From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC5FAC10F0E for ; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 13:37:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EF762064B for ; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 13:37:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726655AbfDINhw (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 09:37:52 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:48874 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726486AbfDINhw (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 09:37:52 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNSCANNABLE X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Apr 2019 06:37:51 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,329,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="138789642" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.tm.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.237.55.112]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 09 Apr 2019 06:37:46 -0700 Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 16:37:45 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Greg KH Cc: Andy Lutomirski , X86 ML , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Dave Hansen , "Christopherson, Sean J" , nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" , "Katz-zamir, Shay" , "Huang, Haitao" , Andy Shevchenko , Thomas Gleixner , "Svahn, Kai" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Triplett , "Huang, Kai" , David Rientjes , James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , LSM List Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning Message-ID: <20190409133745.GA9759@linux.intel.com> References: <20190317211456.13927-18-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20190322112938.GJ3122@linux.intel.com> <20190322114325.GA10165@linux.intel.com> <20190325145503.GB29989@linux.intel.com> <20190405101817.GA9816@linux.intel.com> <20190405142006.GA11612@linux.intel.com> <20190405143446.GA14573@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190405143446.GA14573@kroah.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Apr 05, 2019 at 04:34:46PM +0200, Greg KH wrote: > On Fri, Apr 05, 2019 at 05:20:06PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Fri, Apr 05, 2019 at 06:53:57AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:18 AM Jarkko Sakkinen > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 04:55:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > > Hmm.. on 2nd thought the LSM policy or even DAC policy would restrict > > > > > > > that the container manager can only access specific files inside > > > > > > > securityfs. With this conclusion I still think it is probably the best > > > > > > > place for seurity policy like things even for SGX. It is meant for that > > > > > > > anyway. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > LSM or DAC policy can certainly *restrict* it, but I suspect that most > > > > > > container runtimes don't mount securityfs at all. OTOH, the runtime > > > > > > definitely needs to have a way to pass /dev/sgx/enclave (or whatever > > > > > > it's called) through, so using another device node will definitely > > > > > > work. > > > > > > > > > > OK, I can cope with this argument. I go with the device names above for > > > > > v20. > > > > > > > > In v20 the refactoring would be with corresponding modes: > > > > > > > > /dev/sgx 0755 > > > > /dev/sgx/enclave 0666 > > > > /dev/sgx/provision 0600 > > > > > > > > The problem that I'm facing is that with devnode callback of struct > > > > device_type I can easily give the defaut mode for any of the files but > > > > not for the /dev/sgx directory itself. How do I get the appropriate > > > > mode for it? > > > > > > > > > > Hi Greg- > > > > > > Do you know this one? > > > > I guess one option is to not do anything with the mode but instead > > contribute rules to udev? I'm not too familiar with this but maybe > > that is even recommended way? > > Why do you care about the directory permissions? They should not > matter, only the permissions on the device nodes themselves, right? OK, based on your response to Andy I don't :-) Thanks. /Jarkko