From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24D83C73C53 for ; Tue, 9 Jul 2019 16:06:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2E2D216E3 for ; Tue, 9 Jul 2019 16:06:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726115AbfGIQGk (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Jul 2019 12:06:40 -0400 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:18483 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725816AbfGIQGk (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Jul 2019 12:06:40 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga001.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.18]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Jul 2019 09:06:39 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.63,470,1557212400"; d="scan'208";a="249190862" Received: from mmaitert-mobl2.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.34.54]) by orsmga001.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 09 Jul 2019 09:06:35 -0700 Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2019 19:06:34 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Sean Christopherson Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen , Cedric Xing , Andy Lutomirski , Jethro Beekman , "Dr . Greg Wettstein" , Stephen Smalley Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Message-ID: <20190709160634.3yupyabf5svnj4ds@linux.intel.com> References: <20190617222438.2080-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> <20190617222438.2080-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> <20190619152018.GC1203@linux.intel.com> <20190620221702.GE20474@linux.intel.com> <20190707190809.GE19593@linux.intel.com> <1b7369a08e98dd08a4f8bb19b16479f12bee130f.camel@linux.intel.com> <20190708161932.GE20433@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190708161932.GE20433@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: NeoMutt/20180716 Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jul 08, 2019 at 09:19:32AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > 2. Probably some "user story" type of examples would help with the > > discussion overall [1] i.e. how one would use this for > > her own good. > > The compelling story is Andy's original concern that userspace could > circumvent existing security policies by running code in an enclave. > > AIUI, closing the LSM loophole is the minimal requirement to get SGX > upstreamed. The extensive discussion has largely been focused on > ensuring that whatever mechanism is used to close the loophole will > play nice with future SGX functionality and/or LSM security policies. OK, might be getting here where I fall out of the wagon so: Doesn't Andy's example anyway require a process that has privileges to make pages executable i.e. it could run arbitrary code even without an enclave? /Jarkko