From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com,
chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com,
cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
haitao.huang@intel.com, josh@joshtriplett.org,
kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com,
ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com,
npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v36 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2020 14:16:14 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <m2364zsyn5.fsf@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200716135303.276442-4-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
On Thursday, 2020-07-16 at 16:52:42 +03, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>
> Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when
> a #PF with SGX set happens.
>
> CPU throws a #PF with the SGX set in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map
> (EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the
> properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software
> entities, which SGX hosts. [1]
>
> Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent
> malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for
> legit reasons.
>
> All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient key
> that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows
> user space software to react when this happens (e.g. recreate the enclave,
> which was invalidated).
>
> [1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)
>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 14 ++++++++------
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> index 714b1a30e7b0..4446f95ad997 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> @@ -44,12 +44,13 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
> /*
> * Page fault error code bits:
> *
> - * bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault
> - * bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access
> - * bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access
> - * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
> - * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
> - * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
> + * bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault
> + * bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access
> + * bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access
> + * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
> + * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
> + * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
> + * bit 15 == 1: inside SGX enclave
> */
> enum x86_pf_error_code {
> X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0,
> @@ -58,5 +59,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
> X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
> X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
> X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
> + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15,
> };
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> index 1ead568c0101..1db6fbd7af8e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -1055,6 +1055,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
> return 1;
>
> + /*
> + * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
> + * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
> + * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
> + * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
> + * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
> + * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
> + * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
> + * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
> + */
> + if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX))
> + return 1;
> +
> /*
> * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform
> * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
> --
> 2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-06 17:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-16 13:52 [PATCH v36 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:13 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:14 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:16 ` Darren Kenny [this message]
2020-08-20 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 17:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 04/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:14 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 05/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-07 9:37 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 06/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:17 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:18 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 08/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:27 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 09/24] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:29 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:35 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:59 ` Darren Kenny
2020-08-25 16:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-26 13:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 15:40 ` Darren Kenny
2020-08-26 14:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-27 13:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-27 16:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-28 23:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-29 0:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-01 16:41 ` Haitao Huang
2020-09-04 11:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 16:29 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 16:40 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 15/24] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 17:00 ` Darren Kenny
2020-08-18 13:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 16/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 17/24] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 14:55 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-10 22:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-11 7:16 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-08-11 14:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-18 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-18 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-18 15:15 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-18 16:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-19 13:33 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-19 14:00 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-08-19 21:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-10 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-10 23:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-11 0:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-11 15:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-13 19:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-17 13:12 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-17 15:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-18 15:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-20 0:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-18 14:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 22/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-27 4:47 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-27 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-28 23:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-28 21:35 ` Pavel Machek
2020-08-06 10:21 ` Dr. Greg
2020-08-08 22:18 ` Pavel Machek
2020-08-19 20:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
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