linux-sgx.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
	Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
	Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	Kai Svahn <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
	Philip Tricca <philip.b.tricca@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 16:31:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190531233159.30992-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190531233159.30992-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

SGX will use the mprotect() hook to prevent userspace from circumventing
various security checks, i.e. Linux Security Modules.

Enclaves are built by copying data from normal memory into the Enclave
Page Cache (EPC).  Due to the nature of SGX, the EPC is represented by a
single file that must be MAP_SHARED, i.e. mprotect() only ever sees a
single MAP_SHARED vm_file.  Furthermore, all enclaves will need read,
write and execute pages in the EPC.

As a result, LSM policies cannot be meaningfully applied, e.g. an LSM
can deny access to the EPC as a whole, but can't deny PROT_EXEC on page
that originated in a non-EXECUTE file (which is long gone by the time
mprotect() is called).

By hooking mprotect(), SGX can make explicit LSM upcalls while an
enclave is being built, i.e. when the kernel has a handle to origin of
each enclave page, and enforce the result of the LSM policy whenever
userspace maps the enclave page in the future.

Alternatively, SGX could play games with MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC}, but
that approach is quite ugly, e.g. would require userspace to call an
SGX ioctl() prior to using mprotect() to extend a page's protections.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/mm.h |  2 ++
 mm/mprotect.c      | 15 +++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 0e8834ac32b7..50a42364a885 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -458,6 +458,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
 	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
 	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
 	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
+	int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long start,
+			unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
 	vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
 	vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
 			enum page_entry_size pe_size);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index bf38dfbbb4b4..e466ca5e4fe0 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -547,13 +547,20 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
-		if (error)
-			goto out;
-
 		tmp = vma->vm_end;
 		if (tmp > end)
 			tmp = end;
+
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect) {
+			error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp, prot);
+			if (error)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+		if (error)
+			goto out;
+
 		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-31 23:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-31 23:31 [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:41   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:16     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 22:10       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-05 14:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-05 15:17         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-05 20:14           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 15:37             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-13 13:48               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-13 16:47                 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 17:14                   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 15:18                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-05 15:15       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03  6:26   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 20:08     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 20:39       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 23:45         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04  0:54           ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 20:18         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 22:02           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 20:14   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-03 20:37     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 20:39       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-03 23:48       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04  0:55         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:55   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-06-03  6:27   ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect() Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 12:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 14:51   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03  6:28   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 15:32   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03  6:28   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 16:23   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 16:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-05 15:06       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-05 11:10   ` Ayoun, Serge
2019-06-05 23:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03  6:29   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 20:26     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 16:25   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:25     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 20:34       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:54       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-05 15:10       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-06  1:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03  6:28   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 14:19   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 14:42     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 18:38       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 18:45         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-04 20:29   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 20:36     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:43       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-06  2:04         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 15:01   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 15:50     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-02  7:29 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 17:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 18:30     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04  1:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 15:33       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 16:30         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:38         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 17:47   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 18:02     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 11:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190531233159.30992-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --to=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=cedric.xing@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
    --cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=jethro@fortanix.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=josh@joshtriplett.org \
    --cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=kai.svahn@intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=nhorman@redhat.com \
    --cc=npmccallum@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=philip.b.tricca@intel.com \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge.ayoun@intel.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=shay.katz-zamir@intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=william.c.roberts@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).