From: "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Jethro Beekman" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"Chunyang Hui" <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>,
"Jordan Hand" <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Nathaniel McCallum" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
"Seth Moore" <sethmo@google.com>,
"Darren Kenny" <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
"Suresh Siddha" <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com,
chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com,
cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
haitao.huang@intel.com, josh@joshtriplett.org,
kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com,
ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com,
puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
yaozhangx@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 21:56:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <op.0qwyftihwjvjmi@mqcpg7oapc828.gar.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200911124019.42178-14-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 07:40:08 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
...
> +/**
> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for
> %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
> + * @encl: an enclave pointer
> + * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
> + *
> + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally
> extend the
> + * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and
> measurement mask
> + * are applied to all pages.
> + *
> + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions
> because
> + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a
> mismatch in
> + * the measurement.
> + *
> + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For
> each page
> + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
> + * heuristics:
> + *
> + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO
> permissions.
> + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
> + *
> + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum
> protection bits
> + * within the given address range.
> + *
> + * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been
> invalidated.
> + * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to
> the
> + * caller.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * length of the data processed on success,
> + * -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec
> partition,
> + * -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
> + * -errno otherwise
> + */
> +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void
> __user *arg)
> +{
> + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
> + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> + unsigned long c;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if ((atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) ||
> + !(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> + !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
> + sizeof(secinfo)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> + if (c == SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH || signal_pending(current)) {
> + ret = c;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (need_resched())
> + cond_resched();
> +
> + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
> + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
no need passing addp.length - c?
> + if (ret)
> + break;
Some error cases here are fatal and should be passed back to user space so
that it would not retry.
> + }
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp)))
> + return -EFAULT;
This copy no longer needed?
> + return c;
> +}
> +
Thanks
Haitao
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-14 2:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20200911124019.42178-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2020-09-11 12:39 ` [PATCH v37 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-14 15:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-14 15:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-14 16:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 9:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 13:27 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-15 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-15 14:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-15 14:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-16 16:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-16 16:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-16 16:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-16 15:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:39 ` [PATCH v37 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:39 ` [PATCH v37 04/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 05/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 06/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-14 2:56 ` Haitao Huang [this message]
2020-09-15 9:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 10:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 14:49 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-16 16:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 15/24] x86/sgx: Enable provisioning for remote attestation Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 16/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 22/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-11 12:40 ` [PATCH v37 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
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