linux-sh.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
To: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
	Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] sh: Add SECCOMP_FILTER
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2020 15:50:25 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200828155024.GX3265@brightrain.aerifal.cx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200722231322.419642-3-kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de>

On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 01:13:21AM +0200, Michael Karcher wrote:
> Port sh to use the new SECCOMP_FILTER code.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de>
> ---
>  arch/sh/Kconfig                               | 1 +
>  arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S                 | 2 ++
>  arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c                    | 5 +++--
>  tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 +++++++-
>  4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig
> index 32d959849df9..10b510c16841 100644
> --- a/arch/sh/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ config SUPERH
>  	select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
>  	select GUP_GET_PTE_LOW_HIGH if X2TLB
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
> +	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
>  	select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
> diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S
> index c4d88d61890d..ad963104d22d 100644
> --- a/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S
> +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S
> @@ -368,6 +368,8 @@ syscall_trace_entry:
>  	mov.l	7f, r11		! Call do_syscall_trace_enter which notifies
>  	jsr	@r11	    	! superior (will chomp R[0-7])
>  	 nop
> +	cmp/eq	#-1, r0
> +	bt	syscall_exit
>  	mov.l	r0, @(OFF_R0,r15)	! Save return value
>  	!			Reload R0-R4 from kernel stack, where the
>  	!   	    	    	parent may have modified them using
> diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
> index 64bfb714943e..25ccfbd02bfa 100644
> --- a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
> +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
> @@ -485,8 +485,6 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
>  	long ret = 0;
>  
> -	secure_computing_strict(regs->regs[0]);
> -
>  	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
>  	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
>  		/*
> @@ -496,6 +494,9 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  		 */
>  		ret = -1L;
>  
> +	if (secure_computing() = -1)
> +		return -1;
> +
>  	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
>  		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[0]);
>  

This patch broke strace - it spews out bogus syscalls and gets the
tracee hung. I suspect the last hunk is wrong and breaks all
non-seccomp tracing. I'll follow up with further analysis and possibly
a fix if you don't find one sooner.

Rich

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-08-28 15:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-22 23:13 [PATCH 1/4] sh: Fix validation of system call number Michael Karcher
2020-07-22 23:13 ` [PATCH 2/4] sh: Rearrange blocks in entry-common.S Michael Karcher
2020-07-22 23:20   ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-07-22 23:13 ` [PATCH 3/4] sh: Add SECCOMP_FILTER Michael Karcher
2020-07-22 23:20   ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-08-28 15:50   ` Rich Felker [this message]
2020-08-28 16:21     ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-08-28 16:30     ` Rich Felker
2020-08-28 16:38       ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-08-28 17:03         ` Rich Felker
2020-08-29  0:49           ` Rich Felker
2020-08-29 11:09             ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-09-03  3:56               ` Rich Felker
2020-09-03  5:46                 ` Rich Felker
2020-09-03  6:04                   ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-09-03  6:17                     ` Rich Felker
2020-09-03  6:03                 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-07-22 23:13 ` [PATCH 4/4] sh: bring syscall_set_return_value in line with other architectures Michael Karcher
2020-07-22 23:20   ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-07-22 23:19 ` [PATCH 1/4] sh: Fix validation of system call number John Paul Adrian Glaubitz

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200828155024.GX3265@brightrain.aerifal.cx \
    --to=dalias@libc.org \
    --cc=glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de \
    --cc=kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-sh@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=ysato@users.sourceforge.jp \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).