From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, nhorman@redhat.com,
npmccallum@redhat.com, serge.ayoun@intel.com,
shay.katz-zamir@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
kai.svahn@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, josh@joshtriplett.org,
luto@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
cedric.xing@intel.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v24 15/24] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2019 01:13:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191129231326.18076-16-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191129231326.18076-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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In order to provide a mechanism for devilering provisoning rights:
1. Add a new device file /dev/sgx/provision that works as a token for
allowing an enclave to have the provisioning privileges.
2. Add a new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE that accepts the
following data structure:
struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute {
__u64 addr;
__u64 attribute_fd;
};
A daemon could sit on top of /dev/sgx/provision and send a file
descriptor of this file to a process that needs to be able to provision
enclaves.
The way this API is used is straight-forward. Lets assume that dev_fd is
a handle to /dev/sgx/enclave and prov_fd is a handle to
/dev/sgx/provision. You would allow SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE to
initialize an enclave with the PROVISIONKEY attribute by
params.addr = <enclave address>;
params.token_fd = prov_fd;
ioctl(dev_fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE, ¶ms);
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
index 5edb08ab8fd0..57d0d30c79b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)
#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \
_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE \
+ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute)
/**
* struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -63,4 +65,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_init {
__u64 sigstruct;
};
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute - parameter structure for the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE ioctl
+ * @attribute_fd: file handle of the attribute file in the securityfs
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute {
+ __u64 attribute_fd;
+};
+
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
index c724dcccf2e2..4d996463b213 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
@@ -141,12 +141,18 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = {
.get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area,
};
+const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
static struct bus_type sgx_bus_type = {
.name = "sgx",
};
static struct device sgx_encl_dev;
static struct cdev sgx_encl_cdev;
+static struct device sgx_provision_dev;
+static struct cdev sgx_provision_cdev;
static dev_t sgx_devt;
static void sgx_dev_release(struct device *dev)
@@ -223,22 +229,37 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
if (ret)
goto err_chrdev_region;
+ ret = sgx_dev_init("sgx/provision", &sgx_provision_dev,
+ &sgx_provision_cdev, &sgx_provision_fops, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_encl_dev;
+
sgx_encl_wq = alloc_workqueue("sgx-encl-wq",
WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_FREEZABLE, 1);
if (!sgx_encl_wq) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err_encl_dev;
+ goto err_provision_dev;
}
ret = cdev_device_add(&sgx_encl_cdev, &sgx_encl_dev);
if (ret)
goto err_encl_wq;
+ ret = cdev_device_add(&sgx_provision_cdev, &sgx_provision_dev);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_encl_cdev;
+
return 0;
+err_encl_cdev:
+ cdev_device_del(&sgx_encl_cdev, &sgx_encl_dev);
+
err_encl_wq:
destroy_workqueue(sgx_encl_wq);
+err_provision_dev:
+ put_device(&sgx_provision_dev);
+
err_encl_dev:
put_device(&sgx_encl_dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
index e95c6e86c0c6..2f13886522a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;
extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
+extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops;
+
long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
int sgx_drv_init(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index cd2146a15a22..275388ba9992 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -629,6 +629,50 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_set_attribute - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE
+ * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute instance
+ *
+ * Mark the enclave as being allowed to access a restricted attribute bit.
+ * The requested attribute is specified via the attribute_fd field in the
+ * provided struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute. The attribute_fd must be a
+ * handle to an SGX attribute file, e.g. “/dev/sgx/provision".
+ *
+ * Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail. Currently, the only restricted attribute
+ * is access to the PROVISION_KEY.
+ *
+ * Note, access to the EINITTOKEN_KEY is disallowed entirely.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_set_attribute(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute params;
+ struct file *attribute_file;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ attribute_file = fget(params.attribute_fd);
+ if (!attribute_file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (attribute_file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ encl->allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY;
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ fput(attribute_file);
+ return ret;
+}
long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -652,6 +696,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT:
ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_init(encl, (void __user *)arg);
break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_set_attribute(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
default:
ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;
--
2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-29 23:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-29 23:13 [PATCH v24 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 01/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-30 1:38 ` Neil Horman
2019-11-30 14:37 ` Dr. Greg
2019-12-02 9:24 ` Jethro Beekman
2019-12-06 21:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-06 21:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 03/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 04/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 05/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 06/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-17 14:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-19 0:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX supprt Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-17 15:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-19 0:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-19 6:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-23 9:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-27 6:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-01-14 18:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 08/24] x86/sgx: Enumerate and track EPC sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-18 9:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-18 15:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-12-18 16:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-19 0:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 09/24] x86/sgx: Add functions to allocate and free EPC pages Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 10/24] x86/sgx: Add sgx_einit() for wrapping ENCLS[EINIT] Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 11/24] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 12/24] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-02 15:48 ` Haitao Huang
2019-12-02 18:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-12-09 19:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-09 19:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-01-14 16:12 ` Haitao Huang
2020-01-23 12:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 13/24] selftests/x86: Recurse into subdirectories Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 14/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 16/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 17/24] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 21/24] x86/vdso: Add __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to wrap SGX enclave transitions Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 22/24] selftests/x86: Add vDSO selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document microarchitecture Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-29 23:13 ` [PATCH v24 24/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-20 13:26 ` [PATCH v24 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Nathaniel McCallum
2020-02-24 6:34 ` 三仟(惠春阳)
2020-02-25 10:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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