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Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:48:42 -0400 Received: from static-50-53-46-226.bvtn.or.frontiernet.net ([50.53.46.226] helo=[192.168.192.153]) by youngberry.canonical.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1hfU13-0000tu-LL; Mon, 24 Jun 2019 18:48:34 +0000 From: John Johansen Subject: [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display To: Casey Schaufler , casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: keescook@chromium.org, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov References: <20190621185233.6766-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> <20190621185233.6766-16-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=john.johansen@canonical.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBE5mrPoBEADAk19PsgVgBKkImmR2isPQ6o7KJhTTKjJdwVbkWSnNn+o6Up5knKP1f49E BQlceWg1yp/NwbR8ad+eSEO/uma/K+PqWvBptKC9SWD97FG4uB4/caomLEU97sLQMtnvGWdx rxVRGM4anzWYMgzz5TZmIiVTZ43Ou5VpaS1Vz1ZSxP3h/xKNZr/TcW5WQai8u3PWVnbkjhSZ PHv1BghN69qxEPomrJBm1gmtx3ZiVmFXluwTmTgJOkpFol7nbJ0ilnYHrA7SX3CtR1upeUpM a/WIanVO96WdTjHHIa43fbhmQube4txS3FcQLOJVqQsx6lE9B7qAppm9hQ10qPWwdfPy/+0W 6AWtNu5ASiGVCInWzl2HBqYd/Zll93zUq+NIoCn8sDAM9iH+wtaGDcJywIGIn+edKNtK72AM gChTg/j1ZoWH6ZeWPjuUfubVzZto1FMoGJ/SF4MmdQG1iQNtf4sFZbEgXuy9cGi2bomF0zvy BJSANpxlKNBDYKzN6Kz09HUAkjlFMNgomL/cjqgABtAx59L+dVIZfaF281pIcUZzwvh5+JoG eOW5uBSMbE7L38nszooykIJ5XrAchkJxNfz7k+FnQeKEkNzEd2LWc3QF4BQZYRT6PHHga3Rg ykW5+1wTMqJILdmtaPbXrF3FvnV0LRPcv4xKx7B3fGm7ygdoowARAQABzR1Kb2huIEpvaGFu c2VuIDxqb2huQGpqbXgubmV0PsLBegQTAQoAJAIbAwULCQgHAwUVCgkICwUWAgMBAAIeAQIX gAUCTo0YVwIZAQAKCRAFLzZwGNXD2LxJD/9TJZCpwlncTgYeraEMeDfkWv8c1IsM1j0AmE4V tL+fE780ZVP9gkjgkdYSxt7ecETPTKMaZSisrl1RwqU0oogXdXQSpxrGH01icu/2n0jcYSqY KggPxy78BGs2LZq4XPfJTZmHZGnXGq/eDr/mSnj0aavBJmMZ6jbiPz6yHtBYPZ9fdo8btczw P41YeWoIu26/8II6f0Xm3VC5oAa8v7Rd+RWZa8TMwlhzHExxel3jtI7IzzOsnmE9/8Dm0ARD 5iTLCXwR1cwI/J9BF/S1Xv8PN1huT3ItCNdatgp8zqoJkgPVjmvyL64Q3fEkYbfHOWsaba9/ kAVtBNz9RTFh7IHDfECVaToujBd7BtPqr+qIjWFadJD3I5eLCVJvVrrolrCATlFtN3YkQs6J n1AiIVIU3bHR8Gjevgz5Ll6SCGHgRrkyRpnSYaU/uLgn37N6AYxi/QAL+by3CyEFLjzWAEvy Q8bq3Iucn7JEbhS/J//dUqLoeUf8tsGi00zmrITZYeFYARhQMtsfizIrVDtz1iPf/ZMp5gRB niyjpXn131cm3M3gv6HrQsAGnn8AJru8GDi5XJYIco/1+x/qEiN2nClaAOpbhzN2eUvPDY5W 0q3bA/Zp2mfG52vbRI+tQ0Br1Hd/vsntUHO903mMZep2NzN3BZ5qEvPvG4rW5Zq2DpybWc7B TQROZqz6ARAAoqw6kkBhWyM1fvgamAVjeZ6nKEfnRWbkC94L1EsJLup3Wb2X0ABNOHSkbSD4 pAuC2tKF/EGBt5CP7QdVKRGcQzAd6b2c1Idy9RLw6w4gi+nn/d1Pm1kkYhkSi5zWaIg0m5RQ Uk+El8zkf5tcE/1N0Z5OK2JhjwFu5bX0a0l4cFGWVQEciVMDKRtxMjEtk3SxFalm6ZdQ2pp2 822clnq4zZ9mWu1d2waxiz+b5Ia4weDYa7n41URcBEUbJAgnicJkJtCTwyIxIW2KnVyOrjvk QzIBvaP0FdP2vvZoPMdlCIzOlIkPLgxE0IWueTXeBJhNs01pb8bLqmTIMlu4LvBELA/veiaj j5s8y542H/aHsfBf4MQUhHxO/BZV7h06KSUfIaY7OgAgKuGNB3UiaIUS5+a9gnEOQLDxKRy/ a7Q1v9S+Nvx+7j8iH3jkQJhxT6ZBhZGRx0gkH3T+F0nNDm5NaJUsaswgJrqFZkUGd2Mrm1qn KwXiAt8SIcENdq33R0KKKRC80Xgwj8Jn30vXLSG+NO1GH0UMcAxMwy/pvk6LU5JGjZR73J5U LVhH4MLbDggD3mPaiG8+fotTrJUPqqhg9hyUEPpYG7sqt74Xn79+CEZcjLHzyl6vAFE2W0kx lLtQtUZUHO36afFv8qGpO3ZqPvjBUuatXF6tvUQCwf3H6XMAEQEAAcLBXwQYAQoACQUCTmas +gIbDAAKCRAFLzZwGNXD2D/XD/0ddM/4ai1b+Tl1jznKajX3kG+MeEYeI4f40vco3rOLrnRG FOcbyyfVF69MKepie4OwoI1jcTU0ADecnbWnDNHpr0SczxBMro3bnrLhsmvjunTYIvssBZtB 4aVJjuLILPUlnhFqa7fbVq0ZQjbiV/rt2jBENdm9pbJZ6GjnpYIcAbPCCa/ffL4/SQRSYHXo hGiiS4y5jBTmK5ltfewLOw02fkexH+IJFrrGBXDSg6n2Sgxnn++NF34fXcm9piaw3mKsICm+ 0hdNh4afGZ6IWV8PG2teooVDp4dYih++xX/XS8zBCc1O9w4nzlP2gKzlqSWbhiWpifRJBFa4 WtAeJTdXYd37j/BI4RWWhnyw7aAPNGj33ytGHNUf6Ro2/jtj4tF1y/QFXqjJG/wGjpdtRfbt UjqLHIsvfPNNJq/958p74ndACidlWSHzj+Op26KpbFnmwNO0psiUsnhvHFwPO/vAbl3RsR5+ 0Ro+hvs2cEmQuv9r/bDlCfpzp2t3cK+rhxUqisOx8DZfz1BnkaoCRFbvvvk+7L/fomPntGPk qJciYE8TGHkZw1hOku+4OoM2GB5nEDlj+2TF/jLQ+EipX9PkPJYvxfRlC6dK8PKKfX9KdfmA IcgHfnV1jSn+8yH2djBPtKiqW0J69aIsyx7iV/03paPCjJh7Xq9vAzydN5U/UA== Organization: Canonical Message-ID: Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:48:30 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190621185233.6766-16-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-GB Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On 6/21/19 11:52 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling > which LSM security information is displayed for a process. > The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable > data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of > the LSM currently in use can be read from "display". > At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display > active. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler there is small issue, see below Also I want to get rid of the list search for the display lsm but that can come as a separate patch later > --- > fs/proc/base.c | 1 + > security/security.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- > 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { > ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), > ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), > ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > DIR("smack", 0555, > proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index aa8e1c73a062..92c5aa427b53 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; > static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; > > char *lsm_names; > -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; > +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { > + .lbs_task = sizeof(int), /* slot number for the "display" LSM */ > +}; > > /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ > static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; > @@ -583,6 +585,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) > */ > static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) > { > + int *display; > + > if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { > task->security = NULL; > return 0; > @@ -591,6 +595,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) > task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); > if (task->security == NULL) > return -ENOMEM; > + > + /* > + * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number. > + * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the > + * default first registered LSM be displayed. > + */ > + display = task->security; > + *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID; > + > return 0; > } > > @@ -1579,14 +1592,24 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) > > int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) > { > + int *odisplay = current->security; > + int *ndisplay; > int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); > > - if (rc) > + if (unlikely(rc)) > return rc; > + > rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); > - if (unlikely(rc)) > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > security_task_free(task); > - return rc; > + return rc; > + } > + > + ndisplay = task->security; > + if (ndisplay && odisplay) > + *ndisplay = *odisplay; > + > + return 0; > } > > void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) > @@ -1972,10 +1995,28 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > char **value) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int *display = current->security; > + > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, > + list) { > + if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || > + hp->slot == *display) { > + *value = kstrdup(hp->lsm, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (*value) > + return strlen(hp->lsm); > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + } > + return -EINVAL; > + } > > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > continue; > + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID && > + *display != hp->slot) > + continue; > return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); > } > return -EINVAL; > @@ -1985,10 +2026,27 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, > size_t size) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int *display = current->security; > + int len; > + > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, > + list) { > + len = strlen(hp->lsm); > + if (size >= len && !strncmp(value, hp->lsm, len)) { This isn't quite right. It allows a value that contains a prefix of an lsm to match. That is selinux2 etc would match to selinux. While it isn't a real problem atm. Its not something I want as part of the user space API which would make it so we can't fix it. > + *display = hp->slot; > + return size; > + } > + } > + return -EINVAL; > + } > > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > continue; > + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID && > + *display != hp->slot) > + continue; > return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); > } > return -EINVAL; > @@ -2008,14 +2066,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); > int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > - int rc; > + int *display = current->security; > > - hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { > - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->slot], > - secdata, seclen); > - if (rc != 0) > - return rc; > - } > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) > + if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) > + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->slot], > + secdata, seclen); > return 0; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); > @@ -2024,22 +2080,27 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, > struct lsmblob *blob) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > - int rc; > + int *display = current->security; > > lsmblob_init(blob, 0); > - hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { > - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, > - &blob->secid[hp->slot]); > - if (rc != 0) > - return rc; > - } > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) > + if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) > + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, > + &blob->secid[hp->slot]); > return 0; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); > > void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) > { > - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int *display = current->security; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) > + if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) { > + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen); > + return; > + } > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); > > @@ -2164,8 +2225,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); > int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, > int __user *optlen, unsigned len) > { > - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, > - optval, optlen, len); > + int *display = current->security; > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream, > + list) > + if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->slot) > + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, > + optlen, len); > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > } > > int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, >