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From: Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keyring: avoid pagefaults in keyring_read_iterator
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 11:46:15 -0400
Message-ID: <b8aa0f7c-0a90-efae-9fb7-aa85b19a0d9a@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <30309.1571667719@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 10/21/2019 10:21 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>> The put_user call from keyring_read_iterator caused a page fault which
>> attempts to lock mm->mmap_sem and type->lock_class (key->sem) in the reverse
>> order that keyring_read_iterator did, thus causing the circular locking
>> dependency.
>>
>> Remedy this by using access_ok and __put_user instead of put_user so we'll
>> return an error instead of faulting in the page.
> I wonder if it's better to create a kernel buffer outside of the lock in
> keyctl_read_key().  Hmmm...  The reason I didn't want to do that is that
> keyrings have don't have limits on the size.  Maybe that's not actually a
> problem, since 1MiB would be able to hold a list of a quarter of a million
> keys.
>
> David
>

Hi David,

Thanks for the feedback.

I can try to prototype that, but regardless of where the kernel buffer
is allocated, the important part is causing the initial pagefault in the
read path outside the lock so __put_user won't fail due to a valid user
address but page backing the user address isn't in-core.

I'll start work on v2.

Thanks,

Chris


  reply index

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-18 18:40 Chris von Recklinghausen
2019-10-21 14:21 ` David Howells
2019-10-21 15:46   ` Chris von Recklinghausen [this message]
2019-10-25 11:10     ` Chris von Recklinghausen
2019-11-06 15:25       ` Chris von Recklinghausen
2019-10-21 15:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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