From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDF6AC4360F for ; Fri, 5 Apr 2019 14:34:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F2A821852 for ; Fri, 5 Apr 2019 14:34:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1554474890; bh=dmG1v2bQdEZ7QJeDzr1fth7DG2nFWg6ja79Q73Mi+AE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:List-ID:From; b=c9oc7Ul2ZtU57mHzoClOTfx/r3HoSD16yfTUQYQ69PvF9RU80XIDcmu8/jFoefvcC fj5Q+dddMR5gVNQpTeegCYOCuDdRbdVAME4RR4gUOCCMYDtKcXAuIuCJMwPzjgIBaW yTEg1USYKum5LoXKBglutua2tt7Yh3FqjC+oSMn0= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729833AbfDEOeu (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Apr 2019 10:34:50 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:43238 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726291AbfDEOeu (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Apr 2019 10:34:50 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5019E21726; Fri, 5 Apr 2019 14:34:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1554474888; bh=dmG1v2bQdEZ7QJeDzr1fth7DG2nFWg6ja79Q73Mi+AE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=hGOL9eQAOwviVNPdaTMQlOelfQhNWuJAm/YzJcKf+Qnn3dd43vYPXhpi8cxvHCXeo 3finINm0bqjHJIWrGrTak556y0qHkg62S54znt5MTPWqVr+bDUl85KywzNLAEbrswI a/S2zIjhU0BsswWm95PXJHOEm06zyfvn84Dh50qY= Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 16:34:46 +0200 From: Greg KH To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Andy Lutomirski , X86 ML , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Dave Hansen , "Christopherson, Sean J" , nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" , "Katz-zamir, Shay" , "Huang, Haitao" , Andy Shevchenko , Thomas Gleixner , "Svahn, Kai" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Triplett , "Huang, Kai" , David Rientjes , James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , LSM List Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning Message-ID: <20190405143446.GA14573@kroah.com> References: <20190317211456.13927-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20190317211456.13927-18-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20190322112938.GJ3122@linux.intel.com> <20190322114325.GA10165@linux.intel.com> <20190325145503.GB29989@linux.intel.com> <20190405101817.GA9816@linux.intel.com> <20190405142006.GA11612@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190405142006.GA11612@linux.intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.4 (2019-03-13) Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Apr 05, 2019 at 05:20:06PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri, Apr 05, 2019 at 06:53:57AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:18 AM Jarkko Sakkinen > > wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 04:55:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > Hmm.. on 2nd thought the LSM policy or even DAC policy would restrict > > > > > > that the container manager can only access specific files inside > > > > > > securityfs. With this conclusion I still think it is probably the best > > > > > > place for seurity policy like things even for SGX. It is meant for that > > > > > > anyway. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > LSM or DAC policy can certainly *restrict* it, but I suspect that most > > > > > container runtimes don't mount securityfs at all. OTOH, the runtime > > > > > definitely needs to have a way to pass /dev/sgx/enclave (or whatever > > > > > it's called) through, so using another device node will definitely > > > > > work. > > > > > > > > OK, I can cope with this argument. I go with the device names above for > > > > v20. > > > > > > In v20 the refactoring would be with corresponding modes: > > > > > > /dev/sgx 0755 > > > /dev/sgx/enclave 0666 > > > /dev/sgx/provision 0600 > > > > > > The problem that I'm facing is that with devnode callback of struct > > > device_type I can easily give the defaut mode for any of the files but > > > not for the /dev/sgx directory itself. How do I get the appropriate > > > mode for it? > > > > > > > Hi Greg- > > > > Do you know this one? > > I guess one option is to not do anything with the mode but instead > contribute rules to udev? I'm not too familiar with this but maybe > that is even recommended way? Why do you care about the directory permissions? They should not matter, only the permissions on the device nodes themselves, right?