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From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com,
	wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 24/26] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC)
Date: Mon,  8 Feb 2021 23:55:34 +1300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7093c6d1b4c85b83c0f16cbfd07edfa64eeee814.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com>

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled
in the host.  When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the
hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers,
thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the
correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash).

Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as
writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each
WRMSR is ~400 cycles.  And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of
cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is
unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX
performance.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
index 177ee1c826a8..36e65b7c1129 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
@@ -260,6 +260,59 @@ static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
+static int handle_encls_einit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long sig_hva, secs_hva, token_hva, rflags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	gva_t sig_gva, secs_gva, token_gva;
+	gpa_t sig_gpa, secs_gpa, token_gpa;
+	int ret, trapnr;
+
+	if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 1808, 4096, &sig_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rdx_read(vcpu), 304, 512, &token_gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate the SIGSTRUCT, SECS and TOKEN pointers from GVA to GPA.
+	 * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, sig_gva, false, &sig_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, token_gva, false, &token_gpa))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * ...and then to HVA.  The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
+	 * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time.  Exit to
+	 * userspace if a GPA is invalid.  Note, all structures are aligned and
+	 * cannot split pages.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, sig_gpa, &sig_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, token_gpa, &token_hva))
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = sgx_virt_einit((void __user *)sig_hva, (void __user *)token_hva,
+			     (void __user *)secs_hva,
+			     vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, &trapnr);
+
+	if (ret == -EFAULT)
+		return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr);
+
+	rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_SF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_OF);
+	if (ret)
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	else
+		rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
 static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf)
 {
 	if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
@@ -292,6 +345,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	} else {
 		if (leaf == ECREATE)
 			return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu);
+		if (leaf == EINIT)
+			return handle_encls_einit(vcpu);
 		WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf);
 		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
 		vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS;
-- 
2.29.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-08 11:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-08 10:53 [RFC PATCH v4 00/26] KVM SGX virtualization support Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Kai Huang
2021-02-09 16:11   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() Kai Huang
2021-02-09 16:18   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-09 18:26     ` Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code Kai Huang
2021-02-09 16:24   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-09 16:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-09 16:52       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-09 17:07         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-09 21:03           ` Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Kai Huang
2021-02-09 21:18   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-09 21:19     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-09 21:36       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-10  0:20         ` Kai Huang
2021-02-10 16:52           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-10 23:12             ` Kai Huang
2021-02-12 12:17             ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests' Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-13 13:33               ` Kai Huang
2021-02-12 12:15           ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-12 12:14         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/26] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/26] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/26] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/26] x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/26] x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/26] x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/26] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/26] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/26] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union Kai Huang
2021-02-08 11:11   ` Kai Huang
2021-02-08 14:39     ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-02-09  0:09       ` Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/26] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/26] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features Kai Huang
2021-02-08 11:05   ` Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/26] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/26] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/26] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/26] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/26] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:55 ` Kai Huang [this message]
2021-02-08 10:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/26] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Kai Huang
2021-02-08 10:56 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/26] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Kai Huang

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