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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, nhorman@redhat.com,
	npmccallum@redhat.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
	andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	kai.svahn@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, josh@joshtriplett.org,
	luto@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
	cedric.xing@intel.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v29 04/20] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 00:53:00 +0300
Message-ID: <20200421215316.56503-5-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200421215316.56503-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when
a #PF with SGX set happens.

CPU throws a #PF with the SGX bit in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map
(EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the
properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software
entities, which SGX hosts. [1]

Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks  is to prevent
malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for
legit reasons.

All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient
key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV
allows user space software react when this happens (e.g. rec-create the
enclave, which was invalidated).

[1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index ffa0dc8a535e..bb8d5ae74dbc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -174,5 +174,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_RSVD	=		1 << 3,
 	X86_PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
 	X86_PF_PK	=		1 << 5,
+	X86_PF_SGX	=		1 << 15,
 };
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index fa4ea09593ab..dee9504cde79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1179,6 +1179,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
+	 * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
+	 * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
+	 * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
+	 * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
+	 * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
+	 * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
+	 * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX))
+		return 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform
 	 * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-21 21:52 [PATCH v29 00/20] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:52 ` [PATCH v29 01/20] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:52 ` [PATCH v29 02/20] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:52 ` [PATCH v29 03/20] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 05/20] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 06/20] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 07/20] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 08/20] x86/sgx: Enumerate and track EPC sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 09/20] x86/sgx: Add functions to allocate and free EPC pages Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 10/20] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 11/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-08 19:09   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 12/20] x86/sgx: Add provisioning Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 13/20] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 14/20] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-06 21:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-13 21:40     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 15/20] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 16/20] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 17/20] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 18/20] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 19/20] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 20/20] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-22 16:48 ` [PATCH v29 00/20] Intel SGX foundations Connor Kuehl
2020-04-29  5:22   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-26 16:57 ` Dr. Greg
2020-04-29  5:23   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-29 15:14     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-30  3:59       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-02 23:05         ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-03  0:48           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-04  9:34             ` Dr. Greg
2020-04-29 15:30   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-08  0:40     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-07  0:41   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-08 19:02     ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-08 19:56       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-14  9:16         ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-14 16:15           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-14 16:20             ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-14 19:29               ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-15  9:28               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15  9:42                 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-15 16:24                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15  0:09             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15 19:54           ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-05-16  9:58             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-24 21:27           ` Pavel Machek
2020-05-26  8:16             ` David Laight
2020-04-26 17:03 ` Dr. Greg
2020-04-29 15:27 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-04-30  3:46   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-30  7:19     ` Jethro Beekman
2020-04-30  8:23       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-30 14:12         ` Jethro Beekman
2020-05-06 12:16           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-06 16:39 ` Jordan Hand
2020-05-07 18:06   ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-08 16:16     ` Jordan Hand
2020-05-13 23:09   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-06 21:42 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-05-06 22:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-07  5:02     ` Haitao Huang
2020-05-07 16:49       ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-05-07 19:34         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-07 22:35           ` Haitao Huang
2020-05-08  0:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-28 11:15               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-28 11:19                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-07 22:31         ` Haitao Huang
2020-05-13 22:14   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-13 22:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-14  6:31     ` Jethro Beekman
2020-05-14 19:30     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-15  0:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-08 19:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-14 19:05   ` Seth Moore
2020-05-15  0:23     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-12 11:55 ` Hui, Chunyang
2020-05-12 16:51   ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-14 10:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-16  8:53 ` [PATCH] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen

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