messages from 2019-04-23 19:31:58 to 2019-06-03 18:39:05 UTC [more...]
[RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
2019-06-03 18:38 UTC (26+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release()
` [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
` [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
` [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
` [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE
` [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
` [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
` [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
` [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
[PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
2019-06-03 9:12 UTC (203+ messages)
` [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
` [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
` SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
` [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on "
` [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] selftests/x86: Fixed Makefile for SGX selftest
` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
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