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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/vdso: Remove retpoline from SGX vDSO call
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 07:33:38 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <112ad81e-16ab-d6e0-09e7-3658874434f7@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200930142017.GA49393@linux.intel.com>

On 9/30/20 7:20 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> I'm not expert on Spectre, or any sort of security researcher, but I've
> read a few papers about and understand the general concept. With the
> constraints how the callback is used in practice, I'd *guess* it is
> fine to drop retpoline but I really need some feedback on this from
> people who understand these attacks better.

Do you recall why you added it in the first place?  What was the
motivation for it?  Were you responding to a review comment?

  reply	other threads:[~2020-09-30 14:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-30 14:01 [PATCH] x86/vdso: Remove retpoline from SGX vDSO call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 14:08 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-30 14:20   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 14:33     ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2020-09-30 15:28       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 15:43         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-30 16:28           ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-30 17:01             ` Jethro Beekman
2020-09-30 18:09               ` Andrew Cooper
2020-09-30 19:25                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 20:45                   ` Xing, Cedric
2020-09-30 21:22                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 21:36                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 21:46                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-30 23:41                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 16:38           ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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