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Date:   Tue, 9 Jul 2019 15:25:34 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        Bill Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        "Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
Message-ID: <20190709222534.GG25369@linux.intel.com>
References: <20190619222401.14942-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
 <20190705160549.tzsck5ho5kvtdhit@linux.intel.com>
 <20190708172930.GA20791@linux.intel.com>
 <20190709162203.gzyvulah5u7eksip@linux.intel.com>
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On Tue, Jul 09, 2019 at 01:41:28PM -0700, Xing, Cedric wrote:
> On 7/9/2019 10:09 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >Translating those to SGX, with a lot of input from Stephen, I ended up
> >with the following:
> >
> >   - FILE__ENCLAVE_EXECUTE: equivalent to FILE__EXECUTE, required to gain X
> >                            on an enclave page loaded from a regular file
> >
> >   - PROCESS2__ENCLAVE_EXECDIRTY: hybrid of EXECMOD and EXECUTE+WRITE,
> >                                  required to gain W->X on an enclave page
> 
> EXECMOD basically indicates a file containing self-modifying code. Your
> ENCLAVE_EXECDIRTY is however a process permission, which is illogical.

How is it illogical?  If a PROCESS wants to EXECute a DIRTY ENCLAVE page,
then it needs PROCESS2__ENCLAVE_EXECDIRTY.

FILE__EXECMOD on /dev/sgx/enclave is a process permission masquerading as
a file permission, let's call it what it is.