From: "Xing, Cedric" <email@example.com> To: Casey Schaufler <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Stephen Smalley <email@example.com> Cc: "firstname.lastname@example.org" <email@example.com>, "firstname.lastname@example.org" <email@example.com>, "firstname.lastname@example.org" <email@example.com>, "Schaufler, Casey" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Christopherson, Sean J" <email@example.com> Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2019 07:42:06 +0000 Message-ID: <960B34DE67B9E140824F1DCDEC400C0F6551DBF7@ORSMSX116.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <firstname.lastname@example.org> > From: Casey Schaufler [mailto:email@example.com] > Sent: Monday, July 1, 2019 4:12 PM > > On 7/1/2019 2:45 PM, Xing, Cedric wrote: > >> From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:linux-sgx- > >> email@example.com] On Behalf Of Casey Schaufler > >> Sent: Monday, July 01, 2019 12:54 PM > >>> If you understand the purpose, > >> The purpose is to support the SGX hardware, is it not? > >> If you don't have SGX hardware (e.g. MIPS, ARM, s390) you don't need > >> this code. > > No, it is NOT to support SGX > > Then what *is* it for? > > > - i.e. SGX doesn't require this piece of code to work. > > > > And as Dr. Greg pointed out, it can be used for other TEEs than SGX. > > That sure makes it sound like it's for SGX to me. I meant it is generic and potentially useful to more TEEs but so far useful to SGX, which is the first technology that uses this infrastructure. I hope that makes more sense. > > > It doesn't contain SGX h/w specifics. > > I never said it did. But no one ever suggested doing anything > here before SGX, and your subject line: > > "x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks" > > says it does. Yes. And in the commit message I also stated that the need for such tracking structure is due to the unique lifespan of enclave pages. Hence this infrastructure will also be useful for other TEEs whose pages share the same lifespan. > > > It is compiled out because there's no module calling it on other architectures today. > But it doesn't conflict with any h/w and may be useful (for other TEEs) on other > architectures in future. > > > >>> then why are you objecting the lsm_ prefix as they are APIs to be used > >> by all LSM modules? > >> > >> We name interfaces based on what they provide, not who consumes them. > >> As your code provides enclave services, that is how they should be named. > >> > >>> Or what should be the prefix in your mind? > >> I'm pretty sure that I've consistently suggested "enclave". > >> > >>> Or what kind of APIs do you think can qualify the lsm_ prefix? > >> Code that implements the LSM infrastructure. There is one LSM blob > >> allocation interface, lsm_inode_alloc(), that is used in early set-up > >> that is exported. As I've mentioned more than once, enclave/page > >> management is not an LSM infrastructure function, it's a memory > >> management function. > > It doesn't manage anything. > > Sorry, "memory management" as in all that stuff around pages and > TLBs and who gets what pages, as opposed to keeping track of anything > on its own. > > > The reason it appears in the infrastructure is because the decision of inserting an EMA > depends on the decisions from *all* active LSMs. > > You have not been listening. Most LSMs use VFS. We haven't rolled VFS > functions into the LSM infrastructure. > > > That is NOT new either, as you can see it in security_file_permission() and > security_vm_enough_memory_mm(), both do something after all LSM modules make their > decisions. > > Did you look to see what it is they're doing? If you had, > you would see that is nothing like what you're proposing. I feel like we are talking about different things. I said those hooks did more than just calling registered hooks. And security_enclave_load() is similar to them, also for a similar reason - something needs to be done after *all* LSM modules make their decisions. I'm not sure what you are talking about. > > > > Would you please explain why you don't see those as problems but calling EMA functions > in security_enclave_load() is a problem? > > The enclave code should be calling security_enclave_load(), > not the other way around. That assumes you're using the naming > convention correctly. Yes. The enclave code (SGX driver) calls security_enclave_load/init. Never the other way around. Again, EMA code is similar to auditing code. It is supposed to be called by LSM modules. > > security_vm_enough_memory_mm() was discussed at length and there > wasn't a clean way to get the logic right without putting the code > here. security_file_permission() has the fs_notify_perm call for > similar reasons. Neither is anything like what you're suggesting. Guess we are discussing "at length" right now on how to get the logic right. I'm not sure why "neither is anything like what I'm suggesting". > > > >>> And I'd like to clarify that it doesn't break anything, but is just a > >> bit different, in that security_enclave_load() and security_file_free() > >> call into those APIs. > >> > >> There should be nothing in security_enclave_load() except calls to the > >> enclave_load() hooks (e.g. selinux_enclave_load()). There should be > >> nothing in security_file_free() except file blob management calls to the > >> file_free() hooks (e.g. apparmor_file_free()). > > As above, there are examples in security/security.c where the hook does more than just > calling registered hooks from LSMs. > > And as I've said, that doesn't matter. You're still going about > using the LSM infrastructure backwards. > > >>> But there's a need for them because otherwise code/data would have to > >>> be duplicated among LSMs > >> There's plenty of code duplication among the LSMs, because a lot of what > >> they do is the same thing. Someday there may be an effort to address > >> some of that, but I don't think it's on anybody's radar. > >> As for data duplication, there's a reason we use lots of pointers. > > As stated above, security_enclave_load() needs to do something extra after all LSMs make > their decisions. How can pointers help here? > > I can explain it, but you clearly have no interest in doing > anything to make your code fit into the system. I have a lot > of other things to be doing. I'm so interested in getting things fit. Just that what I see fit doesn't seem fit from your perspective. > > >>> and the logic would be harder to comprehend. > >> Keeping the layering clean is critical to comprehension. > >> There's a lot of VFS code that could have been implemented within the > >> LSM infrastructure, but I don't think that anyone would argue that it > >> should have been. > >> > >>> So that's a trade-off. > >> I remain completely unconvinced that your proposal represents a good way > >> to implement you scheme. > >> > >>> Then what's the practical drawback of doing that? > >> Name space pollution. > > Alright, I can fix the names. > > Good! > > > >> Layering violation. > > Not sure what you are referring to. > > The only places where the blob freed by security_file_free() > may be allocated is security_file_alloc(). The security modules > are welcome to do anything they like in addition, provided > they clean up after themselves in their file_free() hooks. Exactly! Like I said, allocation could happen in security_file_alloc() but I did it in security_enclave_load() to avoid unnecessary allocation for non-enclaves. I know "security" looks close to "selinux" but I beg your attention in the function names. Whatever allocated inside SELinux *never* gets freed by the infrastructure, except those implicit allocations due to EMA splits. > > If SELinux wants to support controls on enclave information, > and that requires additional data, SELinux should include > space in its file blob for that information, or a pointer to > the place where the enclave code is maintaining it. > > That's the way audit works. I have to repeat myself. This was what v1 does. The drawback is, there could be multiple LSMs active at the same time. And an EMA is inserted iff *all* LSMs have approved it. Thus the actual insertion is now done at the end of security_enclave_load(). That makes the logic clear and less error prone, and saves code that'd be duplicated into multiple LSMs otherwise. And that's why I cited security_file_permission()/security_vm_enough_memory() as precedence to security_enclave_load(). > > > If you are referring to buffers allocated in one layer and freed in elsewhere, you have > got the code wrong. Buffers allocated in security_enclave_load() is freed in > security_file_free(). > > It's up to the security module's file_free() to clean up anything that > wasn't allocated in security_file_free(). Interested security modules > should call enclave_load(), and put the information into their portion > of the security blob. The module specific code can call enclave_file_free(), > or whatever interface you want to provide, to clean up. That might take > place in file_free(), but it also might be elsewhere. Would you please take a closer look at my code? Whatever I added to SELinux did *not* allocate anything! Or are you talking about something else? > > > > Whatever else allocated in LSMs are not seen or taken care of by the infrastructure. The > purpose of allocating EMAs in enclave_load() is trying to minimize overhead for non- > enclave files, otherwise it could be done in file_alloc() to be more "paired" with > file_free(). But I don't see it necessary. > > Try looking at maintaining what you've put into the LSM code as > a separate entity. It makes it simpler. Really. It is already a separate entity. It has its own header and own C file. > > >> Architecture specific implementation detail in a general infrastructure. > > Stated earlier, it doesn't contain any h/w specifics but just a TEE abstraction. > > Then put it in the TEE system. It's LSM's abstraction of TEE - i.e., it tracks what matters to LSM only. TEE doesn't care. It just provides information and asks for a decision at return. That's how LSM works. > > > It could be left on all the time or controlled by a different config macro. > > True in any case. > > > It is contingent to CONFIG_INTEL_SGX just for convenience, as SGX is the first (and only > so far) TEE that needs attention from LSM, but there could be more in future. > > All the more reason to keep it separate. These things never get simpler > when they get more generalized. I have a hard time understanding what you mean by "separate". > > >>> If no, why would we want to pay for the cost for not doing that? > >> Modularity and maintainability come directly to mind. > > Putting it elsewhere will incur more maintenance cost. > > I don't believe that for a second. 40 years of C programming > have taught me that trying to do multiple things in one place > is always a bad idea. Agreed. I'm doing only one thing. > > > >>>> ... and the notion that you allocate data for one blob that gets > >>>> freed relative to another breaks the data management model. > >>> What do you mean here? > >> You're freeing the EMA data from security_file_free(). > >> If selinux wants to free EMA data it has allocated in > >> selinux_enclave_load() in selinux_file_free() that's fine, but the LSM > >> infrastructure has no need to know about it. > >> EMA needs to manage its own data, just like VFS does. > >> The LSM infrastructure provides blob management so that the security > >> modules can extend data if they want to. > > You've got the code wrong. selinux_enclave_load() doesn't allocate any memory. > selinux_file_mprotect() may, due to EMA split. But that's transparent to all LSMs. > > ... and the LSM infrastructure doesn't care and > must not be made to care. It's all up to SELinux. It doesn't care the decisions. But it assists in maintaining information on which decisions (from multiple LSMs) are based. > > > The LSM infrastructure doesn't know anything about what LSM modules do, nor does it > manage any buffers allocated by any LSM modules. > > Right, which is why putting your lsm_ema_blob is wrong, and why > forcing into the file blob is wrong. lsm_ema_blob is NOT part of file blob. > > > EMA is currently managing its own data. What's needed is the trigger - to let EMA know > when to update its states. The trigger could be placed in LSM infrastructure or inside > individual LSMs. > > Yes. The latter. > > > The reason to put it in the infrastructure, is that it depends on the decision of *all* > LSMs whether to insert a new EMA. > > That's basic stacking behavior. "Bail on fail", which says that once > denial is detected, you're done. Who does the insertion on success, if not the LSM infrastructure? This is again similar to security_file_permission/security_vm_enough_memory. The last step is done by the infrastructure on success. > > > That's similar to vm_enough_memory() where the final __vm_enough_memory() call is made > by the infrastructure but not individual LSMs. > > Do you really understand the painful reasons that case is required? > And if so, why you aren't taking steps to avoid them? I think I've run into the same painful reasons. Honestly, I tried not to do anything more than just a call_int_hooks. But I realized that'd make thing much more complicated and error prone in multiple-active-LSM cases. So I think I've run into the same painful reasons. And I don't see any actionable suggestions from you so far. > > > >>> EMA blobs are allocated/freed *not* relative to any other blobs. > >> In the code you proposed they are freed in security_file_free(). > >> That is for file blob management. > > Yes. EMA contributes to the file blob. But it only frees memory allocated by the > infrastructure itself, not anything from any LSM modules. > > That's not the way it's supposed to be done. The module tells > the infrastructure what it needs, which may include space for > EMA data. The module asks EMA for the data it needs and stuffs > it somewhere, and the file blob is a fine choice. The module > cleans up in file_free, or at any time before that. If no module > uses EMA, nothing goes in the blob. If two modules use EMA each > is responsible for the data it uses, which may be the same or > may be different. > > I've looked at your code. Making it work the way it should would > not be difficult and would likely simplify a bunch of it. Guess this discussion will never end if we don't get into code. Guess it'd be more productive to talk over phone then come back to this thread with a conclusion. Will that be ok with you?
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-06-19 22:23 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting Sean Christopherson 2019-06-20 21:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-08 14:57 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-09 16:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson 2019-06-20 21:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-20 22:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson 2019-06-20 21:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 1:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-21 1:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-21 16:42 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-08 16:34 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-08 17:29 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-01 19:22 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 1:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-07 19:03 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 1:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 2:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-21 16:54 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-25 20:48 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-27 20:29 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-07 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 17:09 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-25 21:05 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-27 20:26 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-25 20:19 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-26 12:49 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 17:05 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-25 21:01 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-25 21:49 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-27 19:38 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 21:22 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-25 21:09 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-27 20:19 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-28 16:16 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-28 21:20 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-29 1:15 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-07-01 18:14 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-29 23:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-01 17:46 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 17:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-01 18:54 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 19:03 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 19:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-01 20:03 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-07 18:46 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-25 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson 2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 17:18 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-08 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-21 1:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing 2019-07-03 23:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-03 23:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-03 23:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-06 5:04 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-08 14:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] " Cedric Xing 2019-07-08 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-08 17:49 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-08 18:49 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-08 22:26 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing 2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing 2019-07-09 1:03 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module Cedric Xing 2019-07-08 16:26 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-08 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-08 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-09 22:13 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-10 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-10 0:55 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-10 21:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-11 13:51 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-07-11 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-11 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-07-11 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-11 16:32 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-07-11 23:41 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing 2019-07-09 1:33 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-09 21:26 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-10 15:49 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-10 16:08 ` Jethro Beekman 2019-07-10 18:16 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-10 17:54 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing 2019-06-27 22:06 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-06-27 22:52 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-27 23:37 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-06-28 0:47 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-28 17:22 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-06-28 22:29 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-29 1:37 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-29 21:35 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-01 17:57 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 19:53 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-01 21:45 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 23:11 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-02 7:42 ` Xing, Cedric [this message] 2019-07-02 15:44 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-03 9:46 ` Dr. Greg 2019-07-03 15:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-07 13:30 ` Dr. Greg 2019-07-09 0:02 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-07-09 1:52 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-09 21:16 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-11 10:22 ` Dr. Greg 2019-07-15 22:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-28 16:37 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-28 21:53 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-29 1:22 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-07-01 18:02 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-29 23:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-01 17:11 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-01 18:31 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-01 19:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-01 19:56 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-02 2:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-07-02 6:35 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing 2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing 2019-07-05 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-08 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-08 17:33 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-09 16:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-09 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-09 20:41 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-09 22:25 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-09 23:11 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-10 16:57 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-10 20:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-10 20:31 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-07-11 9:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-10 22:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-10 22:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-10 23:16 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-11 9:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-11 14:32 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-07-11 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-07-12 0:08 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-10 1:28 ` Dr. Greg 2019-07-10 2:04 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-07-10 3:21 ` Jethro Beekman
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