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From: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Halcrow" <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	"Paul Turner" <pjt@google.com>,
	"Brendan Gregg" <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian@brauner.io>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>,
	"Martin Lau" <kafai@fb.com>, "Song Liu" <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Mauro Carvalho Chehab" <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Nicolas Ferre" <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>,
	"Stanislav Fomichev" <sdf@google.com>,
	"Quentin Monnet" <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>,
	"Andrey Ignatov" <rdna@fb.com>, "Joe Stringer" <joe@wand.net.nz>
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 14/14] krsi: Pin arg pages only when needed
Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2019 19:45:19 +0000
Message-ID: <cde5ca45-7bff-7eb9-2a70-98603cc420d0@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190915014008.GA19558@chromium.org>



On 9/15/19 2:40 AM, KP Singh wrote:
> On 15-Sep 00:33, Yonghong Song wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9/10/19 12:55 PM, KP Singh wrote:
>>> From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
>>>
>>> Adds a callback which is called when a new program is attached
>>> to a hook. The callback registered by the process_exection hook
>>> checks if a program that has calls to a helper that requires pages to
>>> be pinned (eg. krsi_get_env_var).
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
>>> ---
>>>    include/linux/krsi.h              |  1 +
>>>    security/krsi/include/hooks.h     |  5 ++-
>>>    security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h |  7 ++++
>>>    security/krsi/krsi.c              | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>>    security/krsi/ops.c               | 10 ++++-
>>>    5 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/krsi.h b/include/linux/krsi.h
>>> index c7d1790d0c1f..e443d0309764 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/krsi.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/krsi.h
>>> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
>>>    
>>>    #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_KRSI
>>>    int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog);
>>> +extern const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto;
>>>    #else
>>>    static inline int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr,
>>>    				   struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>> diff --git a/security/krsi/include/hooks.h b/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
>>> index e070c452b5de..38293125ff99 100644
>>> --- a/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
>>> +++ b/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
>>> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
>>>     *
>>>     * Format:
>>>     *
>>> - *   KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, LSM_HOOK, KRSI_HOOK_FN)
>>> + *   KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, LSM_HOOK, KRSI_HOOK_FN, CALLBACK)
>>>     *
>>>     * KRSI adds one layer of indirection between the name of the hook and the name
>>>     * it exposes to the userspace in Security FS to prevent the userspace from
>>> @@ -18,4 +18,5 @@
>>>    KRSI_HOOK_INIT(PROCESS_EXECUTION,
>>>    	       process_execution,
>>>    	       bprm_check_security,
>>> -	       krsi_process_execution)
>>> +	       krsi_process_execution,
>>> +	       krsi_process_execution_cb)
>>> diff --git a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
>>> index 6152847c3b08..99801d5b273a 100644
>>> --- a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
>>> +++ b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
>>> @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ struct krsi_ctx {
>>>    	};
>>>    };
>>>    
>>> +typedef int (*krsi_prog_attach_t) (struct bpf_prog_array *);
>>> +
>>>    /*
>>>     * The LSM creates one file per hook.
>>>     *
>>> @@ -61,6 +63,11 @@ struct krsi_hook {
>>>    	 * The eBPF programs that are attached to this hook.
>>>    	 */
>>>    	struct bpf_prog_array __rcu	*progs;
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * The attach callback is called before a new program is attached
>>> +	 * to the hook and is passed the updated bpf_prog_array as an argument.
>>> +	 */
>>> +	krsi_prog_attach_t attach_callback;
>>>    };
>>>    
>>>    extern struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[];
>>> diff --git a/security/krsi/krsi.c b/security/krsi/krsi.c
>>> index 00a7150c1b22..a4443d7aa150 100644
>>> --- a/security/krsi/krsi.c
>>> +++ b/security/krsi/krsi.c
>>> @@ -5,15 +5,65 @@
>>>    #include <linux/bpf.h>
>>>    #include <linux/binfmts.h>
>>>    #include <linux/highmem.h>
>>> +#include <linux/krsi.h>
>>>    #include <linux/mm.h>
>>>    
>>>    #include "krsi_init.h"
>>>    
>>> +/*
>>> + * need_arg_pages is only updated in bprm_check_security_cb
>>> + * when a mutex on krsi_hook for bprm_check_security is already
>>> + * held. need_arg_pages avoids pinning pages when no program
>>> + * that needs them is attached to the hook.
>>> + */
>>> +static bool need_arg_pages;
>>> +
>>> +/*
>>> + * Checks if the instruction is a BPF_CALL to an eBPF helper located
>>> + * at the given address.
>>> + */
>>> +static inline bool bpf_is_call_to_func(struct bpf_insn *insn,
>>> +				       void *func_addr)
>>> +{
>>> +	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
>>> +
>>> +	if (opcode != BPF_CALL)
>>> +		return false;
>>> +
>>> +	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
>>> +		return false;
>>> +
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * The BPF verifier updates the value of insn->imm from the
>>> +	 * enum bpf_func_id to the offset of the address of helper
>>> +	 * from the __bpf_call_base.
>>> +	 */
>>> +	return __bpf_call_base + insn->imm == func_addr;
>>
>> In how many cases, krsi program does not have krsi_get_env_var() helper?
> 
> It depends, if the user does not choose to use log environment
> variables or use the the value as a part of their MAC policy, the
> pinning of the pages is not needed.

Thanks. I just want to know whether we want to optimize such cases.
I am not a security expert, so I am okay with whatever decision you
made.

> 
> Also, the pinning is needed since eBPF helpers cannot run a non-atomic
> context. It would not be needed if "sleepable eBPF" becomes a thing.

Indeed. 'sleepable BPF' might be also a good thing for realtime linux.
Some works need to address bpf area spin lock, per cpu variables, etc.
before that can happen.

> 
> - KP
> 
>>
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int krsi_process_execution_cb(struct bpf_prog_array *array)
>>> +{
>>> +	struct bpf_prog_array_item *item = array->items;
>>> +	struct bpf_prog *p;
>>> +	const struct bpf_func_proto *proto = &krsi_get_env_var_proto;
>>> +	int i;
>>> +
>>> +	while ((p = READ_ONCE(item->prog))) {
>>> +		for (i = 0; i < p->len; i++) {
>>> +			if (bpf_is_call_to_func(&p->insnsi[i], proto->func))
>>> +				need_arg_pages = true;
>>> +		}
>>> +		item++;
>>> +	}
>>> +	return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>    struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[] = {
>>> -	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, H, I) \
>>> +	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, H, I, CB) \
>>>    		[TYPE] = { \
>>>    			.h_type = TYPE, \
>>>    			.name = #NAME, \
>>> +			.attach_callback = CB, \
>>>    		},
>>>    	#include "hooks.h"
>>>    	#undef KRSI_HOOK_INIT
>>> @@ -75,9 +125,11 @@ static int krsi_process_execution(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>    		.bprm = bprm,
>>>    	};
>>>    
>>> -	ret = pin_arg_pages(&ctx.bprm_ctx);
>>> -	if (ret < 0)
>>> -		goto out_arg_pages;
>>> +	if (READ_ONCE(need_arg_pages)) {
>>> +		ret = pin_arg_pages(&ctx.bprm_ctx);
>>> +		if (ret < 0)
>>> +			goto out_arg_pages;
>>> +	}
>>>    
>>>    	ret = krsi_run_progs(PROCESS_EXECUTION, &ctx);
>>>    	kfree(ctx.bprm_ctx.arg_pages);
>>> @@ -87,7 +139,7 @@ static int krsi_process_execution(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>    }
>>>    
>>>    static struct security_hook_list krsi_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>> -	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(T, N, HOOK, IMPL) LSM_HOOK_INIT(HOOK, IMPL),
>>> +	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(T, N, HOOK, IMPL, CB) LSM_HOOK_INIT(HOOK, IMPL),
>>>    	#include "hooks.h"
>>>    	#undef KRSI_HOOK_INIT
>>>    };
>>> diff --git a/security/krsi/ops.c b/security/krsi/ops.c
>>> index 1db94dfaac15..2de682371eff 100644
>>> --- a/security/krsi/ops.c
>>> +++ b/security/krsi/ops.c
>>> @@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>>    		goto unlock;
>>>    	}
>>>    
>>> +	if (h->attach_callback) {
>>> +		ret = h->attach_callback(new_array);
>>> +		if (ret < 0) {
>>> +			bpf_prog_array_free(new_array);
>>> +			goto unlock;
>>> +		}
>>> +	}
>>> +
>>>    	rcu_assign_pointer(h->progs, new_array);
>>>    	bpf_prog_array_free(old_array);
>>>    
>>> @@ -278,7 +286,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(krsi_get_env_var, struct krsi_ctx *, ctx, char *, name, u32, n_size,
>>>    	return get_env_var(ctx, name, dest, n_size, size);
>>>    }
>>>    
>>> -static const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto = {
>>> +const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto = {
>>>    	.func = krsi_get_env_var,
>>>    	.gpl_only = true,
>>>    	.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
>>>

      reply index

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-10 11:55 [RFC v1 00/14] Kernel Runtime Security Instrumentation KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 01/14] krsi: Add a skeleton and config options for the KRSI LSM KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 02/14] krsi: Introduce types for KRSI eBPF KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 03/14] bpf: krsi: sync BPF UAPI header with tools KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 04/14] krsi: Add support in libbpf for BPF_PROG_TYPE_KRSI KP Singh
2019-09-14 16:09   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 05/14] krsi: Initialize KRSI hooks and create files in securityfs KP Singh
2019-09-14 16:26   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 06/14] krsi: Implement eBPF operations, attachment and execution KP Singh
2019-09-14 16:56   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-15  0:37     ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 07/14] krsi: Check for premissions on eBPF attachment KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 08/14] krsi: Show attached program names in hook read handler KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 09/14] krsi: Add a helper function for bpf_perf_event_output KP Singh
2019-09-14 18:23   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 10/14] krsi: Handle attachment of the same program KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 11/14] krsi: Pin argument pages in bprm_check_security hook KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 12/14] krsi: Add an eBPF helper function to get the value of an env variable KP Singh
2019-09-15  0:16   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-16 13:00     ` KP Singh
2019-09-17 16:58       ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-17 19:36         ` KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 13/14] krsi: Provide an example to read and log environment variables KP Singh
2019-09-15  0:24   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 14/14] krsi: Pin arg pages only when needed KP Singh
2019-09-15  0:33   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-15  1:40     ` KP Singh
2019-09-15 19:45       ` Yonghong Song [this message]

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