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From: "Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Schofield, Alison" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 05/13] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2018 08:37:15 +0000
Message-ID: <fedb2e7fa0ffb9ee80ca2e8228f2d674781babbd.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f0ff967e2015a9dffceef22ac52ecd736a1ddb7e.1543903910.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>

On Mon, 2018-12-03 at 23:39 -0800, Alison Schofield wrote:
> MKTME architecture requires the KeyID to be placed in PTE bits 51:46.
> To create an encrypted VMA, place the KeyID in the upper bits of
> vm_page_prot that matches the position of those PTE bits.
> 
> When the VMA is assigned a KeyID it is always considered a KeyID
> change. The VMA is either going from not encrypted to encrypted,
> or from encrypted with any KeyID to encrypted with any other KeyID.
> To make the change safely, remove the user pages held by the VMA
> and unlink the VMA's anonymous chain.
> 
> Change-Id: I676056525c49c8803898315a10b196ef5a5c5415

Remove.

> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h |  4 ++++
>  arch/x86/mm/mktme.c          | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/mm.h           |  6 ++++++
>  3 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
> index dbb49909d665..de3e529f3ab0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ extern int mktme_map_keyid_from_key(void *key);
>  extern void *mktme_map_key_from_keyid(int keyid);
>  extern int mktme_map_get_free_keyid(void);
>  
> +/* Set the encryption keyid bits in a VMA */
> +extern void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid,
> +				unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
> +
>  DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mktme_enabled_key);
>  static inline bool mktme_enabled(void)
>  {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
> index 34224d4e3f45..e3fdf7b48173 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
> @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/highmem.h>
> +#include <linux/rmap.h>
>  #include <asm/mktme.h>
>  #include <asm/set_memory.h>
>  
> @@ -131,6 +132,31 @@ int mktme_map_get_free_keyid(void)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/* Set the encryption keyid bits in a VMA */

Maybe proper kdoc?

> +void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid,
> +			  unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> +{
> +	int oldkeyid = vma_keyid(vma);
> +	pgprotval_t newprot;
> +
> +	/* Unmap pages with old KeyID if there's any. */
> +	zap_page_range(vma, start, end - start);
> +
> +	if (oldkeyid == newkeyid)
> +		return;
> +
> +	newprot = pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot);
> +	newprot &= ~mktme_keyid_mask;
> +	newprot |= (unsigned long)newkeyid << mktme_keyid_shift;
> +	vma->vm_page_prot = __pgprot(newprot);
> +
> +	/*

No empty comment line.

> +	 * The VMA doesn't have any inherited pages.
> +	 * Start anon VMA tree from scratch.
> +	 */
> +}
> +
>  /* Prepare page to be used for encryption. Called from page allocator. */
>  void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool
> zero)
>  {
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 1309761bb6d0..e2d87e92ca74 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -2806,5 +2806,11 @@ void __init setup_nr_node_ids(void);
>  static inline void setup_nr_node_ids(void) {}
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
> +static inline void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +					int newkeyid,
> +					unsigned long start,
> +					unsigned long end) {}

Add a new line and

{
}


> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */
>  #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
>  #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */

/Jarkko

  reply index

Thread overview: 91+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-04  7:39 [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 01/13] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME APIs Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 18:11   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-05 19:22     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05 23:35       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06  8:04   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 02/13] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Alison Schofield
2018-12-06  8:08   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 03/13] syscall/x86: Wire up a new system call for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 04/13] x86/mm: Add helper functions for MKTME " Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  9:14   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05  5:49     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04 15:35   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-05  5:52     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-06  8:31   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 05/13] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs Alison Schofield
2018-12-06  8:37   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko [this message]
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 06/13] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call Alison Schofield
2018-12-06  8:38   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 07/13] x86/mm: Add helpers for reference counting encrypted VMAs Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  8:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05  5:28     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 08/13] mm: Use reference counting for " Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 09/13] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  9:10   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05  5:30     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05  9:07       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 10/13] keys/mktme: Add the MKTME Key Service type for memory encryption Alison Schofield
2018-12-06  8:51   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06  8:54     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 15:11     ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 22:56       ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 11/13] keys/mktme: Program memory encryption keys on a system wide basis Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  9:21   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04  9:50     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-05  5:44       ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05  5:43     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-05  9:10       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05 17:26         ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  7:39 ` [RFC v2 12/13] keys/mktme: Save MKTME data if kernel cmdline parameter allows Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  9:22   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-07  2:14   ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07  3:42     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-07  6:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07  6:45       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 11:47     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-04  7:40 ` [RFC v2 13/13] keys/mktme: Support CPU Hotplug for MKTME keys Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  9:28   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05  5:32     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  9:31   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-05  5:36     ` Alison Schofield
2018-12-04  9:25 ` [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-04  9:46   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-05 20:32     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-06 11:22       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-06 14:59         ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-07 10:12           ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-06 21:23         ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 11:54           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-04 19:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 20:00   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 20:32     ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-05 22:19   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07  2:05     ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07  6:48       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-07 11:57     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-12-07 21:59       ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 23:45         ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-07 23:48           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-08  1:33           ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-08  3:53             ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 15:31           ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 16:29             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-12 16:43               ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 23:27                 ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-13  5:49                   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-13  5:52                     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-12-12 23:24               ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07 23:35       ` Eric Rannaud
2018-12-05 23:49   ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06  1:09     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06  1:25       ` Dan Williams
2018-12-06 15:39       ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-06 19:10         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 19:31           ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-07  1:55       ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-07  4:23         ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-07 23:53         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-08  1:11           ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-08  2:07           ` Huang, Kai
2018-12-05 20:30 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko

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