messages from 2019-06-03 14:19:58 to 2019-06-18 15:42:01 UTC [more...]
[RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
2019-06-18 15:40 UTC (67+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
` [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add "
` [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
` [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem
[RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3
2019-06-18 15:13 UTC (20+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
` [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
` [RFC PATCH v3 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack
` [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
` [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
` [RFC PATCH v3 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
` [RFC PATCH v3 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
` [RFC PATCH v3 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX
` [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
` [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
` [RFC PATCH v3 11/12] security/apparmor: "
` [RFC PATCH v3 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG
[PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Check that the address is within ELRANGE
2019-06-17 22:30 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
2019-06-17 16:52 UTC (4+ messages)
[RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
2019-06-14 15:18 UTC (73+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release()
` [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
` [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
` [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
` [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE
` [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
` [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
` [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
` [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
[PATCH 0/7] x86/sgx: Clean up and enhance add pages ioctl
2019-06-13 19:45 UTC (33+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/7] x86/sgx: Remove dead code to handle non-existent IOR ioctl
` [PATCH 2/7] x86/sgx: Remove unnecessary @cmd parameter from ioctl helpers
` [PATCH 3/7] x86/sgx: Let ioctl helpers do copy to/from user
` [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
` [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
` [PATCH 6/7] x86/sgx: Use the actual zero page as the source when adding zero pages
` [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
[PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
2019-06-06 15:32 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
2019-06-04 11:39 UTC (25+ messages)
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