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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
	"linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] x86/sgx: Validate TCS permssions in sgx_validate_secinfo()
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 19:46:54 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fa7ef5b767298ac19857d8342a8eca65e31eb843.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <88B7642769729B409B4A93D7C5E0C5E7C661E7A7@hasmsx108.ger.corp.intel.com>

On Thu, 2019-08-22 at 11:33 +0000, Ayoun, Serge wrote:
> Also replying to Sean.
> Sean is right that never mind the value in secsinfo->flags, HW will reset RWX
> For TCS pages.
> So basically you may not enforce and and could not check those but... The signature depends
> On those flags, so if you put a non-zero flag value, eadd will pass but if you
> compute the signature according to this non zero value then you will have
> a delta between ur signature and HW's signature: einit will fail.
> So this is tricky and more a usability issue.
> I vote for checking the flag is zeroed.

As I responded to Sean that as long as the ioctl does not adjust
prot bits I'm cool with any sane solution. What do you think of
requiring at minimum RW?

Doing that kind of adjusting is just doing fixup's for corrupted
data from the user space.

/Jarkko


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-22 16:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-19 15:25 [PATCH 0/5] x86/sgx: Improve permission handing Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-19 15:25 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/sgx: Document permission handling better Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22  3:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-22 16:04     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-19 15:25 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/sgx: Use memchr_inv() in sgx_validate_secinfo() Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22  3:47   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-22 16:20     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-19 15:25 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/sgx: Make sgx_validate_secinfo() more readable Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22  3:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-22 16:26     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22 10:39   ` Ayoun, Serge
2019-08-22 16:45     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-19 15:25 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/sgx: Validate TCS permssions in sgx_validate_secinfo() Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-21 18:45   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22 11:33     ` Ayoun, Serge
2019-08-22 14:27       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-22 16:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-08-22 16:59         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22  3:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-22 16:31     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22 16:34       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-23  0:39         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-23  0:57           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-23  2:05             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-23 13:41               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22 16:38       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-19 15:25 ` [PATCH 5/5] x86/sgx: Rename vm_prot_bits as max_vm_flags Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-22  4:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-22 16:43     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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