > +{ > + open > + cpu > + kernel > + tracepoint > + read > + write > +} > + > + > diff -Nura a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes > --- a/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 > +++ b/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-28 21:35:17.000000000 +0300 > @@ -200,4 +200,6 @@ > > class xdp_socket > > +class perf_event > + > # FLASK > > [root@host ~]# > > * get into rpmbuild/SPECS dir and build policy packages from patched sources: > [root@host ~]# rpmbuild --noclean --noprep -ba selinux-policy.spec > so you have this: > [root@host ~]# ls -alh rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/ > total 33M > drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 . > drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 .. > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 112K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1.2M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-devel-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 2.3M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-doc-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 12M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-minimum-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4.5M Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-mls-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 111K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-sandbox-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 14M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-targeted-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm > > * install SELinux packages from FC repo [2], if not already done so, and > update with the patched rpms above: > [root@host ~]# rpm -Uhv rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/selinux-policy-* > > * there are also packages providing GUI interface and visualizing SELinux management > [root@host ~]# dnf install policycoreutils-gui > > * enable SELinux Permissive mode for Targeted policy, if not already done so: > [root@host ~]# cat /etc/selinux/config > # This file controls the state of SELinux on the system. > # SELINUX= can take one of these three values: > # enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced. > # permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing. > # disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded. > SELINUX=permissive > # SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these three values: > # targeted - Targeted processes are protected, > # minimum - Modification of targeted policy. Only selected processes are protected. > # mls - Multi Level Security protection. > SELINUXTYPE=targeted > > * enable filesystem SELinux labeling at the next reboot > [root@host ~]# touch /.autorelabel > > * reboot machine and it will label filesystems and load Targeted policy into the kernel > > * login and check that dmesg output doesn't mention that perf_event class is unknown to SELinux subsystem > > * check that SELinux is enabled and in Permissive mode > [root@host ~]# getenforce > Permissive > > * turn SELinux into Enforcing mode: > [root@host ~]# setenforce 1 > [root@host ~]# getenforce > Enforcing > > * Now the machine is enabled to test the patch > > --- If something went wrong --- > > * To turn SELinux into Permissive mode: setenforce 0 > * To fully disable SELinux during kernel boot [3] set kernel command line parameter: selinux=0 > * To remove SELinux labeling from local filesystems: find / -mount -print0 | xargs -0 setfattr -h -x security.selinux > * To fully turn SELinux off a machine set SELINUX=disabled at /etc/selinux/config file and reboot > > ~Alexey > > [1] https://download-ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/updates/31/Everything/SRPMS/Packages/s/selinux-policy-3.14.4-49.fc31.src.rpm > [2] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/11/html/Security-Enhanced_Linux/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Enabling_and_Disabling_SELinux.html > [3] https://danwalsh.livejournal.com/10972.html > -- - Arnaldo ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-03-20 13:48 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2020-03-13 17:27 [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov 2020-03-19 6:23 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-03-19 19:01 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-03-19 19:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-03-20 12:24 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-03-20 13:48 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).