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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
	haitao.huang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] x86/sgx: Do not free backing memory on ENCLS[ELDU] failure
Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 13:26:15 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YnuPR3OW7xdEXnVF@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bb918c317ebb96768365b38f00239013b67ad607.camel@intel.com>

On Tue, May 10, 2022 at 12:36:19PM +1200, Kai Huang wrote:
> On Mon, 2022-05-09 at 10:17 -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> > Hi Jarkko,
> > 
> > On 5/7/2022 10:25 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 28, 2022 at 04:49:00PM -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> > > > > I also looked a little deeper at this transient failure problem.  The
> > > > > ELDU documentation also mentions a possible error code of:
> > > > > 
> > > > > 	SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT
> > > > > 
> > > > > It *looks* like there can be conflicts on the SECS page as well as the
> > > > > EPC page being explicitly accessed.  Is that a possible problem here?
> > > > 
> > > > I went down this path myself. SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT is an error code
> > > > supported by newer ELDUC - the ELDU used in current code would indeed
> > > > #GP in this case. The SDM text describing ELDUC as "This leaf function
> > > > behaves like ELDU but with improved conflict handling for oversubscription"
> > > > really does seem relevant to the test that triggers this issue.
> > > > 
> > > > I stopped pursuing this because from what I understand if
> > > > SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT is encountered with commit 08999b2489b4 ("x86/sgx:
> > > > Free backing memory after faulting the enclave page") then it should
> > > > also be encountered without it. The issue is not present with
> > > > 08999b2489b4 ("x86/sgx: Free backing memory after faulting the
> > > > enclave page") removed. I am thus currently investigating based on
> > > > the assumption that the #GP is encountered because of MAC
> > > > verification problem. I may be wrong here also and need more information
> > > > since the SDM documents two seemingly related errors:
> > > > #GP(0) -> If the instruction fails to verify MAC.
> > > > SGX_MAC_COMPARE_FAIL -> If the MAC check fails.
> > > 
> > > This part puzzles me in the pseudo-code.
> > > 
> > > The version is read first:
> > > 
> > > TMP_VER := DS:RDX[63:0]; 
> > > 
> > > Then there's MAC calculation, comparison,  and finally this check:
> > > 
> > > (* Check version before committing *)
> > > IF (DS:RDX ≠ 0) 
> > >         THEN #GP(0); 
> > > ELSE
> > >         DS:RDX := TMP_VER;
> > > FI; 
> > > 
> > > For me it is a mystery what does zero the slot and in what condition
> > > it would be non-zero. Perhaps the #GP refers anyway to this check?
> > 
> > RDX contains the VA slot information and that appears to be correct
> > in these scenarios. The issue is the PCMD data pointed to by the
> > PAGEINFO.PCMD (link to PAGEINFO found in RBX) is all zeroes.
> > 
> > There are two scenarios under which the PCMD data could be zeroes. They
> > are documented in:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/8157fa40-8d02-8819-e1b6-fd2d8863fb56@intel.com/
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/da387afc-e666-45d0-1e99-066d8c4aab03@intel.com/
> > 
> > I understand that context may be lost by pointing you to various emails
> > in this thread - I'll wrap up all learnings when I submit the new version
> > of this series today.
> > 
> 
> Hi Reinette,
> 
> Regardless the root cause of this problem, I agree with Jarkko above pseudo-code
> in the spec is quite confusing.  I can try to get it clarified from Intel
> internally if you want.
 
It is :-) Yeah, it would be great if it could be made a bit more punctual!

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-11 10:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-28 20:11 [RFC PATCH 0/4] SGX shmem backing store issue Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] x86/sgx: Do not free backing memory on ENCLS[ELDU] failure Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:30   ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:20     ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 22:53       ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 23:49         ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-03  2:01           ` Kai Huang
2022-05-07 17:25           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-09 17:17             ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-10  0:36               ` Kai Huang
2022-05-11 10:26                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-05-11 18:29                   ` Haitao Huang
2022-05-11 22:00                     ` Kai Huang
2022-05-12 21:14                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-06 22:09     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] x86/sgx: Set dirty bit after modifying page contents Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:40   ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:41     ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-06 22:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-06 22:40     ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-07 18:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/sgx: Obtain backing storage page with enclave mutex held Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:58   ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:44     ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-06 22:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 20:11 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] x86/sgx: Do not allocate backing pages when loading from backing store Reinette Chatre
2022-04-28 21:12 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] SGX shmem backing store issue Dave Hansen
2022-04-29 18:50   ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-29 19:45     ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-30  3:22       ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-30 15:52         ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-02 14:36         ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-02 17:11           ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-02 21:33             ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-04 22:13               ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04 22:58                 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-04 23:36                   ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04 23:50                     ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-05  0:08                       ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04 23:05                 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-07 17:46               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-07 17:48                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-09 17:09                   ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-10 22:28                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-11 17:23                       ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-12 14:10                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-28 21:29 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-28 22:20   ` Reinette Chatre
2022-05-04  6:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-05  6:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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