From: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com,
bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com,
conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com,
haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com,
kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com,
mikko.ylinen@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v41 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 10:25:43 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201113102543.GK3371@techsingularity.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-11-jarkko@kernel.org>
On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 12:01:21AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>
> Background
> ==========
>
> 1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory
> via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in
> this series.
> 2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
> For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
> copying data to an executable enclave page.
> 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
> can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().
>
> This creates a problem because the original data source may have long since
> vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are established (mmap()
> or mprotect()).
>
> The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to
> declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl(). This
> intent can be immediately compared to the source data???s mapping and
> rejected if necessary.
>
> The ???intent??? is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave
> PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations
> performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave
> can be compared with the earlier declared permissions.
>
> Problem
> =======
>
> There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this
> permission comparison at mmap() time. However, there is no corresponding
> ->mprotect() hook.
>
> Solution
> ========
>
> Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
> inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.
>
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> # v40
> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> # v40
> # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
--
Mel Gorman
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-13 10:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-12 22:01 [PATCH v41 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 01/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX architectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 02/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 03/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 04/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 05/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-16 22:25 ` [PATCH] x86/sgx: clarify 'laundry_list' locking Dave Hansen
2020-11-17 19:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 06/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 08/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 09/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX page allocator functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-13 10:25 ` Mel Gorman [this message]
2020-11-17 18:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-15 17:08 ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-15 17:32 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-11-15 18:36 ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-16 10:09 ` Mel Gorman
2020-11-17 19:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX misc driver interface Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20201115044044.11040-1-hdanton@sina.com>
2020-11-17 17:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 16/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 17/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 18/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 19/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-17 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17 19:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 20/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-16 18:19 ` Shuah Khan
2020-11-17 13:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17 19:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-17 17:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17 21:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-17 21:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 21/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 22/24] x86/sgx: Add ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX kernel architecture Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-12 22:01 ` [PATCH v41 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-16 16:55 ` [PATCH v41 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Borislav Petkov
2020-11-16 17:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-16 17:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17 19:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20201114084211.5284-1-hdanton@sina.com>
2020-11-16 18:33 ` [PATCH v41 05/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <20201115040127.7804-1-hdanton@sina.com>
2020-11-16 21:11 ` [PATCH v41 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX misc driver interface Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <20201114090708.8684-1-hdanton@sina.com>
2020-11-17 18:12 ` [PATCH v41 06/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20201114093256.7800-1-hdanton@sina.com>
2020-11-17 18:14 ` [PATCH v41 09/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX page allocator functions Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20201115030548.1572-1-hdanton@sina.com>
2020-11-17 18:22 ` [PATCH v41 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-12-15 5:38 ` [PATCH v41 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Hui, Chunyang
2020-12-15 5:43 ` Hui, Chunyang
2020-12-15 15:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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